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Joe Torsella

@USJoe_UN

Philadelphian, US Ambassador, Average Joe. On behalf of the American taxpayer, I fight to cut waste and improve results at the UN.

http://usun.state.gov

Joseph M Torsella speech at 5th Committee on the UN Budget

CUT CUT CUT CUT

UN STAFF

NOW

Ambassador Joseph M Torsella
U.S. Representative for UN Management and Reform
U.S. Mission to the United Nations

New York, NY

September 29, 2011

Click here to read this on USUN page

AS DELIVERED

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, congratulations to you on your election as Chairman of the Bureau, and to other members of the bureau. We are grateful for your service, and also thank Under-Secretary-General Angela Kane and her staff, who have produced the budget documents we will consider in this Committee. We look forward to working constructively with you, the Bureau and other Member States to ensure a successful outcome this session.

And we enthusiastically support your call, Mr. Chairman, for working more effectively here in the Fifth Committee. As the General Assembly body in charge of UN management and administration, the Fifth Committee should itself model the management behavior we expect from the rest of the United Nations. We sometimes cloak our discussions here in code words and diplomatic euphemisms, but in keeping with your call this morning for a new approach to our work, I would like to offer today, on behalf of the United States, some very frank and plainspoken observations on the 2012-13 budget proposal.

We meet at a time of severe – and worldwide – economic challenge. The General Debate that has just concluded made it clear: Member States around the world are under financial strain. This is not a phenomenon of one or even several donor nations, but a global reality, north and south, east and west. From Asia to Europe, from Africa to Latin America and North America, heads of state spoke of the enduring impact of the global financial crisis. That crisis has made financial resources ever more scarce, made efficient outcomes ever more important, and made leaders – including every one of us in this room today – ever more accountable to the citizens we represent for the fiscal decisions we make.

No one has said this better or more clearly than Executive Director of UN AIDS Director Michel Sidibè. “All indicators suggest,” Director Sidibe said in a recent presentation, “that key donor countries already experiencing public deficits will continue to face a serious, prolonged fiscal deficit in the near future. It is a mistake,” he continued, “to interpret this as AIDS fatigue. The world is not turning its back on AIDS. It is turning its back on business as usual.”

That is the simple reality we face, all of us: in a time of scarce resources, the United Nations cannot afford business as usual. But that, unfortunately, is exactly what is represented in too much of the budget submitted to us.

To be sure, there are some very positive steps in this budget. When the Secretary General called in February for managers to cut 3% or more from their budget outlines, we applauded. And the United States still supports and welcomes his determined efforts to trim the UN budget and his strong leadership in calling for change in the organization. But what this budget document makes clear is that not all of the organization has risen to the challenge set by the Secretary General. The Secretary General has done his part, but not all of the rest of us have.

First, let’s be clear. A reduction in planned expenses – from budget outline to budget proposal – is not what any family, government or business around the world would recognize as a real belt-tightening “cut.” It is simply loosening our belt a little less than we originally planned. So the relevant measure of our fiscal discipline is whether we will actually spend less in 2012-13 than we did in 2010-11. And this budget fails that test.

There are some cuts around the edges, for example, in conference services, the abolition of some vacant posts, and providing summary records to Member States. These are historic firsts, and we wholeheartedly support those initiatives. But there are too few economy measures in this budget that are entirely realistic, financially meaningful, and clearly sustainable. Of the 37 budget sections before the Committee, reductions are proposed for 18…but 19 either increase (15) or remain unchanged (4). The key driver of costs for future years, in any organization, is personnel. Yet this budget proposes abolishing just 44 net posts from the organization’s 10,307 person workforce. That represents a 0.4% decrease – less than one percent – from current employee levels.

And the onslaught of add-ons which will inevitably be presented during the session – potentially $6 million for Information Communication Technology, $9 million for Administration of Justice, $4 million for the Strategic Heritage Plan renovations in Geneva – as well as the program budget implications emanating from the Economic and Social session in July, a preliminary re-costing estimate of $147 million, and 15 reports still to be considered, could result in an alarming total 2012-13 budget of $5.5 billion.

Considered against the current 2010-11 biennial total of $5.367 billion, that is not a cut. That is in fact a more than 2 percent increase and this does not take into account potential add-ons in the second year of the budget. That does not represent a break from “business as usual,” but rather a continuation of it.

For a decade now, the United Nations regular budget has grown dramatically, relentlessly, and exponentially: from $2.6 billion in 2001-2002, to $5.4 billion in 2010-2011. This growth has significantly outpaced the growth of the budgets of almost all the Member States that comprise the UN. I am not drawing a comparison between the United Nations and the United States, but between the United Nations and the rest of the world.

It’s true that some of this growth can be justified by new mandates that we all proudly support. But it’s also true that those mandates do not account for the disturbingly persistent ten-year trend of increases in the UN budget.

We commonly hear that Special Political Missions are the main reason for the UN’s budget growth. But there are two key points to remember. First, SPMs are – by definition – non-permanent expenses. They may influence the picture for several years at a time, but they do not have the same long-term, structural impact on the UN’s cost structure as, for example, regular budget posts.

Second, SPMs are only part of the story on the cost side of the UN budget. If we consider the budget without SPMs, we see this clearly: it still shows dramatic increases, from $2.4 billion in 2000-2001 to $4.2 billion in 2010-2011. That’s a 75 percent increase – a rate that far outpaces budget increases again in most of the Member States of the UN and at a time when many Member States are cutting entire departments and ministries.

So what is behind this trend? Several budget lines deserve our attention this session: general operating expenses, travel of staff, and grants and contributions have all have played a role, and should be intensely scrutinized. But as I noted earlier, in any organization, it is personnel that is the largest and most important driver of long-term costs, and the UN is no exception: posts accounted for $2.4 billion in costs in 2010-11, a huge increase from ten years ago, when the total costs was a full $1 billion less ($1.4 billion in 2000 - 2001). When we look deeper, we see two troubling facts behind this increase. First, the number of posts themselves has increased, from 8,989 in 2000-2001 to 10,307 in 2010-2011. But second, the cost of UN posts – the total compensation to employees – has grown by 70 percent while the number of posts has grown by only 15 percent.

Focus for a moment on just one figure: according to the proposed budget, the average total compensation for a UN staff member – simply taking the total proposed cost of posts divided by the total number of posts, not including General Temporary Assistance positions – is $238,000 biannually. No number underscores Chairman Monthe’s point more than this one. Instead of spending our time arguing about whether this or that specific UN post should be a P-5 or a D-1, as we often do, we should focus on asking ourselves – and UN managers – the larger, more important questions: Why is it that both the number and compensation of UN personnel have grown so dramatically? How does management intend to bring these numbers and costs back into line? And why do we, as Member States, tolerate a budget process that tells us, how many meetings are scheduled or guidance materials published in a given department, but does not tell us, for example, how much the UN spends on health care benefits for its employees?

We therefore renew our objection, Mr. Chairman, to receiving the UN budget proposal in a piecemeal fashion, and with too little real financial analysis. And we call for a comprehensive makeover to streamline budgets and the budget process for transparency, flexibility, managerial accountability, and analyzable, actionable information.

Mr. Chairman, I am well aware that the sort of business-like focus on efficiency and economy that I am suggesting today has sometimes been heard in this Committee as political code in this committee for a United States perspective. And, yes, my government does have that perspective: we believe it is our obligation to our taxpayers to do more with less in Washington and here at the UN. But doing more with less is not just the American perspective, or just the developed world perspective. The economic challenges of our time that I began with have made it a global perspective. You don’t need to take my word for it; listen to voices from capitals around the world:

In Brasilia, Brazil’s Planning Minister Miriam Belchior says “finding ways to do more with fewer resources will be the government’s new mantra.”

From Maseru, Lesotho’s Finance Minister says “the time has come when we must all learn to do more with less for the sake of our country.”

And in Pretoria the deputy prime minister declares “we must do more with less. The focus has to be on value for money.”

When we look to our home countries, it’s not just words about efficiency that we find: it’s evidence – clear, convincing, relevant evidence – that public organizations like the UN can achieve more with less. That taking an entrepreneurial approach can save money and improve results at the same time. Consider just these few examples:

In Scotland, a multi-year efficiency program emphasizing greater use of shared services and procurement improvements has so far saved the government $2.3 billion pounds.

In 2010, the Mexican Government instituted structural reform of Ministries, salary reductions, hiring freezes, and other measures amounting to $66 billion pesos in savings.

Botswana is providing more medical services to more people...while reducing the costs of certain procedures by as much as 50%.

And Singapore has embraced eGovernment by creating a single online platform for all public services –improving services, increasing access, and leveraging economies of scale all at the same time.

If each of us looks to our capitals, our own private sectors, indeed our personal experiences, we find proof that the rhetorical choices we pose in the Fifth Committee are often false ones. Colleagues, we know that money does not equal mandates, and resources do not equal results. It is entirely possible for any organization – including the UN – to achieve its mission with fewer resources. The issue isn’t simply how much money we allocate to each department or program, it is whether each and every dollar, yen or euro, and every yuan, peso, real, and rand is being used in the most effective, efficient, and businesslike way.

In that regard, Mr. Chairman, although we will provide more detailed comments on the regular budget in our October statement, I want to raise today several specific concerns we have with the budget before us.

First, we are troubled that we have yet to receive the proposal that relates to the overhaul of the Administration of Justice system and all the details related to treatment of cases from the UNDT and UNAT. The potential cost associated with the implementation of decisions emanating from these tribunals is significant.

Second, while the United States has always been an advocate of UN modernization and innovation, we are also concerned with the recent developments on UMOJA – specifically the delay in deploying and the potential for additional costs. We were promised a great deal and now are being offered a patchwork approach to implementation. Let me be clear: UMOJA should be accomplished on-time, without additional resources, and with quantifiable savings from implementation.

Third, and more generally, we are disappointed that ICT continues to present proposals for additional staff and for further initiatives without first demonstrating tangible results with the resources already allocated. First priority for ICT should be timely completion of UMOJA and demonstrating improvements with the resources already approved by Member States.

Fourth, the Under Secretary General of the Office for Internal Oversight Services is actively engaged in putting OIOS back on course, and the strength of OIOS is directly related to achieving real management improvements at the UN overall. All Member States should make every effort to give USG LaPointe and OIOS the resources and tools needed to make OIOS the robust organization it was intended to be.

And fifth, Mr. Chairman, my delegation strongly believes that the buy-in of major stakeholders is required for “the broadest possible agreement” to be reached on any issue, and as such we look forward to working closely with all delegations on the many important issues on our agenda in the months ahead.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, as we consider the urgent need to find savings in the UN budget, let us not to do so abstractly. Let us remember that every savings we can achieve has real-world implications for the people we were all sent here to represent. $100,000 represents just .000001 percent of the UN’s regular budget; that’s the kind of sum sometimes treated as a rounding error in a $5 billion budget. But there are other, better ways to think about that $100,000. $100,000 also represents the average federal taxes paid by 16 hard-working American families in one year. $100,000 could provide over 130,000 high-energy biscuits for the malnourished children helped by UNICEF. It could test over 66,000 children for malaria, equip hospitals with over 1,300 basic surgical kits, or provide 100,000 waterproof sleeping mats for children who have lost their homes to disaster.

The United States, therefore, calls for a comprehensive, department-by-department, line-by-line, review of this budget, with the aim of achieving the Secretary General’s original goal: a real, meaningful, and sustainable reduction in expenses from the last biennium, and the first steps in a new course of fiscal restraint and prudence at the UN.

The experience of governments, businesses and families in each of our countries proves that it can be done. And the duty that each of us has to our taxpayers demands that we do it.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

In Australia the Socialist Gov lied to Parliament - saying that the Carbon Tax will work because the "United States would join the scheme by 2016"

CLICK HERE FOR THIS STORY - SYDNEY MORNING HERALD

Aus Treasury defends carbon price modelling

Treasury officials have rejected claims their carbon price modelling collapses if the United States does not introduce an emissions trading scheme.

Treasury macroeconomic executive director David Gruen told a parliamentary inquiry the department had made assumptions about international climate change action based on the "best information" available now.

"The modelling is based on the US taking action but it's not based on the US taking action specifically as an emission trading scheme," he said.

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Dr Gruen said the US could take action through regulatory measures.

Liberal senator Mathias Cormann then asked the treasury officials to clarify earlier statements that the modelling assumes comparable carbon pricing in other major economies from 2015/16.

"We have modelled abatement in the US but that abatement could take alternative ways," Dr Gruen said.

"We are doing the best we can do based on the information we have now.

"We do not have a crystal ball that tells us actually what is going to happen."

The Treasury official said treasury had taken into account countries' pledges at the UN climate talks in Cancun last year.

"We have operationalised those in our modelling but it does require those countries to live up to those pledges," Dr Gruen said.

Last week, opposition climate action spokesman Greg Hunt said Treasury's updated carbon tax modelling was worthless "because it's based on a fantasy that the Unites States would be part of a global trading scheme by 2016".

"This is utterly out of line with anything that is realistic," Mr Hunt said.

The federal government has introduced bills to price carbon emissions from mid-2012.

The price would begin at a fixed rate of $23 per tonne, rising for three years, before a floating market-based scheme would start in mid-2015.

The joint select committee on Labor's so-called clean energy future legislation continues in Canberra.

Beware the Brokering of Egypt’s ElBaradei

by Claudia Rosett @ Forbes.com

Now that Hosni Mubarak has resigned as dictator of Egypt, what role in the perilous transition ahead might be played by former United Nations nuclear chief and Nobel laureate, Mohamed ElBaradei?

When protests erupted last month, ElBaradei returned to his native Egypt, and under the caption “opposition leader” has been all over the news, offering himself as a “broker,” a “vessel,” a “bridge,” an “agent of change,” from Mubarak’s rule to “democracy.” On Friday he welcomed Mubarak’s ouster as “the greatest day of my life.”

Yet ElBaradei has linked arms with, among others, Egypt’s Islamist Muslim Brotherhood – the jihad-preaching movement that aspires to an Islamic caliphate, and spawned the terrorists of Hamas and al Qaeda. What kind of brokering and bridge-building might that portend? Look at his record.

Image by AFP/Getty Images via @daylife

Where was ElBaradei’s interest in democracy during the years in which he acquired the multilateral mystique and Nobel prize that made him one of the most famous names in Egypt? As director-general of the UN’s International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, from 1997-2009, ElBaradei’s hallmark was contempt for the world’s democracies, notably the U.S. and Israel; and an affinity for some of the world’s worst tyrannies, notably Iran, Syria and North Korea.

This cannot simply be chalked up to the constraints of serving as a technocrat within the UN, where respect for sovereign states trumps such fine distinctions as despotism versus democracy. ElBaradei has long prided himself on speaking outside the box. As head of the IAEA he used his erstwhile neutral platform in 2009 to try to bully the BBC into airing a fundraiser for Hamas-controlled Gaza. Throughout his 12-year tenure he trespassed on the diplomatic turf of UN member states, publicly urging that despots seeking to fortify themselves with nuclear weapons be treated with deference and dialogue.

When North Korea’s totalitarian regime conducted its first nuclear test, in 2006, ElBaradei did not call for North Korean tyrant Kim Jong Il to step down, complete with his nuclear obsessions, and make way for democracy. He urged appeasement, calling Kim Jong Il’s nuclear detonation “A cry for help.”

In Iran, ElBaradei was one of the UN’s big gifts to the mullahs, running interference for years against referral of Iran’s nuclear program from the IAEA to the UN Security Council. According to former U.S. Ambassador John Bolton, ElBaradei “frequently altered the reports of IAEA inspectors,” editing their findings in such a way that he “gave Iran every benefit of the doubt.”

In the fall of 2009, when news emerged that Iran had secretly built a uranium enrichment plant on an Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps base near Qom, ElBaradei went to Iran, and on Oct. 4 made a statement there that could hardly have been more deferential toward the UN sanctioned and nonproliferation-treaty-violating Iranian regime. The IAEA inspectors had come, he said, “To assure ourselves that it is a facility built for peaceful purposes.” Ignoring the thrust of three UN Security Council sanctions resolutions aimed at stopping Iran’s drive toward nuclear weapons ElBaradei added, “As I have said many times, and I continue to say today, the Agency has no concrete proof that there is an ongoing weapons program in Iran.” He further assured Iran’s rulers that the IAEA had no interest in Iran’s missile program, which he apparently viewed as in no way “nuclear-related.”

ElBaradei threw in some personal comments, but they had nothing to do with the bloody suppression just four months earlier of the Iranian uprising against a regime far more brutal than the despotism he is now reviling in Egypt. Thanking his Iranian government hosts for their kind welcome, he stressed that this final visit in his official IAEA capacity would be “definitely not my last.” He said that as a private citizen, “I would be very happy to come here as many times as I can.”

Three months after ElBaradei’s Nov., 2009 retirement, the IAEA suddenly became much better at connecting the dots. On February 18, 2010, the new head of the IAEA, Japan’s Yukiya Amano, produced a hard-hitting report, based on information stretching well back into ElBaradei’s tenure, discussing reasons for concern that Iran might be working on “the development of a nuclear payload for a missile.”

When Israel in 2007 destroyed a clandestine and nearly completed reactor that Syria, with the help of North Korea, had been building for years on the Euphrates River, ElBaradei appeared less upset with the Syrians for building and concealing the illicit reactor than with the Israelis for destroying it. He chided Syria’s tyrannical, terrorist-sponsoring regime for not being more transparent. He publicly accused Israel’s democratic government of breaking international law.

In the case of Saddam Hussein’s mass-murdering totalitarian regime in Iraq, ElBaradei’s current interest in democracy for the Arab world was nowhere on display. He opposed the U.S.-led overthrow of Saddam, whose legitimacy he did not question. He reserved for President George W. Bush a brand of insult he never lavished on the worst tyrants of the Middle East.

In 2004, ElBaradei went out of his way to insert the IAEA into the U.S. presidential race between Bush and John Kerry. The week before the vote, The New York Times ran a story, based on half-baked information leaked from the IAEA, alleging that U.S. authorities had failed to secure large quantities of high explosives that had apparently disappeared from an Iraqi weapons facility at Al Qaqaa, near Baghdad. The same day the story broke, ElBaradei rushed to confirm it, sending the leaked document to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan with a letter saying that “because the matter has been given media coverage” ElBaradei wanted the underlying document distributed to the Security Council. It later turned out the Al Qaqaa story had been overblown. But in the runup to the polls, it looked like the IAEA-generated scandal might sway the election. The Washington Post — no fan of Bush — editorialized that ElBaradei had gone out of his way to fuel the story, and “The fact that he was providing easy fodder for Mr. Kerry’s campaign just eight days before the presidential election evidently did not deter this U.N. civil servant.”

The following year, 2005, the Norwegian Nobel Prize Committee — also no fan of Bush — awarded ElBaradei and the IAEA the Nobel Peace Prize. The Nobel citation was necessarily generic praise “for their efforts”; nuclear proliferation was on the move, and there were no stellar deeds to cite.

Having returned to Egypt after his long and richly decorated sojourn at the IAEA, ElBaradei has said he is not seeking the presidency, but if the people insist, he would “not disappoint.” Meanwhile, by his own account “reaching out” to the Muslim Brotherhood, he is there to broker change. He’s got a record as a broker all right, but is this the resume of a man who prizes democracy?

The Deepening Mysteries of U.N. Financial Disclosure

By Claudia Rosett @ Forbes

Nov. 15 2010 - 10:54 am | 583 views | 1 recommendation | 0 comments

When the new U.S. Congress convenes in January, there may be revived interest in oversight of a runaway United Nations. The U.N. system is fueled by billions every year in U.S. tax dollars, but has been operating these past two years without such speed bumps as even the occasional congressional oversight hearing into those busy back corridors of the U.N., in which the U.S. administration places so much trust, and through which so much money flows.

Many areas want looking into. These range from assorted fiascos of U.N. peacekeeping and sanctions regimes, to such questions as who’s actually benefiting from U.S. money given to the U.N. (now more than $6 billion per year) and from the credibility that U.S. support lends to the institution (priceless).

But a common theme running through all of this is the U.N.’s continuing failure to provide transparency and accountability. On that score, there’s a certain sorry entertainment value — as well as serious questions — to be found in browsing the U.N.’s current version of financial disclosure, as practiced by senior U.N. officials. This system was supposed to be one of the important reforms brought in by former Secretary-General Kofi Annan, as he tried during his final stretch in office, in 2006, to wipe the sludge of Oil-for-Food from his Brioni suits.

When Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon arrived in office, in 2007, he promised that his “first priority” at the U.N. would be to “restore trust.” He advertised that as part of this effort, he would follow through on Annan’s pledges of disclosure of personal finances by senior U.N. officials. That was a great idea, the urgent need for it underscored that same year by the indictment in New York’s Southern District of the former head of the U.N. Oil-for-Food program, Benon Sevan, on charges of bribery and conspiracy to defraud the U.N. relief program he had run (Sevan, who left the U.S. and has not returned to face the charges, has denied any wrong-doing); and the conviction in New York federal court of a former head of the U.N. General Assembly’s budget oversight committee, Vladimir Kuznetsov. He was found guilty in 2007 of conspiring to launder hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of kickbacks on U.N. procurement deals, while serving as the highest-ranking Russian official at the U.N.

But the “reform” that Annan bequeathed, and Ban has run with, is a system in which what is mainly disclosed by U.N. management is that almost nothing is disclosed (yes, you read that right). Top U.N. officials are supposed to render up information in-house about their finances. This is done in ways so confidential that even the U.N.’s Ethics Office, which administers the program, is not privy to the details. Senior staffers are then allowed to choose for themselves whether any information at all about their finances will be released to the public. This has resulted in some officials, such as Annan’s former chief of staff, Iqbal Riza (who has lingered at the U.N. in New York as a “special adviser” to Ban Ki-Moon) filing a public disclosure form in which he does nothing more than check a box, confirming that he has chosen “to maintain the confidentiality of the information disclosed by me.”

Some of the more forthcoming officials do choose to disclose slightly more than merely a refusal to disclose. Even then, it’s done in a format so abbreviated and generic that it provides almost no information. The U.N.’s entire public disclosure form runs to a single page, with no actual dollar amounts listed. Ban himself, for instance, filled out a form for 2009 which says his assets consist of an apartment and two lots of land in South Korea. What are these worth? There’s no clue.

Under the heading of “Ethical Standards,” such farcical “disclosures,” from dozens of senior U.N. officials worldwide, are posted on Ban Ki-moon’s official U.N. web site. Until now, I thought the Riza-style approach of utterly non-disclosing disclosure took the cake.

But in revisiting the site recently, I came across an entry that is in some ways even more tantalizing. That would be the form filed for 2009 by the director-general of the U.N. Office at Geneva, Sergei Ordzhonikidze. A former Soviet and then Russian diplomat, Ordzhonikidze was appointed in 2002 by Kofi Annan to head the U.N.’s palatial spread in Geneva, where last year alone he managed a budget of $227 million. (The U.N. Office at Geneva is home to the lavishly maintained Human Rights Council, among other U.N exotica).

Ordzhonikidze accounts directly to the U.N. Secretary-General, and serves as Ban’s representative in Geneva. When Ban Ki-moon’s web pages began featuring the “disclosure” forms, Ordzhonikidze for 2007 and 2008 was among the U.N. officials willing to list his assets. But he said they consisted solely of “Bank Savings accounts.” He listed nothing else. How much was in those savings accounts? Where in the world were they held? That’s a level of detail which UN public “disclosure” doesn’t bother with.

But here’s the intriguing bit. For the most recent filing, for 2009, Ordzhonikidze’s assets have apparently changed. He no longer lists even “Bank Savings accounts.” Under assets, he lists “Nil.” Likewise, under the other five categories, he also lists “Nil.” Apparently, he has gone from having assets that consisted solely of savings accounts to having no assets at all — or at least nothing worth more than $10,000, which is the minimum bar for disclosure. No house, no substantial possessions, no profits from the sale of personal property, no assets whatsoever. For that matter, no liabilities, either. No nothin’, just “Nil, Nil, Nil, Nil, Nil, Nil.”

What’s going on? After years of service pulling in a U.N. salary well into six-figures and loaded with perks, while running a U.N. complex that features a nine-figure budget and peacocks on the manicured lawns, has the director-general of the U.N. Office at Geneva been somehow abruptly left with no finances of his own to report? (Queried by email about this, a spokesperson for the U.N. in Geneva said Ordzhonikidze was traveling and could not be reached in time for this article.)

Or has Ban’s promise of U.N. transparency devolved to where he and his top team members, under the label of ”public disclosure,” routinely disclose either next-to-nothing or “Nil”? If U.S. law makers are ready to try again, can they get the candor the U.N. has repeatedly promised and failed to deliver? It would be worth finding out.

UK Conservatives demand transparency and accountability for their Tax Payers money - while Susan Rice of USUN can't find that "word" in her vocabulary

In a total contrast from US Mission to the UN (USUN), already in the first few weeks in job the UK Government is challenging the United Nations and the rest of multilateral organizations with Transparency and Accountability.

Andrew Mitchell, the International Development Secretary has announced a new UKaid Transparency Guarantee to ensure that full information on all DFID's spending is made available to public.

Mitchell, who was speaking at the launch of Oxfam's report on 21st Century Aid at the Royal Society, gave this pledge to UK Tax-payers:

“To the British taxpayer I say this: our aim is to spend every penny of every pound of your money wisely and well. We want to squeeze every last ounce of value from it. We owe you that.

“And I promise you as well that in future, when it comes to international development, we will want to see hard evidence of the impact your money makes. Not just dense and impenetrable budget lines but clear evidence of real effect.”

Mitchell's words have already caused panic across some powerful UN Agencies who have called for a "pre-sessional informal brainstorming meeting this morning (June 07)" and review their past and current "affinity" with UK Government, and strategize how to "stall any transparency request" from Mitchell. In the words of a powerful Chief Finance Officer of one of these Agencies: - "we've dealt with Americans before ...certainly wont be difficult to push back Brits as well".

What a difference from Ambassador Susan Rice of US Mission to the United Nations (USUN), who not only seem lost in translation and but has deleted from her vocabulary the words "Transparency and Accountability".

Maybe Susan Rice need to attend a "Capacity building" workshop from DFID and learn a thing or two from Andrew Mitchell.

Situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s - General Assembly recognizes that UNDP in DPRK failed to provide assistance to those in need

64/175.

Resolution adopted by the General Assembly

[on the report of the Third Committee (A/64/439/Add.3)]

Situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

Reaffirming that States Members of the United Nations have an obligation to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms and to fulfil the obligations that they have undertaken under the various international instruments,

Mindful that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,1 the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,1 the Convention on the Rights of the Child2 and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,3

Noting the constructive dialogue with the Committee on the Rights of the Child during the consideration of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s combined third and fourth periodic reports on the implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child as a sign of engagement in international cooperative efforts in the field of human rights, and hoping that the enhanced dialogue will contribute to improving the situation of children in the country,

Taking note of the concluding observations of the treaty-monitoring bodies under the four treaties to which the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is a party, the most recent of which were given by the Committee on the Rights of the Child in January 2009,4

Noting with appreciation the collaboration established between the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the United Nations Children’s Fund and the World Health Organization in order to improve the health situation in the country, and the collaboration established with the United Nations Children’s Fund in order to improve the quality of education for children,

Noting the decision on the resumption, on a modest scale, of the activities of the United Nations Development Programme in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and encouraging the engagement of the Government with the international community to ensure that the programmes benefit the persons in need of assistance,

Recalling its resolutions 60/173 of 16 December 2005, 61/174 of 19 December 2006, 62/167 of 18 December 2007 and 63/190 of 18 December 2008, Commission on Human Rights resolutions 2003/10 of 16 April 2003,5 2004/13 of 15 April 20046 and 2005/11 of 14 April 2005,7 Human Rights Council decision 1/102 of 30 June 20068 and Council resolutions 7/15 of 27March 20089 and 10/16 of 26March 2009,10 and mindful of the need for the international community to strengthen its coordinated efforts aimed at achieving the implementation of those resolutions,

Taking note of the report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,11 regretting that he still has not been allowed to visit the country and that he received no cooperation from the authorities of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and taking note also of the comprehensive report of the Secretary-General on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea submitted in accordance with resolution 63/190,12

Noting the importance of the inter-Korean dialogue, which could contribute to the improvement of the human rights and humanitarian situation in the country,

Welcoming the recent resumption of the reunion of separated families across the border, which is an urgent humanitarian concern of the entire Korean people,

1. Expresses its very serious concern at:

(a) The persistence of continuing reports of systematic, widespread and grave violations of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, including:

(i) Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, including inhuman conditions of detention, public executions, extrajudicial and arbitrary detention; the absence of due process and the rule of law, including fair trial guarantees and an independent judiciary; the imposition of the death penalty for political and religious reasons; collective punishments; and the existence of a large number of prison camps and the extensive use of forced labour;

(ii) Limitations imposed on every person who wishes to move freely within the country and travel abroad, including the punishment of those who leave or try to leave the country without permission, or their families, as well as punishment of persons who are returned;

(iii) The situation of refugees and asylum-seekers expelled or returned to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and sanctions imposed on citizens of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea who have been repatriated from abroad, leading to punishments of internment, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or the death penalty, and, in this regard, urges all States to respect the fundamental principle of non-refoulement, to treat those who seek refuge humanely and to ensure unhindered access to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and his Office, with a view to improving the situation of those who seek refuge, and once again urges States parties to comply with their obligations under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees13 and the 1967 Protocol thereto14 in relation to refugees from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea who are covered by those instruments;

(iv) All-pervasive and severe restrictions on the freedoms of thought, conscience, religion, opinion and expression, peaceful assembly and association, the right to privacy and equal access to information, by such means as the persecution of individuals exercising their freedom of opinion and expression, and their families, and on the right of everyone to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives, of his or her country;

(v) The violations of economic, social and cultural rights, which have led to severe malnutrition, widespread health problems and other hardship for the population in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, in particular for persons belonging to particularly exposed groups, inter alia, women, children and the elderly;

(vi) Continuing violations of the human rights and fundamental freedoms of women, in particular the trafficking of women for the purpose of prostitution or forced marriage and the subjection of women to human smuggling, forced abortions, gender-based discrimination, including in the economic sphere, and gender-based violence;

(vii) Continuing reports of violations of the human rights and fundamental freedoms of children, in particular the continued lack of access to basic economic, social and cultural rights for many children, and in this regard notes the particularly vulnerable situation faced by, inter alia, returned or repatriated children, street children, children with disabilities, children whose parents are detained, children living in detention or in institutions and children in conflict with the law;4

(viii) Continuing reports of violations of the human rights and fundamental freedoms of persons with disabilities, especially on the use of collective camps and of coercive measures that target the rights of persons with disabilities to decide freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of their children;

(ix) Violations of workers’ rights, including the right to freedom of association and collective bargaining, the right to strike as defined by the obligations of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,1 and the prohibition of the economic exploitation of children and of any harmful or hazardous work of children as defined by the obligations of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea under the Convention on the Rights of the Child;2

(b) The continued refusal of the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to recognize the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea or to extend cooperation to him, despite the renewal of the mandate by the Human Rights Council in its resolutions 7/15 and 10/16;

2. Reiterates its very serious concern at unresolved questions of international concern relating to abductions in the form of enforced disappearance, which violates the human rights of nationals of other sovereign countries, and in this regard strongly calls upon the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea urgently to resolve these questions, including through existing channels, in a transparent manner, including by ensuring the immediate return of abductees;

3. Expresses its very deep concern at the precarious humanitarian situation in the country, partly as a result of frequent natural disasters, compounded by the misallocation of resources away from the satisfaction of basic needs, and the increasing State restrictions on the cultivation and trade in foodstuffs, as well as the prevalence of maternal malnutrition and of infant malnutrition, which, despite some progress, continues to affect the physical and mental development of a significant proportion of children, and urges the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, in this regard, to take preventive and remedial action;

4. Commends the Special Rapporteur for the activities undertaken so far and for his continued efforts in the conduct of his mandate despite the limited access to information;

5. Strongly urges the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to respect fully all human rights and fundamental freedoms and, in this regard:

(a) To immediately put an end to the systematic, widespread and grave violations of human rights mentioned above, inter alia, by implementing fully the measures set out in the above-mentioned resolutions of the General Assembly, the Commission on Human Rights and the Human Rights Council, and the recommendations addressed to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea by the United Nations special procedures and treaty bodies;

(b) To protect its inhabitants, address the issue of impunity and ensure that those responsible for violations of human rights are brought to justice before an independent judiciary;

(c) To tackle the root causes leading to refugee outflows and prosecute those who exploit refugees by human smuggling, trafficking and extortion, while not criminalizing the victims, and to ensure that citizens of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea expelled or returned to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea are able to return in safety and dignity, are humanely treated and are not subjected to any kind of punishment;

(d) To extend its full cooperation to the Special Rapporteur, including by granting him full, free and unimpeded access to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and to other United Nations human rights mechanisms;

(e) To engage in technical cooperation activities in the field of human rights with the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and her Office, as pursued by the High Commissioner in recent years, with a view of improving the situation of human rights in the country, and in the universal periodic review by the Human Rights Council;

(f) To engage in cooperation with the International Labour Organization with a view to significantly improving workers’ rights;

(g) To continue and reinforce its cooperation with United Nations humanitarian agencies;

(h) To ensure full, safe and unhindered access to humanitarian aid and take measures to allow humanitarian agencies to secure its impartial delivery to all parts of the country on the basis of need in accordance with humanitarian principles, as it pledged to do, and to ensure access to adequate food and implement food security policies, including through sustainable agriculture;

6. Decides to continue its examination of the situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea at its sixty-fifth session, and to this end requests the Secretary-General to submit a comprehensive report on the situation in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Special Rapporteur to continue to report his findings and recommendations.

65th plenary meeting 18 December 2009