Tegegnework Gettu
Assistant Secretary General
Director of Regional Bureau for Africa
frmr Chief (deal maker) of Staff of Kemal Dervis
Would his secrets deals affect Helen Clark ?
Should she be worried ?
coming soon........
Showing posts with label gettu. Show all posts
Showing posts with label gettu. Show all posts
Saturday, October 22, 2011
Tuesday, June 17, 2008
NO! NOT ANOTHER UNDP SCANDAL IN THE HORN OF AFRICA!
By Jerry Okungu
Hargeisa, Somaliland
June 16, 2008
A few weeks before Kenya’s elections, in mid October 2007 to be precise, this author caught a UNDP vehicle based in Nairobi distributing hate leaflets targeting Raila Odinga, the then main challenger to Mwai Kibaki in Dagoretti Corner of Nairobi.
This muddy Saturday afternoon, a Volvo with UN registration looked stuck in the mud.
As he drove by after getting a tip from some young men, he stopped to find out what the UN vehicle was doing in that God-forsaken place so late in the evening on a Saturday afternoon bearing in mind that most UN offices close down on Friday midday.
When he moved closer, he found two young men seated comfortably distributing Raila Odinga’s alleged version of his MoU with the Muslim community. That document was as damaging as it possibly could. It talked of Raila in future introducing Sharia law in Kenya and turning Kenya into an Islamic state.
It talked of every major wish list a Muslim would have of a perfect Islamic state. It left it in no one’s mind that Christians and other religious groups would be in deep trouble should Raila Odinga’s ODM win the elections. For all intents and purposes, this document was meant to instill fear in Americans, the British and any other power that would abhor another Islamic state in the Horn of Africa.
After getting a copy of this seditious document, this author took the picture of the vehicle and sent it to all the newsrooms in Nairobi with a caption “Is the UN involved in Kenya’s local political campaign?”
Of all the newsrooms that received the damaging picture, only the Nairobi Star used the story and the picture and followed it up with the UN in Gigiri. The vehicle was traced to the UNDP in Gigiri and after that there was a general stone-walling on how it got involved in the murky waters of Kenyan elections.
Soon after the elections, news leaked that top ranking officials of UNDP in Nairobi together with the then World Bank Director, Collin Bruce had secretly endorsed the flawed elections that caused over two thousand lives and hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons.
Since then, Collin Bruce has been recalled to Washington while the fate of top UNDP officials in Nairobi still remains a mystery after the Chief UN official in Nairobi called a press conference to dissociate herself from the purported endorsement of Kenya’s election results.
As the war raged in the streets of Kenya with Kofi Annan in town to resolve the dispute, a UN official in the Communications department met me by accident at the Serena Hotel. On being introduced to him by his brother, he just fell short of punching me on the face when he was told I was the Jerry Okungu who had filed the UNDP- story and picture of the UN vehicle!
This week, as I was busy going through the newspapers in Somaliland, I came across this article in the Somaliland Times which incidentally was filed from Nairobi in mid May 2008 accusing UNDP of involvement with the Islamic Courts in Somalia! Is this a coincidence or a well orchestrated UNDP network in Africa to meddle in the politics of the regions? Can some UN official clear the air?
Read on a make your own conclusions.
“Nairobi, May 17, 2008 –
A former employee of the UNDP has reportedly accused the agency of involvement with and support to a remittance company linked to the ousted Union of Islamic Courts. This support, according to Ismail Ahmed, included intervening to help the company, Dalsan win U.S. licenses and unfreezing funds blocked in Switzerland on suspicion of money laundering and terrorist financing.
Dalsan was the remittance company which was being headed by Abdilkadir Hashi Ayro, younger brother to Aden Hashi Ayro, leader of the Al-Shabbab who was killed during a US air raid early this month. Two years ago, the remittance company is said to have collapsed and suffered a loss of about $30,000,000.
Ahmed, who worked for UNDP from 2005 and 2007, provided a detailed dossier to Reuters also accused the UN agency of terminating his contract and taking retaliatory measures against him.
A Washington-based Government Accountability Project supported Ahmed's account. Shelley Walden, international programme associate at the non-profit group, told Reuters that the UNDP had turned a blind eye to wrongdoing and damaged its credibility.
UNDP spokesman Stephane Dujarric said: "Clearly UNDP takes all these allegations extremely seriously and we are in fact investigating them thoroughly."
He said the agency's Office of Audit and Investigations had already produced a report on the alleged retaliation for Ahmed's whistle blowing. Its new ethics adviser, who began work on December 1, would review the report and decide what action to take.
Dujarric however refrained from commenting on specific allegations.
"We're going at this with a very open mind. What we will find, we will find...I can't prejudge what the investigation team will find," he told Reuters.
Dalsan, according to some expert accounts was either the largest or the second-largest Somali money-wiring company after its competition Al-Barakaat's assets were frozen by US Executive Order immediately after 9/11.
It had offices in US, Great Britain, Kenya, and the United Arab Emirates where its headquarters was based before Abdilkadir moved it to Mogadishu.
"A report by the European Commission's Nairobi-based Somali Unit estimates that at its height in the aftermath of the U.S. actions against Al-Barakaat, Dalsan, which was, rather interestingly, formed in August 2001, was moving at least $100 million a year," according to J. Peter Pham who is the Director of the Nelson Institute for International and Public Affairs.
Pham adds: "In early May 2006, Dalsan folded its operations without warning, taking with it not only the $10 million to $30 million in capital invested by individual shareholders, but an estimated $9 million to $12 million in unconsummated money transfers from ordinary customers.
Company officials – at least those who can be tracked down – have thus far refused to explain the causes of the shutdown, much less elaborate on the fate of the funds entrusted to them."
"A little more detachment, however, raises even greater concerns. Is it yet another coincidence that Dalsan was closely linked with the likes of the Sheikh Osman and Hashi 'Ayro brothers, all of whom were leading figures in the Al-Itihaad precursor of the Islamic Courts militia?
And is it still another mere coincidence that the extremist forces within the ICU received a massive infusion of arms and men in the same month that Dalsan collapsed – reinforcements that tipped the scales in the Islamists' battle with U.S.-backed factions for control of Mogadishu?" Pham asks in his report written in 2006.”
Source: The Reporter, Somaliland Times and Reuters
Nairobi, May 17, 2008 – A former employee of the UNDP has reportedly accused the agency of involvement with and support to a remittance company linked to the ousted Union of Islamic Courts.
A former employee of the UNDP has reportedly accused the agency of involvement with and support to a remittance company linked to the ousted Union of Islamic Courts.
This support, according to Ismail Ahmed, included intervening to help the company Dalsan win U.S. licenses and unfreezing funds blocked in Switzerland on suspicion of money laundering and terrorist financing.
Dalsan was the remittance company which was being headed by Abdilkadir Hashi Ayro, younger brother to Aden Hashi Ayro, leader of the Al-Shabbab who was killed during a US air raid early this month.
Two years ago, the remittance company is said to have collapsed and suffered a loss of about $30,000,000.
Ahmed, who worked for UNDP from 2005 and 2007, provided a detailed dossier to Reuters also accused the UN agency of terminating his contract and taking retaliatory measures against him.
A Washington-based Government Accountability Project supported Ahmed's account. Shelley Walden, international programme associate at the non-profit group, told Reuters that the UNDP had turned a blind eye to wrongdoing and damaged its
credibility.
UNDP spokesman Stephane Dujarric said: "Clearly UNDP takes all these allegations extremely seriously and we are in fact investigating them thoroughly."
He said the agency's Office of Audit and Investigations had already produced a report on the alleged retaliation for Ahmed's whistle blowing. Its new ethics adviser, who began work on December 1, would review the report and decide what action to take.
Dujarric however refrained from commenting on specific allegations.
"We're going at this with a very open mind. What we will find, we will find...I can't prejudge what the investigation team will find," he told Reuters.
Dalsan, according to some expert accounts was either the largest or the second-largest Somali money-wiring company after its competition Al-Barakaat's assets were frozen by US Executive Order immediately after 9/11.
It had offices in US, Great Britain, Kenya, and the United Arab Emirates where its headquarters was based before Abdilkadir
moved it to Mogadishu.
"A report by the European Commission's Nairobi-based Somali Unit estimates that at its height in the aftermath of the U.S. actions against Al-Barakaat, Dalsan, which was, rather interestingly, formed in August 2001, was moving at least $100 million a year," according to J. Peter Pham is Director of the Nelson Institute for International and Public Affairs.
Pham adds: "In early May 2006, Dalsan folded its operations without warning, taking with it not only the $10 million to $30 million in capital invested by individual shareholders, but an estimated $9 million to $12 million in unconsummated money transfers from ordinary customers.
Company officials – at least those who can be tracked down – have thus far refused to explain the causes of the shutdown, much less elaborate on the fate of the funds entrusted to them."
"A little more detachment, however, raises even greater concerns. Is it yet another coincidence that Dalsan was closely linked with the likes of the Sheikh Osman and Hashi 'Ayro brothers, all of whom were leading figures in the Al-Itihaad precursor of the Islamic Courts militia? And is it still another mere coincidence that the extremist forces within the ICU received a massive infusion of arms and men in the same month that Dalsan collapsed – reinforcements that tipped the scales in the
Islamists' battle with U.S.-backed factions for control of Mogadishu?" Pham asks in his report written in 2006.
Source: The Somaliland Times Reporter and Reuters
Hargeisa, Somaliland
June 16, 2008
A few weeks before Kenya’s elections, in mid October 2007 to be precise, this author caught a UNDP vehicle based in Nairobi distributing hate leaflets targeting Raila Odinga, the then main challenger to Mwai Kibaki in Dagoretti Corner of Nairobi.
This muddy Saturday afternoon, a Volvo with UN registration looked stuck in the mud.
As he drove by after getting a tip from some young men, he stopped to find out what the UN vehicle was doing in that God-forsaken place so late in the evening on a Saturday afternoon bearing in mind that most UN offices close down on Friday midday.
When he moved closer, he found two young men seated comfortably distributing Raila Odinga’s alleged version of his MoU with the Muslim community. That document was as damaging as it possibly could. It talked of Raila in future introducing Sharia law in Kenya and turning Kenya into an Islamic state.
It talked of every major wish list a Muslim would have of a perfect Islamic state. It left it in no one’s mind that Christians and other religious groups would be in deep trouble should Raila Odinga’s ODM win the elections. For all intents and purposes, this document was meant to instill fear in Americans, the British and any other power that would abhor another Islamic state in the Horn of Africa.
After getting a copy of this seditious document, this author took the picture of the vehicle and sent it to all the newsrooms in Nairobi with a caption “Is the UN involved in Kenya’s local political campaign?”
Of all the newsrooms that received the damaging picture, only the Nairobi Star used the story and the picture and followed it up with the UN in Gigiri. The vehicle was traced to the UNDP in Gigiri and after that there was a general stone-walling on how it got involved in the murky waters of Kenyan elections.
Soon after the elections, news leaked that top ranking officials of UNDP in Nairobi together with the then World Bank Director, Collin Bruce had secretly endorsed the flawed elections that caused over two thousand lives and hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons.
Since then, Collin Bruce has been recalled to Washington while the fate of top UNDP officials in Nairobi still remains a mystery after the Chief UN official in Nairobi called a press conference to dissociate herself from the purported endorsement of Kenya’s election results.
As the war raged in the streets of Kenya with Kofi Annan in town to resolve the dispute, a UN official in the Communications department met me by accident at the Serena Hotel. On being introduced to him by his brother, he just fell short of punching me on the face when he was told I was the Jerry Okungu who had filed the UNDP- story and picture of the UN vehicle!
This week, as I was busy going through the newspapers in Somaliland, I came across this article in the Somaliland Times which incidentally was filed from Nairobi in mid May 2008 accusing UNDP of involvement with the Islamic Courts in Somalia! Is this a coincidence or a well orchestrated UNDP network in Africa to meddle in the politics of the regions? Can some UN official clear the air?
Read on a make your own conclusions.
“Nairobi, May 17, 2008 –
A former employee of the UNDP has reportedly accused the agency of involvement with and support to a remittance company linked to the ousted Union of Islamic Courts. This support, according to Ismail Ahmed, included intervening to help the company, Dalsan win U.S. licenses and unfreezing funds blocked in Switzerland on suspicion of money laundering and terrorist financing.
Dalsan was the remittance company which was being headed by Abdilkadir Hashi Ayro, younger brother to Aden Hashi Ayro, leader of the Al-Shabbab who was killed during a US air raid early this month. Two years ago, the remittance company is said to have collapsed and suffered a loss of about $30,000,000.
Ahmed, who worked for UNDP from 2005 and 2007, provided a detailed dossier to Reuters also accused the UN agency of terminating his contract and taking retaliatory measures against him.
A Washington-based Government Accountability Project supported Ahmed's account. Shelley Walden, international programme associate at the non-profit group, told Reuters that the UNDP had turned a blind eye to wrongdoing and damaged its credibility.
UNDP spokesman Stephane Dujarric said: "Clearly UNDP takes all these allegations extremely seriously and we are in fact investigating them thoroughly."
He said the agency's Office of Audit and Investigations had already produced a report on the alleged retaliation for Ahmed's whistle blowing. Its new ethics adviser, who began work on December 1, would review the report and decide what action to take.
Dujarric however refrained from commenting on specific allegations.
"We're going at this with a very open mind. What we will find, we will find...I can't prejudge what the investigation team will find," he told Reuters.
Dalsan, according to some expert accounts was either the largest or the second-largest Somali money-wiring company after its competition Al-Barakaat's assets were frozen by US Executive Order immediately after 9/11.
It had offices in US, Great Britain, Kenya, and the United Arab Emirates where its headquarters was based before Abdilkadir moved it to Mogadishu.
"A report by the European Commission's Nairobi-based Somali Unit estimates that at its height in the aftermath of the U.S. actions against Al-Barakaat, Dalsan, which was, rather interestingly, formed in August 2001, was moving at least $100 million a year," according to J. Peter Pham who is the Director of the Nelson Institute for International and Public Affairs.
Pham adds: "In early May 2006, Dalsan folded its operations without warning, taking with it not only the $10 million to $30 million in capital invested by individual shareholders, but an estimated $9 million to $12 million in unconsummated money transfers from ordinary customers.
Company officials – at least those who can be tracked down – have thus far refused to explain the causes of the shutdown, much less elaborate on the fate of the funds entrusted to them."
"A little more detachment, however, raises even greater concerns. Is it yet another coincidence that Dalsan was closely linked with the likes of the Sheikh Osman and Hashi 'Ayro brothers, all of whom were leading figures in the Al-Itihaad precursor of the Islamic Courts militia?
And is it still another mere coincidence that the extremist forces within the ICU received a massive infusion of arms and men in the same month that Dalsan collapsed – reinforcements that tipped the scales in the Islamists' battle with U.S.-backed factions for control of Mogadishu?" Pham asks in his report written in 2006.”
Source: The Reporter, Somaliland Times and Reuters
Nairobi, May 17, 2008 – A former employee of the UNDP has reportedly accused the agency of involvement with and support to a remittance company linked to the ousted Union of Islamic Courts.
A former employee of the UNDP has reportedly accused the agency of involvement with and support to a remittance company linked to the ousted Union of Islamic Courts.
This support, according to Ismail Ahmed, included intervening to help the company Dalsan win U.S. licenses and unfreezing funds blocked in Switzerland on suspicion of money laundering and terrorist financing.
Dalsan was the remittance company which was being headed by Abdilkadir Hashi Ayro, younger brother to Aden Hashi Ayro, leader of the Al-Shabbab who was killed during a US air raid early this month.
Two years ago, the remittance company is said to have collapsed and suffered a loss of about $30,000,000.
Ahmed, who worked for UNDP from 2005 and 2007, provided a detailed dossier to Reuters also accused the UN agency of terminating his contract and taking retaliatory measures against him.
A Washington-based Government Accountability Project supported Ahmed's account. Shelley Walden, international programme associate at the non-profit group, told Reuters that the UNDP had turned a blind eye to wrongdoing and damaged its
credibility.
UNDP spokesman Stephane Dujarric said: "Clearly UNDP takes all these allegations extremely seriously and we are in fact investigating them thoroughly."
He said the agency's Office of Audit and Investigations had already produced a report on the alleged retaliation for Ahmed's whistle blowing. Its new ethics adviser, who began work on December 1, would review the report and decide what action to take.
Dujarric however refrained from commenting on specific allegations.
"We're going at this with a very open mind. What we will find, we will find...I can't prejudge what the investigation team will find," he told Reuters.
Dalsan, according to some expert accounts was either the largest or the second-largest Somali money-wiring company after its competition Al-Barakaat's assets were frozen by US Executive Order immediately after 9/11.
It had offices in US, Great Britain, Kenya, and the United Arab Emirates where its headquarters was based before Abdilkadir
moved it to Mogadishu.
"A report by the European Commission's Nairobi-based Somali Unit estimates that at its height in the aftermath of the U.S. actions against Al-Barakaat, Dalsan, which was, rather interestingly, formed in August 2001, was moving at least $100 million a year," according to J. Peter Pham is Director of the Nelson Institute for International and Public Affairs.
Pham adds: "In early May 2006, Dalsan folded its operations without warning, taking with it not only the $10 million to $30 million in capital invested by individual shareholders, but an estimated $9 million to $12 million in unconsummated money transfers from ordinary customers.
Company officials – at least those who can be tracked down – have thus far refused to explain the causes of the shutdown, much less elaborate on the fate of the funds entrusted to them."
"A little more detachment, however, raises even greater concerns. Is it yet another coincidence that Dalsan was closely linked with the likes of the Sheikh Osman and Hashi 'Ayro brothers, all of whom were leading figures in the Al-Itihaad precursor of the Islamic Courts militia? And is it still another mere coincidence that the extremist forces within the ICU received a massive infusion of arms and men in the same month that Dalsan collapsed – reinforcements that tipped the scales in the
Islamists' battle with U.S.-backed factions for control of Mogadishu?" Pham asks in his report written in 2006.
Source: The Somaliland Times Reporter and Reuters
Saturday, May 31, 2008
UNDP admits wrong doing in Procurements - while keeping secret its internal Audit from PSO staff
Major victory achieved thanks to UNDP Watch !!!!!!A strong and long campaign in uncovering the internal corruption at UNDP's Procurement Department, has resulted today in major VICTORY.
In a letter to the staff of Procurement Services (PSO) its Director Mr. Provenzano acknowledged the past wrong doings while laying out the strategy for immediate future.
Knowing very well that his email would be brought to the attention of UNDP Watch, Provenzano carefully crafted it to provide a clear answer to all "clues" about how ACP operated in the past, while trying to pull himself "out" and playing safe for both sides (Dervis and "Watchers").
Provenzano admits (in a italian lawyer style) that UNDP in fact had no:
(a) policy at all in dealing with suspended vendors and therefore need to promulgate one,
(b) that in fact it was wrong to award CORIMEC,
(c) he makes his "UNDP Watch" sugestion to create a UNDP Procurement expert Board with specialist from each Regional Bureau (Thanks Jim);
(d) UNDP Lacks of guides and rules on Procurement Ethics;
(e) UNDP lacks of an ISO certification (Krishan has never been certified);
(f) he admits that UNDP lacks of basic reporting and assessment tools for Vendors and Procurements, casting a major doubt on past 3.9 Billion USD procured in past 28 months from Akiko Yuge and Krishan Batra.
While UNDP Watch and all staff thinks that UNDP should take immediate administrative punitive actions against the following staffers:
- Jan Mattsson
- Akiko Yuge
- Krishan Batra
- James Provenzano
These individuals have:
- have diverted UNDP funds for their own interests;
- have awarded contracts to third parties without any process for personal gain;
- have awarded contracts to individuals in amounts above $100K, resulting in at least 275 Million USD of dubbious contracts, and inexistent individuals;
- have failed to institutionalized a transparent and accountable procurement process, resulting in 1,7 Billion USD lost for the organization;
Here is the letter of James Provenzano:An advise for your Jim, you can't have it both ways.
UNDP Watch is Watching !!!!!
Wednesday, May 21, 2008
Who is Dervis and Melkert watching ?
Kemal Dervis and Ad Melkert have set-up a firewall mechanism which has put together a Watch List of dissidents and potential "weak" loose- cannons-managers that can become problematic down the road.
Two SSAs at OIST were entrusted the job of Watching and screening thru thousand of outgoing and incoming personal and official emails and instant messages that those on the "list" have.
At end of each day a report with potential "red flags" is delivered at 6:00 pm to Gettu (Dervis's Chief of Staff) who than screens it and prepares briefing for Kemal and Ad and how to deal with the internal potential "uprising".
As any other dictatorship, the paranoia is high, and therefore we were not surprised when we learned that the first to be on the list were the Heads of Regional Bureaus, Heads of Thematic Groups, Comptroller and Treasurer, Head of Legal, Head of PSO and even the new head of OAPR.
But most dangerous game is that UNDP put under tight watch all correspondence of the so called "independent review panel" and all their email apparatus including LAN were doubled out and screened at end of each day by separate "trustful eyes". Two separate lines go from 7th and 8th floor of Uganda house to thru-their basement to "no-where...".
The list also contains entire "potential disturbing units", like BoM/PSO, BoM/Legal, BoM/Travel, etc. The most important element is that all American citizens working at HQs and those in the field have been put under the watch List and their emails (personal + undp.org - for those at HQs; and undp.org - for those at COs) are totally under 24 hour watch by super-potent computers who run instantly password cracking and use brutal force softwares to crack individual passwords and instant messaging passowrds (MSN + Skype).
OIST has also put coded names for each trouble individuals. Representatives of UNDP/UNFPA/UNOPS Staff Council are among those singled out as Red Flags. UNDP has created a dedicated parallel double to UNFPA email server to look out on the "german" (OIST coded name for Stephan Flaetgen - Vice President of Staf Council). He and Dimitri Samaras are among those whom are watched the most, and whose machines (desktops) are not only screened but are put a direct VPN to make sure that they don't use external drives to remove information out of their offices.
The most interesting thing is that UNDP's PSO/ACP approved without knowing - that they were approving the hiring of a firm and two long term consultants for OIST last November 07, whom not only were hired without any job description, but their current location is un-known and that they would have been granted direct administrative access and responsibility to the HQs servers (Email & Satellite Comm servers).
How can the United States of America, the host country for UNDP HQs and United Nations HQs allow that a foreign entity with super-natural immunities and internal established impunity, which have multiple time violated the national interest and security of US, be allowed to established such powerful illegal mechanisms who violate the rights of its staff, but most importantly violate the rights of the US citizens working within this organization ?
Does UNDP and UN knows that is illegal in the United States of America to scrutinize without a court order the emails of US citizens?
UNDP watch will publish the whole list of those under watch and will be sending a direct watch-out email to all those who's rights were violated int he past 6 months.
Who else Dervis was watching ? Maybe Ban Ki-moon ?
Continue to read UNDP Watch for more on this and thank you very much for your continuing support. Keep your internal docs comming.
Wednesday, May 14, 2008
Malaysia-The Star: UNDP accused over firm with suspected militant links
By Mark Trevelyan, Security Correspondent
LONDON (Reuters) - A U.N. agency supported a Somali money transfer firm with suspected links to Islamist militants in a project that was corrupt and failed to curb the risks of money laundering and terrorist finance, a former employee said.
Ismail Ahmed, who worked for the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), said the agency's Somalia country office had provided "critical support" to the company, Dalsan, between 2003 and 2005, including intervening on its behalf with Swiss prosecutors and U.S. regulators.
The case highlights the risks associated with the financial industry of a country widely seen as a failed state and potential breeding ground for terrorism. Somalia depends more than any other country on money remittances from abroad.
"The true cost of the fraud and corruption in this (UNDP) programme is not just the funds lost but how it damaged the Somali remittance industry," Ahmed wrote in a detailed dossier of allegations which he made available to Reuters.
"Overall, UNDP's remittance programme appears to have done more harm than good."
UNDP spokesman Stephane Dujarric said the agency was investigating Ahmed's corruption charges and his allegation that he was punished for blowing the whistle, including by having his contract terminated.
"Clearly UNDP takes all these allegations extremely seriously and we are in fact investigating them thoroughly," Dujarric said. He declined comment on specific allegations but said those relating to Dalsan would definitely be investigated.
MILITANT LINKS
Ahmed accused the UNDP of backing Dalsan -- which collapsed in 2006, leaving depositors with losses of $30 million -- despite knowing of its suspected links to militant groups.
Dalsan's co-founder, Mohamed Sheikh Osman, was once the official spokesman of Islamist movement al-Ittihad al-Islamiya, proscribed by the United States and U.N. as a terrorist group.
Chairman Abdilkadir Hashi Farah Ayro was the brother of Aden Hashi Ayro, head of the al Shabaab militant group and mastermind of an insurgency against Somali government troops and their Ethiopian allies, who was killed in a U.S. air strike on May 1.
Ahmed said in a telephone interview the UNDP, which was working to help the Somali financial industry comply with international anti-terrorism and anti-money laundering rules, backed Dalsan after another company boycotted its programme.
"They were desperate to get some support from the industry," he said. "They thought at the time it was a risk worth taking."
Ahmed, a British national of Somali origin with an economics doctorate and over 20 years of experience in Somali development issues, worked for the UNDP from 2005 to 2007 on a programme to support the Somali remittance industry and strengthen its compliance with anti-money laundering and anti-terrorism rules.
The UNDP launched the scheme in 2002 after the largest firm, al-Barakaat, was blacklisted by Washington after the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks on the United States for funding terrorism.
In his dossier, Ahmed described support that the UNDP provided to Dalsan in Switzerland, the United States, Dubai, Britain and elsewhere. He said the UNDP's Somalia remittance programme had damaged the industry it was meant to help.
"UNDP interventions distorted the market by encouraging a number of unscrupulous and opportunistic companies to enter the market," he wrote. This led to an unusually high failure rate for Somali money transfer companies, with around 15 collapsing between November 2001 and May 2006.
He said money transfers of about $2 billion a year to Somalia and other Horn of Africa countries remain vulnerable to money laundering and terrorist finance -- channelling funds through the financial system for the benefit of militant groups.
"Two billion dollars are going through systems which are non-compliant, and that is pretty serious," he said.
LONDON (Reuters) - A U.N. agency supported a Somali money transfer firm with suspected links to Islamist militants in a project that was corrupt and failed to curb the risks of money laundering and terrorist finance, a former employee said.
Ismail Ahmed, who worked for the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), said the agency's Somalia country office had provided "critical support" to the company, Dalsan, between 2003 and 2005, including intervening on its behalf with Swiss prosecutors and U.S. regulators.
The case highlights the risks associated with the financial industry of a country widely seen as a failed state and potential breeding ground for terrorism. Somalia depends more than any other country on money remittances from abroad.
"The true cost of the fraud and corruption in this (UNDP) programme is not just the funds lost but how it damaged the Somali remittance industry," Ahmed wrote in a detailed dossier of allegations which he made available to Reuters.
"Overall, UNDP's remittance programme appears to have done more harm than good."
UNDP spokesman Stephane Dujarric said the agency was investigating Ahmed's corruption charges and his allegation that he was punished for blowing the whistle, including by having his contract terminated.
"Clearly UNDP takes all these allegations extremely seriously and we are in fact investigating them thoroughly," Dujarric said. He declined comment on specific allegations but said those relating to Dalsan would definitely be investigated.
MILITANT LINKS
Ahmed accused the UNDP of backing Dalsan -- which collapsed in 2006, leaving depositors with losses of $30 million -- despite knowing of its suspected links to militant groups.
Dalsan's co-founder, Mohamed Sheikh Osman, was once the official spokesman of Islamist movement al-Ittihad al-Islamiya, proscribed by the United States and U.N. as a terrorist group.
Chairman Abdilkadir Hashi Farah Ayro was the brother of Aden Hashi Ayro, head of the al Shabaab militant group and mastermind of an insurgency against Somali government troops and their Ethiopian allies, who was killed in a U.S. air strike on May 1.
Ahmed said in a telephone interview the UNDP, which was working to help the Somali financial industry comply with international anti-terrorism and anti-money laundering rules, backed Dalsan after another company boycotted its programme.
"They were desperate to get some support from the industry," he said. "They thought at the time it was a risk worth taking."
Ahmed, a British national of Somali origin with an economics doctorate and over 20 years of experience in Somali development issues, worked for the UNDP from 2005 to 2007 on a programme to support the Somali remittance industry and strengthen its compliance with anti-money laundering and anti-terrorism rules.
The UNDP launched the scheme in 2002 after the largest firm, al-Barakaat, was blacklisted by Washington after the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks on the United States for funding terrorism.
In his dossier, Ahmed described support that the UNDP provided to Dalsan in Switzerland, the United States, Dubai, Britain and elsewhere. He said the UNDP's Somalia remittance programme had damaged the industry it was meant to help.
"UNDP interventions distorted the market by encouraging a number of unscrupulous and opportunistic companies to enter the market," he wrote. This led to an unusually high failure rate for Somali money transfer companies, with around 15 collapsing between November 2001 and May 2006.
He said money transfers of about $2 billion a year to Somalia and other Horn of Africa countries remain vulnerable to money laundering and terrorist finance -- channelling funds through the financial system for the benefit of militant groups.
"Two billion dollars are going through systems which are non-compliant, and that is pretty serious," he said.
UNDP accused over firm with suspected militant links
http://africa.reuters.com/wire/news/usnL1436115.html
Wed 14 May 2008, 11:42 GMT
[-] Text [+] By Mark Trevelyan, Security Correspondent
LONDON, May 14 (Reuters) - A U.N. agency supported a Somali money transfer firm with suspected links to Islamist militants in a project that was corrupt and failed to curb the risks of money laundering and terrorist finance, a former employee said.
Ismail Ahmed, who worked for the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), said the agency's Somalia country office had provided "critical support" to the company, Dalsan, between 2003 and 2005, including intervening on its behalf with Swiss prosecutors and U.S. regulators.
The case highlights the risks associated with the financial industry of a country widely seen as a failed state and potential breeding ground for terrorism. Somalia depends more than any other country on money remittances from abroad.
"The true cost of the fraud and corruption in this (UNDP) programme is not just the funds lost but how it damaged the Somali remittance industry," Ahmed wrote in a detailed dossier of allegations which he made available to Reuters.
"Overall, UNDP's remittance programme appears to have done more harm than good."
UNDP spokesman Stephane Dujarric said the agency was investigating Ahmed's corruption charges and his allegation that he was punished for blowing the whistle, including by having his contract terminated.
"Clearly UNDP takes all these allegations extremely seriously and we are in fact investigating them thoroughly," Dujarric said. He declined comment on specific allegations but said those relating to Dalsan would definitely be investigated.
MILITANT LINKS
Ahmed accused the UNDP of backing Dalsan -- which collapsed in 2006, leaving depositors with losses of $30 million -- despite knowing of its suspected links to militant groups.
Dalsan's co-founder, Mohamed Sheikh Osman, was once the official spokesman of Islamist movement al-Ittihad al-Islamiya, proscribed by the United States and U.N. as a terrorist group.
Chairman Abdilkadir Hashi Farah Ayro was the brother of Aden Hashi Ayro, head of the al Shabaab militant group and mastermind of an insurgency against Somali government troops and their Ethiopian allies, who was killed in a U.S. air strike on May 1.
Ahmed said in a telephone interview the UNDP, which was working to help the Somali financial industry comply with international anti-terrorism and anti-money laundering rules, backed Dalsan after another company boycotted its programme.
"They were desperate to get some support from the industry," he said. "They thought at the time it was a risk worth taking."
Ahmed, a British national of Somali origin with an economics doctorate and over 20 years of experience in Somali development issues, worked for the UNDP from 2005 to 2007 on a programme to support the Somali remittance industry and strengthen its compliance with anti-money laundering and anti-terrorism rules.
The UNDP launched the scheme in 2002 after the largest firm, al-Barakaat, was blacklisted by Washington after the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks on the United States for funding terrorism.
In his dossier, Ahmed described support that the UNDP provided to Dalsan in Switzerland, the United States, Dubai, Britain and elsewhere. He said the UNDP's Somalia remittance programme had damaged the industry it was meant to help.
"UNDP interventions distorted the market by encouraging a number of unscrupulous and opportunistic companies to enter the market," he wrote. This led to an unusually high failure rate for Somali money transfer companies, with around 15 collapsing between November 2001 and May 2006.
He said money transfers of about $2 billion a year to Somalia and other Horn of Africa countries remain vulnerable to money laundering and terrorist finance -- channelling funds through the financial system for the benefit of militant groups.
"Two billion dollars are going through systems which are non-compliant, and that is pretty serious," he said. (Editing by Timothy Heritage)
Wed 14 May 2008, 11:42 GMT
[-] Text [+] By Mark Trevelyan, Security Correspondent
LONDON, May 14 (Reuters) - A U.N. agency supported a Somali money transfer firm with suspected links to Islamist militants in a project that was corrupt and failed to curb the risks of money laundering and terrorist finance, a former employee said.
Ismail Ahmed, who worked for the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), said the agency's Somalia country office had provided "critical support" to the company, Dalsan, between 2003 and 2005, including intervening on its behalf with Swiss prosecutors and U.S. regulators.
The case highlights the risks associated with the financial industry of a country widely seen as a failed state and potential breeding ground for terrorism. Somalia depends more than any other country on money remittances from abroad.
"The true cost of the fraud and corruption in this (UNDP) programme is not just the funds lost but how it damaged the Somali remittance industry," Ahmed wrote in a detailed dossier of allegations which he made available to Reuters.
"Overall, UNDP's remittance programme appears to have done more harm than good."
UNDP spokesman Stephane Dujarric said the agency was investigating Ahmed's corruption charges and his allegation that he was punished for blowing the whistle, including by having his contract terminated.
"Clearly UNDP takes all these allegations extremely seriously and we are in fact investigating them thoroughly," Dujarric said. He declined comment on specific allegations but said those relating to Dalsan would definitely be investigated.
MILITANT LINKS
Ahmed accused the UNDP of backing Dalsan -- which collapsed in 2006, leaving depositors with losses of $30 million -- despite knowing of its suspected links to militant groups.
Dalsan's co-founder, Mohamed Sheikh Osman, was once the official spokesman of Islamist movement al-Ittihad al-Islamiya, proscribed by the United States and U.N. as a terrorist group.
Chairman Abdilkadir Hashi Farah Ayro was the brother of Aden Hashi Ayro, head of the al Shabaab militant group and mastermind of an insurgency against Somali government troops and their Ethiopian allies, who was killed in a U.S. air strike on May 1.
Ahmed said in a telephone interview the UNDP, which was working to help the Somali financial industry comply with international anti-terrorism and anti-money laundering rules, backed Dalsan after another company boycotted its programme.
"They were desperate to get some support from the industry," he said. "They thought at the time it was a risk worth taking."
Ahmed, a British national of Somali origin with an economics doctorate and over 20 years of experience in Somali development issues, worked for the UNDP from 2005 to 2007 on a programme to support the Somali remittance industry and strengthen its compliance with anti-money laundering and anti-terrorism rules.
The UNDP launched the scheme in 2002 after the largest firm, al-Barakaat, was blacklisted by Washington after the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks on the United States for funding terrorism.
In his dossier, Ahmed described support that the UNDP provided to Dalsan in Switzerland, the United States, Dubai, Britain and elsewhere. He said the UNDP's Somalia remittance programme had damaged the industry it was meant to help.
"UNDP interventions distorted the market by encouraging a number of unscrupulous and opportunistic companies to enter the market," he wrote. This led to an unusually high failure rate for Somali money transfer companies, with around 15 collapsing between November 2001 and May 2006.
He said money transfers of about $2 billion a year to Somalia and other Horn of Africa countries remain vulnerable to money laundering and terrorist finance -- channelling funds through the financial system for the benefit of militant groups.
"Two billion dollars are going through systems which are non-compliant, and that is pretty serious," he said. (Editing by Timothy Heritage)
Tuesday, April 29, 2008
More nefarious proposals from Kemal Dervis & Associates
From the "Joint evaluation of UNDG contribution to the implementation
of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (first phase)"
20. UNDG should make increased use of national systems for support services, when appropriate and to the benefit of the partner countries, in order to strengthen national capacities and reduce transaction costs. Such support services include: procurement, security, information technology, telecommunications and banking, as well as planning, reporting and evaluation.
21. UNDG should further harmonize and simplify its business practices in order to increase the accountability and transparency of operational activities while ensuring that development assistance to partner countries is provided in a coherent fashion that supports capacity development. Practices that could be improved include: budgeting, audit functions, procurement systems, and professional expertise, including the adoption of the International Public Sector Accounting Standards.
22. UNDG should measure the cost of non-harmonized approaches to development assistance and further standardize and harmonize the concepts and practices to reduce transaction costs.
23. UNDG should create specific, measurable, achievable and relevant results frameworks and strategies that enable partner countries to design, monitor and evaluate results in the development of their capacities at different levels to achieve national development goals and progress towards the internationally agreed development goals, including the Millennium Development Goals.
24. It is recommended that UNDG encourage governments of partner countries to initiate and conduct joint and country-led evaluations to assess the contribution of the United Nations development system to national development plans and strategies, and to systematize and disseminate lessons learned from these exercises as mechanisms for mutual accountability.
25. UNDG should reinforce its commitment to strengthening the capacity of partner countries, at their request and with their ownership and leadership, to coordinate external assistance, including system-wide and sector-wide approaches and budget support, and to make the best possible use of such assistance, especially by being involved in national planning and monitoring processes and linking the aid effectiveness agenda to the broader development effectiveness
agenda.
26. UNDG should harmonize its approach among its members and other development partners to strengthen national capacities. Capacity development is commonly associated with various forms of support aimed at individuals (training), institutions (organizational development) and the enabling environment (support to policies and strategies). UNDG should contribute to the capacity of partner countries to optimize the use of new aid modalities.
27. UNDG should further develop and strengthen its knowledge management systems and expertise, including resources available at the regional level and from non-resident organizations, to better assist partner country needs for capacity development.
28. Incentives to implement the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness should address directly the factors that stand in the way of progress, especially with respect to harmonization. UNDG should address the structural obstacles to the adherence of the Paris Declaration principles as part of the broader United Nations reform process. This goes beyond the subject of the present evaluation, which addresses the implementation of the Paris Declaration, though it clearly affects the ability of UNDG to deliver development assistance efficiently.
29. UNDG should adopt a complementary approach to incorporating cross-cutting issues like gender mainstreaming, capacity development and rural development, as was done in response to HIV/AIDS. In addition, UNCTs should review the adequacy of their arrangements and efforts aimed at gender equality and rural development in countries with substantial rural poverty by going beyond social concerns and addressing rural poverty on a sustainable basis, thus recognizing in a systematic way the need for improvements in production and income.
of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (first phase)"
20. UNDG should make increased use of national systems for support services, when appropriate and to the benefit of the partner countries, in order to strengthen national capacities and reduce transaction costs. Such support services include: procurement, security, information technology, telecommunications and banking, as well as planning, reporting and evaluation.
21. UNDG should further harmonize and simplify its business practices in order to increase the accountability and transparency of operational activities while ensuring that development assistance to partner countries is provided in a coherent fashion that supports capacity development. Practices that could be improved include: budgeting, audit functions, procurement systems, and professional expertise, including the adoption of the International Public Sector Accounting Standards.
22. UNDG should measure the cost of non-harmonized approaches to development assistance and further standardize and harmonize the concepts and practices to reduce transaction costs.
23. UNDG should create specific, measurable, achievable and relevant results frameworks and strategies that enable partner countries to design, monitor and evaluate results in the development of their capacities at different levels to achieve national development goals and progress towards the internationally agreed development goals, including the Millennium Development Goals.
24. It is recommended that UNDG encourage governments of partner countries to initiate and conduct joint and country-led evaluations to assess the contribution of the United Nations development system to national development plans and strategies, and to systematize and disseminate lessons learned from these exercises as mechanisms for mutual accountability.
25. UNDG should reinforce its commitment to strengthening the capacity of partner countries, at their request and with their ownership and leadership, to coordinate external assistance, including system-wide and sector-wide approaches and budget support, and to make the best possible use of such assistance, especially by being involved in national planning and monitoring processes and linking the aid effectiveness agenda to the broader development effectiveness
agenda.
26. UNDG should harmonize its approach among its members and other development partners to strengthen national capacities. Capacity development is commonly associated with various forms of support aimed at individuals (training), institutions (organizational development) and the enabling environment (support to policies and strategies). UNDG should contribute to the capacity of partner countries to optimize the use of new aid modalities.
27. UNDG should further develop and strengthen its knowledge management systems and expertise, including resources available at the regional level and from non-resident organizations, to better assist partner country needs for capacity development.
28. Incentives to implement the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness should address directly the factors that stand in the way of progress, especially with respect to harmonization. UNDG should address the structural obstacles to the adherence of the Paris Declaration principles as part of the broader United Nations reform process. This goes beyond the subject of the present evaluation, which addresses the implementation of the Paris Declaration, though it clearly affects the ability of UNDG to deliver development assistance efficiently.
29. UNDG should adopt a complementary approach to incorporating cross-cutting issues like gender mainstreaming, capacity development and rural development, as was done in response to HIV/AIDS. In addition, UNCTs should review the adequacy of their arrangements and efforts aimed at gender equality and rural development in countries with substantial rural poverty by going beyond social concerns and addressing rural poverty on a sustainable basis, thus recognizing in a systematic way the need for improvements in production and income.
Monday, April 7, 2008
UNDP's Medial Alert Team (MAT) in HIGH ALERT and expanding
David Morrison demanded this afternoon from Ad Melkert that MAT - Media Alert Team take over the current situation created by the leaked Venezuela corruption story.
MAT was created amids North Korea crisis which has demonstrated that UNDP needed a more permanent crisis capacity to handle media crisis situation to ensure that the impact on the day‑to‑day operations and focus of senior management is not diverted over a longer period of time. OC is already working on a new structural set up to be better equipped to handle the new media environment, but other key units also need to be involved.
Since mid-June 2007, MAT's cost to UNDP almost 3.9 million USD, which are totally unaccounted for and never approved from UNDP's Executive Board for such an expenditure.
Since David Morrison is a pathological liar, and first thing first he will deny the existence of MAT, we are publishing here the minutes of the SMT Retreat on 12-14 June 2007.
MAT was created amids North Korea crisis which has demonstrated that UNDP needed a more permanent crisis capacity to handle media crisis situation to ensure that the impact on the day‑to‑day operations and focus of senior management is not diverted over a longer period of time. OC is already working on a new structural set up to be better equipped to handle the new media environment, but other key units also need to be involved.
Since mid-June 2007, MAT's cost to UNDP almost 3.9 million USD, which are totally unaccounted for and never approved from UNDP's Executive Board for such an expenditure.
Since David Morrison is a pathological liar, and first thing first he will deny the existence of MAT, we are publishing here the minutes of the SMT Retreat on 12-14 June 2007.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
