'External explosion' probably sank ship, S. Korean says

By Blaine Harden

Washington Post Foreign Service
Friday, April 16, 2010; 5:54 AM

TOKYO -- An "external explosion" probably sank a South Korean naval ship three weeks ago near a disputed sea border with North Korea, a government investigator said Wednesday in Seoul.

The announcement increased suspicion that North Korea was involved in what has been described as the worst naval disaster in South Korea's history. At least 38 sailors were killed, with eight others missing. Rescuers found 58 survivors.

North Korea's possible link to the ship's sinking has halted U.S. efforts to persuade Kim Jong Il's government to rejoin six-party nuclear disarmament talks. It also raises difficult questions about what, if anything, South Korea and the United States might do to retaliate against an unpredictable dictatorship that maintains an artillery arsenal capable of killing many thousands of civilians in Seoul.

The wrecked stern of the 1,200-ton Cheonan was pulled from the Yellow Sea on Thursday, giving South Korean experts their first chance to examine what ripped the ship apart on March 26. The ship sank during a routine patrol near the North-South maritime border that has been the scene of three bloody naval skirmishes between the two Koreas.

Military officials in Seoul have speculated that the ship was struck by a torpedo or collided with a mine. But the governments of South Korea and the United States have taken pains not to accuse the North of involvement, saying they want specialists to conduct a thorough investigation. Experts from the U.S. and other countries are participating in the investigation.

That cautious tone continued Friday, with state investigators saying they needed more time before drawing a final conclusion.

Yet there was a slightly harder edge to comments by Defense Minister Kim Tae-young, who said that once his government determines what caused the explosion, "we will respond in a very clear and firm manner."

Kim, who previously raised the possibility that the ship may have been sunk by a torpedo or a mine, said Friday the incident had created a "grave national security situation."

While North Korea has not commented publicly on the incident, its diplomats have told Chinese officials that the North was not involved, according to reports in the South Korean

During a briefing in Seoul, South Korea's investigative team said the sinking of the Cheonan did not appear to have been caused by an on-board accident or by running aground.

"There is a high possibility of an external explosion rather than an internal explosion," said Yoon Duk-yong, co-head of a state investigation team. "A strong force was applied to the left side of the ship, leaving the hull and iron sheets curved inward. This kind of destruction is caused by an external explosion."

He said evidence gathered from wreckage showed a low probability that the ship had sunk because of an internal blast, metal fatigue or collision with a reef. The ship's ammunition room, its fuel tank and diesel engine room were not damaged, he said, noting that there was no indication of an internal fire.

It may take months to determine precisely what sank the warship. Experts have said underwater mines left over from the Korean War in the early 1950s could still be in waters where the ship sank. Most speculation, though, has focused on the possibility of a torpedo attack.

"Small North Korean submarines have ventured into South Korean waters in the past," said Kwon Tae-young of the Korea Research Institute for Strategy, a think-tank in Seoul. "But to know the precise cause, scientific research would need to identify torpedo debris."

Hard evidence of a North Korean torpedo or mine, if it could be found, would not clarify how South Korea or the United States should respond, Kwon said.

"Even if North Korean involvement becomes clear, a military option will be hard to execute," he said. "It's a very complex situation. You have to consider your allies, the socio-economic impact and also gauge the military will of the other side."

North Korea has for decades disputed its border in the Yellow Sea with the South. Known as the Northern Limit Line, it was drawn by the U.S. military at the end of the Korean War in 1953.

The North cultivates a reputation for hair-trigger belligerence. Last year, it ignored U.N. resolutions by exploding its second nuclear device, launching a long-range ballistic missile and test-firing a number of short-range missiles into international waters.

Given to rhetorical excess, it often threatens South Korea and the United States with "all-out war." The North has also said it has the ability to turn Seoul, with a metro population of about 22 million and located just 35 miles from the border, into "a sea of fire."

That is not an empty threat, according to many military analysts.

North Korea has moved about 70 percent of its military units and up to 80 percent of its artillery to within 60 miles of the border, according to the Strategic Studies Institute, a research arm of the U.S. Army War College.

Special correspondent June Lee in Seoul contributed to this report.

Kim Jong Il's 'Cashbox'

Claudia Rosett, 04.15.10, 12:00 PM ET

Despite all the pomp and nuclear summitry, North Korea keeps sliding down President Barack Obama's to-do list. Yet something must be done. The threat here is not solely North Korea's own arsenal, or its role, despite U.S. and United Nations sanctions, as a 24/7 convenience store for rogue regimes interested in weapons of mass destruction plus delivery systems. The further problem is that North Korea provides perverse inspiration for other despotisms.

While Obama talks about a world without nuclear weapons, Kim Jong Il sets tyrants everywhere a swaggering example of how to build the bomb and get away with it. Indeed, if recluse weirdo Kim can have the bomb, how on earth could Iran's ayatollahs face themselves in the mirror every morning if they don't have one too?

In the new millennium, Pyongyang has been blazing a proliferation trail that includes illicit nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009; illicit tests of ballistic missiles; and such extravagant stuff as help for Syria in building a secret nuclear reactor (which might even now be cranking out plutonium for bombs, had the Israelis not destroyed it with an air strike in 2007). Coupled with such North Korean habits as vending missiles and munitions to the likes of Syria, Iran and Iran's Lebanon-based terrorist clients, Hezbollah, all this is a wildly dangerous mix.

So what to do about North Korea? Over the past 16 years, nuclear talks and freeze deals have repeatedly failed, under both presidents George W. Bush and Bill Clinton. Asked about North Korea in a press conference at the close of this week's nuclear summit in Washington, Obama gave the vague reply that he hoped economic pressure would lead to a resumption of the six-party talks. But he ducked the question of why sanctions have failed to halt North Korea's nuclear program, saying "I'm not going to give you a full dissertation on North Korean behavior."

OK, it's not Obama's job to deliver dissertations on North Korea. But he missed a fat opportunity to say something genuinely informed and useful. The president--and his entire foreign policy team--ought to be reading and talking (loudly) about the material contained in a highly readable 36-page monograph published just last month by the Strategic Studies Institute of the Army War College: "Criminal Sovereignty: Understanding North Korea's Illicit International Activities."

This study is co-authored by three men who share an unusually clear-eyed interest in exploring the nitty-gritty of North Korea's inner workings, Paul Rexton Kan, Bruce E. Bechtol Jr. and Robert Collins. Among them, going back more than three decades, they have more experience observing North Korea than some of the high-profile diplomats who have parleyed with Pyongyang in recent years from the five-star hotels of Beijing and Berlin. For this publication the three analysts draw on congressional testimony, press reports from around Asia and interviews with North Korean defectors (a resource too often ignored or underutilized by Washington officialdom).

"Criminal Sovereignty" focuses not on proliferation per se, but on a curious institution within North Korea's government, usually referred to as Bureau No, 39. And what, exactly, is Bureau No. 39?

Located in a heavily guarded concrete building in downtown Pyongyang, Bureau No. 39 is the nerve center of North Korea's state-run network of international crime. Its official name is Central Committee Bureau 39 of the Korean Workers' Party. The authors refer to it by what Bechtol says is the more accurately nuanced translation of "Office No. 39."

The mission of Office No. 39 is to generate torrents of cash for North Korean ruler Kim Jong Il, by way of illicit activities abroad. Favorite rackets include international trafficking of drugs produced under state supervision in North Korea, and state production and laundering into world markets of counterfeit U.S. currency, and cigarettes. Such activities are tied directly to the survival of Kim's regime. The authors report "the crimes organized by Office No. 39 are committed beyond the borders of North Korea by the regime itself, not solely for the personal enrichment of the leadership, but to prop up its armed forces and to fund its military programs."

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What sets Office No. 39 apart from more pedestrian political corruption or organized crime is that this operation is not some wayward private gang or unauthorized appendage of government. It is an integral and institutionalized part of the North Korean regime. As such, it enjoys the perquisites and protective trappings of the modern nation-state, including the use of North Korean embassies and state-run businesses abroad, and the reluctance of other nations to intervene in the sovereign affairs of North Korea.

Office No. 39 is directly tied to Kim himself, who set it up way back in 1974, when his father, Kim Il Sung, was still in power. The authors explain: "This office was established for the explicit purpose of running illegal activities to generate currency for the North Korean government." Since the 1991 Soviet collapse, which ended subsidies from Moscow, Office No. 39 has become ever more important, and especially over the past 10 years, its activities have become more prolific.

Office No. 39 continues to report directly to Kim, who took charge of the regime when his father died in 1994. According to a North Korean defector interviewed by the authors, Kim Kwang-Jin, who has firsthand knowledge of North Korean financial practices, Office No. 39 is also known to North Korean insiders as "the keeper of Kim's cashbox." Organized into 10 departments, specializing in various illicit activities, Office No. 39 serves as a slush fund through which billions of dollars have flowed over the years. In a bizarre personal touch, these funds are collected and presented periodically to Kim in aggregate amounts, labeled "revolutionary funds," on such special occasions as his official birthday, Feb. 12, or the birthday of his late father, Kim Il Sung, April 15th.

This money is not spent on easing the miseries of millions of repressed and famished North Koreans. That effort--from which Kim also has a record of appropriating resources to sustain his regime--is left to the likes of international donors, contributing via outfits such as the United Nations. The authors explain that the profits of Bureau 39 help swell the offshore bank accounts of Kim's regime, used not only to pay for his luxurious lifestyle, but to buy the loyalties and materials that underpin his totalitarian, nuclear-entwined military state.

If Office No. 39 enjoys the amenities of operating as part of the North Korean state, it is by the same token an avenue of vulnerability leading straight to Kim Jong Il. That was evident back in 2005, when the U.S. Treasury caused clear pain for Kim by targeting a major hub of Office No. 39 financial activities in Macau--only to be only to be yanked off the case by a State Department desperate to coddle Kim into a nuclear freeze deal, which then flopped.

These days U.S. and U.N. efforts to corral North Korea seem focused narrowly on activities tied directly to nuclear proliferation. It's been a while since Washington complained loudly about the rest of Kim's rackets. Obama needs to think bigger, speak up and solicit the world's help in cracking down much harder on the all the networks of Office No. 39. Emptying Kim's cashbox could go farther toward ending the North Korean nuclear threat than any amount of six-party talks or summits.

Claudia Rosett, a journalist in residence with the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, writes a weekly column on foreign affairs for Forbes.

Read more Forbes Opinions here.

Humanitarian violations in North Korea

By Sarah G. Kim
April 16, 2010
Section: Arts, Etc.

What is the first thought that runs through your mind when you hear “North Korea?” Is it nuclear bombs? Or Communism? Or even their “dear leader,” Kim Jong-Il? Or maybe you were one of the few who thought about the human rights violations.

At the end of World War II, the Korean peninsula was divided into Soviet and American occupied zones. Because North Korea refused to participate in the United Nations supervised election in 1948, two separate Korean governments were created for the two occupation zones. The clash of Communism and Democracy led to the Korean War in 1950. A 1953 armistice ended the fighting, however the two countries are technically still at war with each other because a peace treaty was never signed. Currently, communist North Korea is a single-party state led by the Korean Workers’ Party, of which Kim Jong-Il is the head. They claim to have an arsenal of Weapons of Mass Destruction and to possess nuclear weapons. This is the North Korea that is commonly portrayed throughout the world. However, there is another side to this dark story.

Many people around the world are unaware of the human rights violations that exist in North Korea. Do you even know that they exist? Here are some basic facts about the human rights crisis from the organization Liberty in North Korea:

The North Korean government forbids freedom of speech, press, assembly, and association. They even control the press and barely allow any outside information into the country. North Korea consistently ranks first among the countries with the least amount of freedom of the press. Freedom of religion, physical movement, and workers’ rights are also severely restricted.

The mid-1990s famine killed over one million people in part due to the government’s neglect and mismanagement of relief efforts. During the past five years, the government has continued to let their people suffer from severe food shortages and a near-total breakdown in the public health system. This has led to devastating malnutrition in North Korea and an entire generation of children physically and mentally impaired.

Thirty-seven percent of children in North Korea have stunted grown due to malnutrition and 23 percent are underweight.

There are an estimated 200,000 North Koreans who were forced into political concentration camps. They are provided no explanation or reasoning as to why they are brought to such a place. Usually, all sentences are for life, and execution and torture are a common method of punishment. Recently, satellite images revealed gas chambers in these concentration camps.

Article Seven of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court defines 11 categories of acts that constitute crimes against humanity: murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation or forcible transfer of population, imprisonment, torture, rape, sexual slavery or enforced prostitution, persecution and enforced disappearance of persons, apartheid and other inhumane acts. North Korea is guilty of committing every single one of these acts on a systematic basis with the exception of apartheid.

North Korean laborers under labor contracts are forced to work under arrangements where they are denied the freedom of movement and a large portion of their salaries are deposited into government accounts.

About 10,000 to 15,000 laborers are subjected to harsh conditions in jobs involving construction and logging.

Estimates of 50,000 up to 400,000 refugees have fled to neighboring countries, risking torture and execution if captured.

Of these refugees, 70 percent of North Korean women and children who escape into China face exploitation and sex trafficking. In North Korea, children are routinely forced into child labor, and sexual servitude within the prison camps.

Situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s - General Assembly recognizes that UNDP in DPRK failed to provide assistance to those in need

64/175.

Resolution adopted by the General Assembly

[on the report of the Third Committee (A/64/439/Add.3)]

Situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

Reaffirming that States Members of the United Nations have an obligation to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms and to fulfil the obligations that they have undertaken under the various international instruments,

Mindful that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,1 the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,1 the Convention on the Rights of the Child2 and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,3

Noting the constructive dialogue with the Committee on the Rights of the Child during the consideration of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s combined third and fourth periodic reports on the implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child as a sign of engagement in international cooperative efforts in the field of human rights, and hoping that the enhanced dialogue will contribute to improving the situation of children in the country,

Taking note of the concluding observations of the treaty-monitoring bodies under the four treaties to which the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is a party, the most recent of which were given by the Committee on the Rights of the Child in January 2009,4

Noting with appreciation the collaboration established between the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the United Nations Children’s Fund and the World Health Organization in order to improve the health situation in the country, and the collaboration established with the United Nations Children’s Fund in order to improve the quality of education for children,

Noting the decision on the resumption, on a modest scale, of the activities of the United Nations Development Programme in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and encouraging the engagement of the Government with the international community to ensure that the programmes benefit the persons in need of assistance,

Recalling its resolutions 60/173 of 16 December 2005, 61/174 of 19 December 2006, 62/167 of 18 December 2007 and 63/190 of 18 December 2008, Commission on Human Rights resolutions 2003/10 of 16 April 2003,5 2004/13 of 15 April 20046 and 2005/11 of 14 April 2005,7 Human Rights Council decision 1/102 of 30 June 20068 and Council resolutions 7/15 of 27March 20089 and 10/16 of 26March 2009,10 and mindful of the need for the international community to strengthen its coordinated efforts aimed at achieving the implementation of those resolutions,

Taking note of the report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,11 regretting that he still has not been allowed to visit the country and that he received no cooperation from the authorities of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and taking note also of the comprehensive report of the Secretary-General on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea submitted in accordance with resolution 63/190,12

Noting the importance of the inter-Korean dialogue, which could contribute to the improvement of the human rights and humanitarian situation in the country,

Welcoming the recent resumption of the reunion of separated families across the border, which is an urgent humanitarian concern of the entire Korean people,

1. Expresses its very serious concern at:

(a) The persistence of continuing reports of systematic, widespread and grave violations of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, including:

(i) Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, including inhuman conditions of detention, public executions, extrajudicial and arbitrary detention; the absence of due process and the rule of law, including fair trial guarantees and an independent judiciary; the imposition of the death penalty for political and religious reasons; collective punishments; and the existence of a large number of prison camps and the extensive use of forced labour;

(ii) Limitations imposed on every person who wishes to move freely within the country and travel abroad, including the punishment of those who leave or try to leave the country without permission, or their families, as well as punishment of persons who are returned;

(iii) The situation of refugees and asylum-seekers expelled or returned to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and sanctions imposed on citizens of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea who have been repatriated from abroad, leading to punishments of internment, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or the death penalty, and, in this regard, urges all States to respect the fundamental principle of non-refoulement, to treat those who seek refuge humanely and to ensure unhindered access to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and his Office, with a view to improving the situation of those who seek refuge, and once again urges States parties to comply with their obligations under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees13 and the 1967 Protocol thereto14 in relation to refugees from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea who are covered by those instruments;

(iv) All-pervasive and severe restrictions on the freedoms of thought, conscience, religion, opinion and expression, peaceful assembly and association, the right to privacy and equal access to information, by such means as the persecution of individuals exercising their freedom of opinion and expression, and their families, and on the right of everyone to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives, of his or her country;

(v) The violations of economic, social and cultural rights, which have led to severe malnutrition, widespread health problems and other hardship for the population in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, in particular for persons belonging to particularly exposed groups, inter alia, women, children and the elderly;

(vi) Continuing violations of the human rights and fundamental freedoms of women, in particular the trafficking of women for the purpose of prostitution or forced marriage and the subjection of women to human smuggling, forced abortions, gender-based discrimination, including in the economic sphere, and gender-based violence;

(vii) Continuing reports of violations of the human rights and fundamental freedoms of children, in particular the continued lack of access to basic economic, social and cultural rights for many children, and in this regard notes the particularly vulnerable situation faced by, inter alia, returned or repatriated children, street children, children with disabilities, children whose parents are detained, children living in detention or in institutions and children in conflict with the law;4

(viii) Continuing reports of violations of the human rights and fundamental freedoms of persons with disabilities, especially on the use of collective camps and of coercive measures that target the rights of persons with disabilities to decide freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of their children;

(ix) Violations of workers’ rights, including the right to freedom of association and collective bargaining, the right to strike as defined by the obligations of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,1 and the prohibition of the economic exploitation of children and of any harmful or hazardous work of children as defined by the obligations of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea under the Convention on the Rights of the Child;2

(b) The continued refusal of the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to recognize the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea or to extend cooperation to him, despite the renewal of the mandate by the Human Rights Council in its resolutions 7/15 and 10/16;

2. Reiterates its very serious concern at unresolved questions of international concern relating to abductions in the form of enforced disappearance, which violates the human rights of nationals of other sovereign countries, and in this regard strongly calls upon the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea urgently to resolve these questions, including through existing channels, in a transparent manner, including by ensuring the immediate return of abductees;

3. Expresses its very deep concern at the precarious humanitarian situation in the country, partly as a result of frequent natural disasters, compounded by the misallocation of resources away from the satisfaction of basic needs, and the increasing State restrictions on the cultivation and trade in foodstuffs, as well as the prevalence of maternal malnutrition and of infant malnutrition, which, despite some progress, continues to affect the physical and mental development of a significant proportion of children, and urges the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, in this regard, to take preventive and remedial action;

4. Commends the Special Rapporteur for the activities undertaken so far and for his continued efforts in the conduct of his mandate despite the limited access to information;

5. Strongly urges the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to respect fully all human rights and fundamental freedoms and, in this regard:

(a) To immediately put an end to the systematic, widespread and grave violations of human rights mentioned above, inter alia, by implementing fully the measures set out in the above-mentioned resolutions of the General Assembly, the Commission on Human Rights and the Human Rights Council, and the recommendations addressed to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea by the United Nations special procedures and treaty bodies;

(b) To protect its inhabitants, address the issue of impunity and ensure that those responsible for violations of human rights are brought to justice before an independent judiciary;

(c) To tackle the root causes leading to refugee outflows and prosecute those who exploit refugees by human smuggling, trafficking and extortion, while not criminalizing the victims, and to ensure that citizens of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea expelled or returned to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea are able to return in safety and dignity, are humanely treated and are not subjected to any kind of punishment;

(d) To extend its full cooperation to the Special Rapporteur, including by granting him full, free and unimpeded access to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and to other United Nations human rights mechanisms;

(e) To engage in technical cooperation activities in the field of human rights with the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and her Office, as pursued by the High Commissioner in recent years, with a view of improving the situation of human rights in the country, and in the universal periodic review by the Human Rights Council;

(f) To engage in cooperation with the International Labour Organization with a view to significantly improving workers’ rights;

(g) To continue and reinforce its cooperation with United Nations humanitarian agencies;

(h) To ensure full, safe and unhindered access to humanitarian aid and take measures to allow humanitarian agencies to secure its impartial delivery to all parts of the country on the basis of need in accordance with humanitarian principles, as it pledged to do, and to ensure access to adequate food and implement food security policies, including through sustainable agriculture;

6. Decides to continue its examination of the situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea at its sixty-fifth session, and to this end requests the Secretary-General to submit a comprehensive report on the situation in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Special Rapporteur to continue to report his findings and recommendations.

65th plenary meeting 18 December 2009

Confidential document reveals Obama's hardline US climate talk strategy

Document outlines key messages the Obama administration wants to convey in the run-up to UN climate talks in Mexico in November

The document outlines key messages the Obama administration wants to convey in the run-up to UN climate talks in Mexico in November. Photograph: Anja Niedringhaus/AP

A document accidentally left on a European hotel computer and passed to the Guardian reveals the US government's increasingly controversial strategy in the global UN climate talks.

Titled Strategic communications objectives and dated 11 March 2010, it outlines the key messages that the Obama administration wants to convey to its critics and to the world media in the run-up to the vital UN climate talks in Cancun, Mexico in November. (You can read the document text below).

Top of the list of objectives is to: "Reinforce the perception that the US is constructively engaged in UN negotiations in an effort to produce a global regime to combat climate change." It also talks of "managing expectations" of the outcome of the Cancun meeting and bypassing traditional media outlets by using podcasts and "intimate meetings" with the chief US negotiator to disarm the US's harsher critics.

But the key phrase is in paragraph three where the author writes: "Create a clear understanding of the CA's [Copenhagen accord's] standing and the importance of operationalising ALL elements."

This is the clearest signal that the US will refuse to negotiate on separate elements of the controversial accord, but intends to push it through the UN process as a single "take it or leave it" text. The accord is the last-minute agreement reached at the chaotic Copenhagen summit in December. Over 110 countries are now "associated" with the accord but it has not been adopted by the 192-nation UN climate convention. The US has denied aid to some countries that do not support the accord.

The "take it or leave it" approach divided countries in Bonn this weekendand alienated most developing countries including China, India and Brazil who want to take parts of the accord to include in the formal UN negotiations. They say the accord has no legal standing and should not be used as the basis of the final legally binding agreement because it is not ambitious enough. It lacks any specific cuts in greenhouse gas emissions and sets a temperature rise limit of 2C, which critics say is too high to prevent serious harm to Africa and other parts of the world.

Last night Jonathan Pershing, lead US negotiator at the Bonn talks, said he "had no knowledge" of the document. But he endorsed one of its key messages. "We are not prepared to see a process go forward in which certain elements are cherry-picked. That was not the agreement we reached in Copenhagen," he said.

Text of the leaked document:

Strategic communications objectives

1) Reinforce the perception that the US is constructively engaged in UN negotiations in an effort to produce a global regime to combat climate change. This includes support for a symmetrical and legally binding treaty.

2) Manage expectations for Cancun – Without owning the message, advance the narrative that while a symmetrical legally binding treaty in Mexico is unlikely, solid progress can be made on the six or so main elements.

3) Create a clear understanding of the CA's standing and the importance of operationalising ALL elements.

4) Build and maintain outside support for the administration's commitment to meeting the climate and clean energy challenge despite an increasingly difficult political environment to pass legislation.

5) Deepen support and understanding from the developing world that advanced developing countries must be part of any meaningful solution to climate change including taking responsibilities under a legally binding treaty.

Media outreach

• Continue to conduct interviews with print, TV and radio outlets driving the climate change story.

• Increase use of off-the-record conversations.

• Strengthen presence in international media markets during trips abroad. Focus efforts on radio and television markets.

• Take greater advantage of new media opportunities such as podcasts to advance US position in the field bypassing traditional media outlets.

• Consider a series of policy speeches/public forums during trips abroad to make our case directly to the developing world.

Key outreach efforts

• Comprehensive and early outreach to policy makers, key stakeholders and validators is critical to broadening support for our positions in the coming year.

• Prior to the 9-11 April meeting in Bonn it would be good for Todd to meet with leading NGOs. This should come in the form of 1:1s and small group sessions.

• Larger group sessions, similar to the one held at CAP prior to Copenhagen, will be useful down the line, but more intimate meetings in the spring are essential to building the foundation of support. Or at the very least, disarming some of the harsher critics.

National Review: The U.N. 'Love Boat'

by BRETT D. SCHAEFER

EnlargeiStockphoto.com

The World Food Program has rented out two passenger ships to accommodate many U.N. staff members off the coast of Haiti. At $112,500 per day, how much of these costs are passed off onto the U.S., the largest contributor to WFP.

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April 13, 2010

In a story posted last week on Fox News's website, George Russell laid out one of the most outrageous examples of poor judgment and profligacy seen in recent years from a U.N. organization. As Russell reports, two passenger ships (the Ola Esmeralda and the Sea Voyager) have been rented by the World Food Program — a U.N. humanitarian-relief organization — for $112,500 per day for the purposes of "accommodation for many of the U.N.'s international staff" off the coast of Haiti. The ships are also available to NGO workers and dignitaries such as Brazilian president Luiz Inacio da Silva, who recently visited the impoverished and earthquake-ravaged island. The total cost of renting these ships is projected to be over $10 million for the first 90 days. U.N. staff call one of the ships the "Love Boat."

Sensing that the news might not be received well, WFP quickly pulled down its own article (complete with pictures) about the ships. Russell preserved the story, however, and does a wonderful job of exposing the many questions surrounding WFP's decision to rent these ships. Among the highlights:

WFP is being overcharged, because the projected expense is millions of dollars more than what the ships would have been likely to earn through normal operation.

The Ola Esmeralda is owned by a Venezuelan company with close ties to Pres. Hugo Chavez.

Also included in the story is a revealing insight into the U.N. mindset. Russell asked Edmond Mulet, special representative in Haiti of the U.N. secretary general and head of the U.N. peacekeeping mission (MINUSTAH) in the country, about the decision. Mulet's answer, spread through several quotes in the story, was shocking: "It is the least we could do for them. They are working 14, 16 hours a day. The place was pulverized. Living conditions are really appalling. . . . [When] oxygen masks come down in a falling plane, the first thing you do is put them on yourself. You have to be in good shape in order to help the Haitians."

Apparently, a visit to the Lido Deck is just the thing for staying in "good shape."

Russell reports that if the two boats are fully booked, the cost to WFP is $181.81 per passenger per day for the Sea Voyager and $154.25 per passenger per day for the Ola Esmeralda. But U.N. staffers get to stay on the ships for $40 per day, and those participating in the U.N. peacekeeping mission get to stay for $20 per day. So WFP, even if the ship is full, provides each U.N. "passenger" a direct subsidy of up to $161.81 per day. But WFP doesn't really pay for it, of course; the taxpayers in the countries who contribute to WFP do. In 2008, the U.S. gave over $2 billion to WFP — about 40 percent of its total budget.

And as if that weren't enough, American taxpayers pay roughly a quarter of the expense of U.N. operations and staff salaries — expenditures that include a Daily Subsistence Allowance for U.N. staff of $244 dollars. Reasonable people might wonder, given that their daily allowances would more than cover it, why WFP is not charging U.N. staff the full cost of staying on the ships rather than $40 or $20 per day. Such is the regard U.N. agencies have for our hard-earned tax dollars.

This is just the latest in a series of missteps by WFP. For instance, according to a March 2010 report by the U.N. Monitoring Group on Somalia, "up to half of the food aid intended for needy Somalis is routinely diverted," and WFP food-aid delivery was dominated by three individuals (and their families and associates) linked to "arms sales and insurgent connections." A February 2010 story, also by Russell, detailed how WFP's relief effort in Afghanistan was inflated, with some outside experts saying that “some of the costs are more than 100 percent higher than they need to be."

Since the U.S. is by far the largest contributor to the World Food Program, Congress should take a keen interest in its activities in Haiti and elsewhere.

Galbraith: Karzai Ripped Off U.S. Taxpayers

Peter W. Galbraith served as United Nations deputy envoy to Afghanistan from June to September 2009. He was fired after urging the U.N. to respond to what he described as "massive electoral fraud" committed by the Afghan Independent Election Commission during the 2009 national elections.

Former diplomat Peter Galbraith Talks to ABC News about Afghanistan President Karzai and allegations of corruption in recent elections.

(AP Photo)

Recently, President Hamid Karzai admitted there was electoral fraud, but blamedGalbraith and other Westerners. Here is Galbraith's response in an exclusive to ABC News.

1. Why do you think Karzai blamed you specifically for election fraud during last year's national elections?

I can't imagine why Karzai would accuse me of orchestrating the fraud. As is well known, I thought the U.N. had a responsibility to prevent fraud in what were U.N.-funded and U.N.-supported elections. My superiors felt so strongly that the U.N. should not get involved that Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon fired me.

Karzai's accusation that I was behind the fraud is therefore exceptionally bizarre. He claims I committed the fraud -- involving more than one million phony Karzai votes -- so I could leak this to the media and weaken him.

Obviously it raises more questions about his state of mind than about anything I did.

It is interesting, though, that he now admits his re-election was fraudulent.

2. Why do you think Karzai has recently been lashing out against the U.S. to Afghan officials and parliamentarians? Do you think there is credence to the idea that he is simply posturing himself as an independent leader who is the sole arbiter for reconciliation talks with the Taliban?

Afghans see the same weird behavior that we do. Afghans know Karzai's was not legitimately re-elected, and they wonder why he would make such improbable allegations [and thereby draw renewed attention to the elections]. The NATO coalition is reasonably popular with many Afghans, and Afghans rightly worry that Karzai's antics will alienate his country's most important supporters.

3. On Tuesday, the White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs declined to say whether Karzai is an ally or not. Is he an ally? Yes, but not a useful one. I think Gibbs was wrong to call Karzai the democratically elected leader of Afghanistan. It undermines U.S. credibility when the White House says something Afghans know is not true.

4. Do you think that U.S. public pressure from the Obama administration on Karzai to fight corruption helps or hurts the effort to achieve that end? Karzai has no desire to fight corruption and is not capable of so doing. Stealing an election is the ultimate corrupt act as it enables all subsequent larceny.

Of course, the Obama administration has to make the effort but there is no prospect that it will make a material difference.

5. What needs to be done to have an honest election in September? What are your expectations? Will we see honest elections this time?

If Afghanistan's electoral machinery remains unchanged, there is no prospect that the fall parliamentary elections will be honest. Elections in Afghanistan are the responsibility of the Independent Election Commission (IEC), which is not independent at all. Karzai appoints the IEC members, and they do his bidding. The IEC, or its staff, were complicit in every case of significant fraud in the 2009 presidential elections. To make matters worse, Karzai promulgated a decree in February giving him the power to appoint all five members of the Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC), a previously independent body that threw out hundreds of thousands of phony Karzai votes.

Fortunately, the West has enormous leverage over Afghanistan's electoral processes. Unless Western donors pay for Afghanistan's elections, they cannot be held. The U.S. should provide no funds for Afghanistan's elections until Karzai rescinds the decree giving him control over the ECC and until Afghanistan establishes a genuinely independent IEC with no Karzai appointees. If the Obama administration is unwilling to be tough, Congress should place such a condition into the law appropriating election funding.

U.S. taxpayers provided $200 million to pay for the fraudulent 2009 presidential elections. We were ripped off. President Obama and the Congress should make sure that does not happen again.

6. You were fired over your bringing allegations of fraud to your superior, Kai Eide, the U.N. special representative to Afghanistan. As we become more aware that corruption is still an enormous problem in Afghanistan, do you feel somewhat vindicated in your decision to bring the allegations to light?

I feel completely vindicated but that is small consolation. It would be much better if the U.N. hierarchy had supported steps last summer that might have mitigated the fraud and avoided a prolonged political crisis that undermines all the U.S. and the U.N. seek to accomplish in Afghanistan.

7. Critics say you may be right about corruption in Afghanistan, but you are being pessimistic. Is this true? True. I see no prospects for improvement under current circumstances.

8. What tools can effectively fight corruption in Afghanistan, as far as U.S. tools, or Afghan government action?

The U.S. needs to recognize that stealing a national election is the most debilitating possible corruption. The Obama administration and the Congress should use its financial leverage to make sure Karzai doesn't steal this year's parliamentary elections.

9. How optimistic are you about the prospect of Afghan government reconciliation with the Taliban and other insurgent groups?

I support negotiations with the Taliban leadership. As we are unlikely to defeat them, negotiation is the only way to end the war. At the moment, the Taliban must feel things are going their way. They operate in more of the country than ever before, Karzai is visibly unglued, and domestic support for the Afghanistan war is eroding in key troop-contributing countries. So, the Taliban may well believe they have more to gain from fighting than from negotiation. Still, negotiations are worth a try.

10. You characterize the war in Afghanistan as one that cannot be won nor lost. Is this war a quagmire in your opinion?

Yes. We can't defeat the Taliban because we don't have a credible local partner. The Taliban, which is an entirely Pashtun movement, cannot take territory in the half of Afghanistan that is not Pashtun and they cannot take Kabul.