I was reading Claudia's portal and found a very interesting comment posted in there from an Alex Reed. Since his or her comments were posted as public under Claudia's page, and since those represent a very interesting view point from someone who seem to be an insider into IT and UN, am publishing this COMMENTS on as they are:
By ALEX REED
Were we to enquire, "Watchman, what of the night?" over at UNDP, what tales might be told.....
There are a few of things that come to mind after a quick look at the Asset Disposal Request, pages 1 & 2.
The bad news first -- before anyone gets into their ninja outfits or gets all lawyerly on UNDP......
• As you note, these documents date from September, 2007. I don't know at what stage in the UN disposal process the Disposal Request comes in. However, at some point, either before or after the Disposal Request is signed, any IT department would carefully wipe all hard drives before final physical disposal of such equipment. In the case of such presumably sensitive UNDP information (Ha!), I would expect them to overwrite the hard drives at least 7 times (this would meet the U.S. Department of Defense 5220-22-M standard for securely erasing disks). However, software is readily available that would overwrite 35 or 50 times. That many overwrites would be very, very time consuming -- but then, they've had since January, 2007, when the Cash-for-Kim story broke, to do the deed. Once the overwrites are done, for the very determined and thorough tidy-upper, there's the option of the old sledge-hammer technique for the hard drives. But if the UNDippies are truly professional about their disposals, after all the overwrites have been done, the final repose of the hard disks would see them make their departure Viking-style across the waters of the Hudson River..... to keep a rendez-vous with Tony Soprano's friend in the car compactor business who would send them through his metal grinder first, and then into the compactor to become one with a late model Escalade and other biodegradable sundries. If UNDP were this good, the hard drives, by now, would have been ground up/squished/melted/reformed, and currently would be rolling down Solano Avenue in the People's Republic of Berkeley as a Toyota Prius. In reality, they don't have to be that good because they have the luxury of operating in total secrecy. And since the mandarins in charge of our esteemed State Department appear quite unperturbed by UNDP chicanery, and are too busy selling out Israel at the moment anyway, UNDP looks to be able to continue on its merry secret way.
• It would be good to know when UNDP decided to replace all these servers en masse -- before or after Cash-for-Kim burst upon the world? When was the replacement equipment ordered? When did it arrive?
Now for some, perhaps, slightly better news.....
• Even if the original hard drives and their contents have been destroyed, there must be back-ups that were done, day by day, of all the information on all the servers.
• Now the UNDP administration (o.k., Dervis & Melkert) has proved itself to be world-class in at least one department: high-handed arrogance. But even they would not be stupid enough to destroy all the original backups just to destroy the documents that could give them problems. That would tear the lid off once and for all. That's one thing that would light a redhot fire under Congress -- and then say farewell to all UNDP funding from the U.S. and our allies.
• Perhaps the back-ups could be altered and some inculpatory documents erased, but this could be detected, and whatever was erased could probably be recovered. To irretrievably erase every damning document for a period that ran to many years, and to do so without destroying everything, would be a physical impossibility -- even with an army of IT guys working 24/7 since last January.
• Unfortunately, to go through all those back-ups and find the smoking gun documents would also require an army of IT people working 24/7 -- and knowing what to look for. But then, isn't that why we have a U.S. Government?
• Assuming that Dervis and Melkert are not suicidal, and that thus the original day to day server backups do still exist, the big question is, of course, how to get at them. Given the appalling lack of transparency in all other areas of the UNDP set up, I can't see them suddenly forking over the potential bombshell backups if we simply ask nicely and say please. Can some U.S. government agency, or Congressional Committee get hold of the backups? The Federal Prosecutors in Manhattan? This may be a job for the X-Men!
• I found a couple of details in the second UNDP document worrying. (This is the "Minutes OIST CAP Committee Meeting No. 018" Held on Wednesday, 12 September 2007.)
• In the first paragraph, they request the nice round figure of $500,000 (American taxpayer dollars at work!) for "various products and services, including but not limited to" Symantec anti-virus software, and Veritas NetBackup. The very vague "various products and services" and the very lawyerly "including but not limited to" could cover quite a bit of nasty terra incognita. It would be good to know just what exactly were ALL the "products and services" included in this $500K shopping spree.
• The second point of concern I have is about the proposed purchase of Veritas NetBackup software. Why, if they were about to dispose of the 11 servers (which originally cost about $265K), do they need the Veritas NetBackup software? To go with what equipment? What variety of server is replacing the old stuff? What was the Veritas NetBackup software supposed to back up? What was the backup software used with the old servers over all the years they were in use up until now? Where are all the old backups? Is part of the $500K in "services" being used to have the old backups somehow "translated" so they can still be accessed by the new servers? It would seem a necessary step in any such wholesale transition to all new equipment. If so, is there any "editing" of content from the original backups going on in order to purge the backups of any inconvenient paperwork? Again where are the original backups? -- this should be the first of all questions.
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One note about the UNDP Pyongyang files. I seem to remember reading an aside buried at the very end of an Inner City Press report this last week that noted that 52 boxes of files/papers from the UNDP Pyongyang office have been shipped to UNDP in Beijing. Wait, here it is, On UN Accountability, Many Words But Few Answers, Growing Mistrust Noted from 20 November 2007: "Meanwhile, UNDP reported (sic) moved 52 boxes of documents from North Korea to its building in Beijing, but will not bring them to New York, on the theory that they could somehow be tampered with. By who?" Another source put the shipment at 59 boxes. Just what the 52/59 boxes of UNDP mystery files contain is not clear. A Beijing tourism note: it is said that Maurice Strong's office in Beijing is located right across the road from UNDP's Beijing outpost. Watchman, what of the night?
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One thing that comes to mind when you read Alex's comments is that those makes you wonder if people like Alex should instead worked inside UNDP - how different the UNDP would have been.
Alex you are welcome to post any further comments and or additions to your thoughts if you wish to. Best UNDP Watch.
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