UNOPS PROBLEMS WITH BOARD OF AUDITORS

Current challenges and measures to address them

2. For the 2006-2007 biennium the Board of Auditors had issued a modified audit opinion, in which, among other concerns, there were three matters of emphasis, namely, the unreconciled inter-fund account mainly with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), deferred revenue and non-expendable assets. The financial situation of the organization has improved significantly over the course of the last three biennia. This has occurred despite the fact that in the last five years, in addition to a number of significant write-offs, UNOPS made exceptionally high bad-debt provisions, covering sizeable losses from prior periods, and made full accrual for all end-of-service liabilities, including after-service health insurance. As at December 2009, UNOPS reserves were fully replenished at $42.7 million, representing an addition of some $38.4 million since December 2005.

Issues to watch and risks to mitigate

In paragraph 45, UNOPS agreed with the Board’s reiterated prior recommendation to review its accounting policies regarding revenue recognition, as part of its preparation for IPSAS implementation.

1. UNOPS has established an IPSAS project board to drive the organization-wide

transition from UNSAS to IPSAS by January 2012. UNOPS is presently reviewing

and drafting its revenue recognition policy for project revenue. The policy will be

based on the percentage completion method.

Department responsible: Finance

Status: In progress

Priority: High

Target date: December 2010

In paragraph 48, UNOPS agreed with the Board’s recommendation to establish procedures to review the reasonableness of the interest income received from the UNDP Treasury.

2. UNOPS has conceptualized a methodology to review the interest received

from the UNDP Treasury for reasonableness on a quarterly basis.

Department responsible: Finance

Status: In progress

Priority: High

Target date: December 2010

In paragraph 51, UNOPS agreed with the Board’s recommendation to regularly monitor administrative budgets on a line-by-line basis to ensure that budgets are not exceeded.

3. UNOPS follows a rigorous half-yearly budget review process of administrative

expenditures throughout its country offices, regional offices and headquarters.

Department responsible: Finance

Status: In progress

Priority: Medium

Target date: December 2010

In paragraph 57, UNOPS agreed with the Board’s recommendation to address instances of obligations raised that are not supported with valid and appropriate obligating documents.

4. UNOPS retired the imprest modality in April 2010, and further occurrences of

the instances noted by the Board have been prevented. UNOPS monitors purchase

orders on its financial dashboard, and random purchase orders are selected for

review at headquarters. In addition, quarterly certification of obligating documents

is requested from regional directors.

Department responsible: Finance

Status: Completed

Priority: High

Target date: Fully implemented

In paragraph 64, UNOPS agreed with the Board’s recommendation to implement controls and reports to accurately differentiate between project receivable and payable balances and project balances that represent over-expenditure.

5. UNOPS has implemented a quarterly project quality assurance review process

for all projects. Any project over-expenditure is highlighted for action through the

quality assurance process. Furthermore, reports will be prepared for the next audit to

clearly differentiate project receivable and project payable balances.

Department responsible: Finance

Status: In progress

Priority: High

Target date: December 2010 & April 2011

In paragraph 65, UNOPS agreed with the Board’s further recommendation to improve its system controls to prevent and detect any classification errors in financial reporting in a timely manner.

6. UNOPS will implement monitoring and review controls to detect

misclassifications in a timely manner and prior to financial reporting.

Department responsible: Finance

Status: In Progress

Priority: High

Target date: December 2010

In paragraph 69, UNOPS agreed with the Board’s recommendation to account for the funds received in advance from donors as a liability upon receipt of the funds and not as a credit entry within the accounts receivable accounts.

7. UNOPS will implement an annual review process to identify credit balances in

accounts receivable and to reclassify these as accounts payable.

Department responsible: Finance

Status: In Progress

Priority: Medium

In paragraph 72, UNOPS agreed with the Board’s recommendation to (a) follow-up and clear the credit balances in the accounts receivable, and (b) reclassify credit balances in accounts receivable and account for them as payable.

8. UNOPS will implement an annual review process to identify credit balances in

accounts receivable and to reclassify these as accounts payable.

Department responsible: Finance

Status: In Progress

Priority: Medium

Target date: December 2010

In paragraph 83, UNOPS agreed with the Board’s recommendation to resolve the disputed inter-fund differences in its accounts with UNDP.

9. Resolution of the historic UNOPS-UNDP inter-fund differences is sought and

is currently under discussion at the Executive Director level. These negotiations are

expected to be finalized by the end of 2010.

Department responsible: Finance

Status: In progress

Priority: High

Target date: December 2010

In paragraph 86, UNOPS agreed with the Board’s recommendation to (a) follow-up the rejected project expenditures and make appropriate accounting entries, (b) improve the validation of information captured on its system to ensure that the incidents of rejections are minimized, and (c) consider alternate arrangements with UNDP to further improve the acceptance rate.

10. UNOPS continues to submit project expenditures to UNDP on a quarterly

basis. In late 2009, UNOPS developed a project expenditure validation system to

detect possible rejections and correction of data prior to submission to UNDP.

Overall, the validation process has reduced the rate of rejections to below 1 per cent

for the 2009 year. In addition, UNOPS is also in the process of implementing new

controls to prevent incorrect posting of project expenditures to the chart of accounts.

Department responsible : Finance

Status : In Progress

Priority : High

Target date : December 2010

In paragraph 91, UNOPS agreed with the Board’s recommendation to (a) continue to follow-up on the unreconciled inter-fund differences in its accounts, and (b) engage with the relevant United Nations agencies in order to resolve the old inter-fund differences.

11. As part of the UNOPS project closure phase 2 initiative, meetings will be set

up with the relevant UN agencies to negotiate a resolution of the old inter-fund

differences.

Department responsible: Finance

Status: In Progress

Priority: High

Target date: March 2011

In paragraph 111, UNOPS agreed with the Board’s recommendation to consider a revision of its policy for the valuation of the annual leave liability in its implementation of International Public Sector Accounting Standards.

12. UNOPS selection of policies for the valuation of the annual leave liability is

based on decisions made for the entire United Nations system. At the United

Nations IPSAS task force meeting, which was held in late August through early

September 2010, further guidance on the accounting and disclosure of all end-ofservice-

liabilities in compliance with IPSAS was requested.

Department responsible: Finance

Status: In progress

Priority: High

Target date: December 2010

In paragraph 116, UNOPS agreed with the Board’s recommendation to take appropriate measures to ensure the validity, accuracy and completeness of the data used in the computation of all post-retirement and end-of-service liabilities in future financial periods by ensuring that the information pertains to the correct reporting period.

13. UNOPS selection of policies for the valuation of all end-of-service liabilities is

based on decisions made for the entire United Nations system. An expected outcome

of the aforementioned UN IPSAS task force meeting has been further guidance on

the accounting and disclosure of all end-of-service-liabilities in compliance with

IPSAS.

Department responsible: Finance

Status: In progress

Priority: Medium

Target date: December 2010

IRENA and UNOPS to work together

WAM Copenhagen, March 24th, 2010 (WAM) -- The International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) and United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) today signed an agreement which paves the way for UNOPS to provide comprehensive administrative and procurement support to the recently established agency.

Mandated by governments worldwide, IRENA's mission is to promote the widespread and increased adoption and sustainable use of all forms of renewable energy. With the global population projected to reach 10 billion in 2050, abundant renewable energy sources worldwide can make a significant contribution to the world's growing demand for energy.

IRENA was officially established in Bonn, Germany on January 26, 2009 and 142 states and the European Union have now signed its statute. It is headquartered in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates.

The Memorandum of Understanding signed by H l ne Pelosse, Interim Director-General of IRENA and Jan Mattsson, Executive Director of UNOPS, is aimed at ensuring that the agency can quickly and efficiently begin implementing its mandate.

UNOPS will provide services such as the recruitment and administration of personnel, financial management, procurement and legal functions. On request it will also provide other consultancy and management services.

Speaking at the signing ceremony at UNOPS headquarters in Copenhagen, Ms. Pelosse said: "The unique expertise of UNOPS in the area of service provision will enhance the capabilities of IRENA and boost the take-off of its activities dedicated to renewable energy." Mattsson said: "This is an excellent example of where UNOPS is able to support an agency, with each partner focusing on its comparative strengths. We are delighted to be able to assist IRENA so it is in a position to quickly deliver on its important mission." WAM/SS WAM/SS/AM

U.S. Ignored U.N. Aid Agency's Fraud and Mismanagement

Monday , January 11, 2010

By George Russell

Between 2004 and 2008, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) showered more than $330 million on an obscure United Nations agency known as UNOPS — United Nations Office for Project Services — to carry out development aid projects in Afghanistan. What happened next wasn’t pretty.

Among other things, USAID apparently overlooked a growing stack of U.N. audits and investigations that pointed to fraud, mismanagement and lack of internal financial controls by UNOPS in Afghanistan, even as the U.S. agency continued to shovel money in UNOPS’s direction. So did other branches of the U.S. government, to the tune of an additional $100 million.

In a stunning number of cases, however, USAID also ignored its own oversight procedures and did not even insist that contracts with UNOPS enshrine the agency’s uncontested right to access financial records that would tell how the U.S. government money was spent. Consequently those records were never examined.

In other cases, it looked like legal loopholes were created to make sure UNOPS got to keep its financial records out of USAID’s reach.

Worse, the oversight disaster may still not be fixed—even as UNOPS, claiming that it has changed its ways, may get a bigger role in Afghanistan, financed with dollops of U.S. money, in the months and years ahead. .

U.S. government inspectors who did a 17-month study of the fiasco, however, have reported that they can’t fully assess whether the problems with UNOPS have been solved — partially due to a continuing lack of full cooperation on the part of UNOPS officials, who refused to let the inspectors question UNOPS managers thoroughly about the operations of the U.N. agency’s financial management system.

Along with refusing to allow the inspectors access to significant information about its financial management system, the study reveals that UNOPS had not even begun investigating some aspects of alleged fraud by its employees that has already been uncovered in Afghanistan, and, more importantly for future operations, still does not systematically review the accuracy of the data on its electronic books.

All of those distressing conclusions, and more, are contained in a dense, 68-page report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), an investigative arm of Congress that examines how U.S. federal public funds are spent, and suggests a few remedies for the administrative lapses it uncovers.

Click here to read the entire report

In the case of UNOPS, GAO has been remarkably discreet. Its report was presented on Nov. 19 to the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Investigations that originally commissioned it, then kept out of the public eye for another month.

The GAO findings only became public on Dec. 17, just in time to languish without much notice over the Christmas break. They were, however, hailed by UNOPS four days later, as the organization pledged “to continue to implement reforms that strengthen the organization’s management and financial controls.”

Both U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and the Obama administration have their own reasons to applaud UNOPS’s attitude, however much it may or may not be grounded in fact. Both have big plans for upping U.S. spending in Afghanistan via the U.N., as part of an expanded military and civilian effort that President Obama inaugurated on Dec. 1, with the announcement that 30,000 additional U.S. troops would go to Afghanistan.

Alongside the military buildup, Secretary-General Ban on Dec. 4 began to tout a “civilian surge” in Afghanistan that would include mammoth infusions of additional development aid, under U.N. supervision, which would likely point to an increased role for UNOPS.

As part of that increase the U.N.’s requested spending this year for its peacekeeping mission in Afghanistan, known as UNAMA, is nearly $242 million, making it one of the fastest-growing — and contentious — big-ticket items in the U.N.’s 2010 budget. The U.S. share of that total would be about $63 million. (The U.S. pays about 22 percent of regular U.N budgets, and about 26 percent of peacekeeping tallies.)

But far more money than that will likely be involved. On Jan. 28, for example, Ban and British Prime Minister Gordon Brown will host a major international conference on Afghanistan that will include a significant pitch for more development aid — much of which will likely also be filtered through U.N. agencies, including UNOPS.

All of which could result in hundreds of millions of dollars worth of contracts churning through UNOPS, a little-known U.N. agency based in Copenhagen, which is the world organization’s chief on-the-ground manager for development projects, as well as a provider of procurement, human resources management, and financial management, services both for the U.N. and for other governments and private organizations.

It is also another U.N. organization swathed in diplomatic immunity and secrecy that has been stained in a series of scandals and administrative lapses in past years. The fallout from those lapses is continuing.

Last April, for example, the Inspector General of USAID issued a separate report on $25 million worth of projects sub-contracted to UNOPS between 2003 and 2006 to build small-scale infrastructure projects throughout Afghanistan. It revealed, among other things, that $10 million of the money was spent on UNOPS work in Haiti, Sudan, Sri Lanka and Dubai; that some of the projects actually completed in Afghanistan were built shoddily or to the wrong specifications and were on the verge of falling apart; that UNOPS officials saw at least one of the projects as a “cash cow,” and that UNOPS officials stonewalled when U.S. inspectors tried to find out what happened.

According to the report, UNOPS also drew down $6.7 million worth of U.S. funds from a line of credit months after the project ended, with no apparent justification. One whistleblowing U.N. employee cited in the Inspector General’s report reported that the local director of UNOPS spent about $200,000 of U.S. money on renovating his guesthouse.

At the same time, the agency’s oversight was further hampered by the fact that its 36-nation supervisory Executive Board did not have direct access to the internal audit reports documenting UNOPS’s failings — just as the same Executive Board, which also supervises the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), did not have access to internal audit reports from the same period that pointed to UNDP violations of its own rules in North Korea.

(In September 2008, the GAO report notes, UNOPS rules were altered to give Executive Board members “limited access” to the audits, if formally requested. The same change went into effect for UNDP.)

U.S. prosecutors subsequently were unable to bring civil or criminal charges against anyone involved with misappropriation of funds at UNOPS, because those officials operate under U.N. diplomatic immunity. The USAID Inspector General, however, vowed to set collection agencies on UNOPS to retrieve some of the money. UNOPS has since reported on its own website that it “has reimbursed money owed to its clients as a result of errors or misuse, and will address any new issues if they come to light.”

Click here for the Inspector General's report

The U.S. funds involved in the $25 million scandal are not even part of the bigger ocean of cash examined in the just-released GAO report.

Instead, the document observes in a footnote that UNOPS pulled down $97.8 million in U.S. subcontracting work between 2004 and 2008, over and above the money it received to undertake projects directly.

The litany of management sins uncovered in the U.N.’s own internal audits of UNOPS are the major focus of GAO concern—along with the fact that most of the documentation of those lapses was unavailable to the U.S., even as it funneled huge sums to the U.N. agency.

Since the inception of U.N. peacekeeping in Afghanistan in 2002, the GAO report says, regularly scheduled U.N. internal audits and investigations discovered that UNOPS was spending money it did not have (2002); lacked “valid information” on some of its costs and did not have an “independently validated internal control network” (2004); had “recurring expenditures” beyond its budget, along with inadequate or non-existent supervision by managers (2006), and along with continuing cost overruns, had “deficiencies in managing project budgets and expenditures in the field” (2007)

Some of the undocumented information on costs and spending increased the cost of projects dramatically. The GAO report says that the price-tag on the biggest USAID project in Afghanistan, building secondary roads, increased by a factor of ten through a series of modifications and add-ons—without supporting documentation.

In addition, an external U.N. Board of Auditors report on UNOPS, published in June, 2008, noted “significant weaknesses in the accounting and internal control system,” “inadequate cost control of projects” and other failings. At the same time the auditors declared that UNOPS “has made good progress” in “addressing various weaknesses in its internal control accounting and imprest functions.”

Click here to see a timeline of audit reports against USAID projects carried out by UNOPS

Indeed, during much of that period, UNOPS was in such bad shape that the U.N. comptroller declared in 2005 that the agency was “in a precarious situation,” and it subsequently underwent a substantial management overhaul. On its website, UNOPS claims that the new management (headed by current executive director Jan Mattson) was in the forefront of identifying the organization’s failings.

Significantly, however, the GAO study says that as far as it can determine, UNOPS financial documentation systems are still not up to the task of discovering bad management or wrongdoing. “Without a system in place that can document timely, accurate, and complete information, management’s capacity to ensure effective internal audits is limited.”

The GAO inspectors say that UNOPS’s own director of internal oversight has said that “the accuracy and completeness of data entry remain a concern.” The inspectors added their own important observation that UNOPS management “does not know the extent to which data reliability is a problem because UNOPS has not sought any systematic check on data reliability.”

Nor did UNOPS management apparently want the GAO inspectors to find out certain things on their own. As part of their investigation, the inspectors prepared a questionnaire for UNOPS managers world wide, asking them to assess how well the UNOPS financial management system, known as Atlas, captured data and strengthened internal financial controls.

The report says that UNOPS top management demanded that the inspectors cut out “almost half” of the proposed survey questions, including ones the U.S. officials felt “were important” to discovering the capabilities of Atlas.

The failings found by the inspectors on the part of USAID itself in the UNOPS case are equally grave, starting with the inexplicable lack of concern by the agency in following its own rules regarding oversight.

In dealing with organizations like UNAPS, the report says, USAID can demand a right to audit financial documentation in any contract where it is the sole donor to a project, as it was in five of 11 of the major grants made to UNOPS during the 2004-2008 period. UNAID did not demand the inclusion of that right in the contracts, the report says.

Even when the aid agency is not the sole contributor, it can negotiate for the same rights, and in four cases chose not to. In three of the four cases, the only other contributor turned out to be UNOPS itself, often in token ways, like adding in-kind landscaping services. Top UNOPS officials told the GAO inspectors that the U.N. agency’s actions were “strange,” because UNOPS is not normally a donor to anything it works on.

Says the report: “They told us these in-kind contributions might have been made to avoid USAID’s regulations.”

When it came to recommendations arising from their work, the GAO inspectors confined themselves to generalities, including the tightening up of USAID procedures to demand audits when the agency’s contributions gave it the right to do so, better training of USAID officials in those rights, and creation of some kind of system to check that the audit rights were actually asked for. All of these were apparently embraced by the State Department, of which USAID is a part.

When it came to UNOPS, the inspectors didn’t say much — presumably because the U.N. agency is immune to strong medicine administered from outside its diplomatic immunity envelope.

Instead, the GAO officials vaguely urged that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton work with other member states to “support” UNOPS’s “continued management reforms,” and to “encourage UNOPS management to assess the effectiveness of the reform effort.”

On the first GAO suggestion, UNOPS on its website has said it “takes note of these comments, and is committed to further strengthening data quality, to completing investigative processes and to implementing necessary reforms.”

But then it added, on the point of assessing the effectiveness of its reforms, that “UNOPS believes reforms have already produced tangible results.” Among other things, the agency said, its external auditors had approved its accounts without qualifications, and UNOPS has been able to sign new operating agreements with various U.N. agencies, the European Commission and the World Bank.

As a result, the agencies revenues and new business have “almost doubled,” the agency reported.

With fresh gushers of cash about to pour into Afghanistan in the near future, those revenues could be on a path to skyrocket much further — regardless how much improvement is actually registered with the way that UNOPS handles the money under its care.

George Russell is executive editor of Fox News

Helen Clark and the UN media

THE NATIONAL BUSINESS REVIEW

(CLICK HERE FOR THE STORY)

Wouldn’t it be remarkable, as David Farrar suggests, if Clark’s time in New York comes to be remembered for her unintentional accomplishment in lowering the already pit-low reputation of the UN?

David Cohen | Wednesday October 21 2009 - 12:37pm

The first we heard about Helen Clark’s latest media problems came by way of a brief item courtesy of what used to be among her most slavish media fans, so this is a curious story.

Nevertheless, it appears to be true: the woman who had all but a few New Zealand journalists eating out of her hand during her nine-year premiership seems to be significantly out of her depth in dealing with American journalists covering the UN beat.

Speaking this week to Morning Report, a plainly indignant Matthew Lee criticisedthe UN development chief’s “total failure” to engage freely with local reporters.

Moreover, Clark’s offsider, Heather Simpson, was showing a marked tendency to — surprise, surprise — micromanage what media business her boss does attend to, according to Lee:

It has become somewhat striking, a total failure to answer questions about the agency as they arise. … Once requests were made for Helen Clark to do a press conference there were a flurry of calls from her two spokespeople at the UNDP to specific media outlets saying do you want a one on one. One of them responded and said Okay here’s the journalist who will do it. But UNDP responded, “No, no, we prefer this other journalist who works for you.’ That’s a degree of micro-management of press coverage that is almost unheard of in the UN.

None of which should come as any great shock to any Kiwi reporter who remembers dealing with Control Freak Central, circa 1999-2008.

Local journalists perceived as potentially critical were usually given short shrift by the Clark office or else the hint was heavily dropped that persistence in such an attitude would result in having their access severely curtailed — or else their supplications were simply ignored altogether. This was the case irrespective of whether one was an impertinent student reporter or a senior political biographer.

It will be fascinating to see how the current situation is settled. Wouldn’t it be remarkable, as David Farrar suggests, if Clark’s time in New York comes to be remembered for her unintentional accomplishment in lowering the already pit-low reputation of the UN?

Reports of Nepotism for UN's Ban Ki-moon Removed From Internet After Legal Threats by Ban's Son in Law

By Matthew Russell Lee

UNITED NATIONS, August 22 -- The son in law of UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, Siddarth Chatterjee, had used threats of legal action to force the removal from the Internet of comments that he may have gotten his promotion with the UN Office of Project Services in Copenhagen due to nepotism, Inner City Press has learned.

In preparing its exclusive August 14 article on nepotism at the UN and Ban's position on and in it, Inner City Press ran across an article in the Indian Star online, which cited Inner City Press' previous piece on Chatterjee's promotion with the UN in Iraq. Recently, that Indian Star article and comments were taken off the Internet -- following a threat from Chatterjee and then by his India-based lawyer. Click here for the now-empty page.

Free press advocates express concern at the threats, noting that in such matters "the cover-up is always worse that the crime," and demanding that Ban Ki-moon rebuke and renounce them. But will it happen?

Here for the record, and as requested by free press advocates in several continents, are comments which were on the Indian Star page which Ban's son in law, not stopped and presumably encouraged by Ban, got removed from the Internet by legal intimidation:

(Replied: Saturday, May 02, 2009, 06:05 am EST)

Interesting indeed. Some of us have, until very recently, had the misfortune of being exposed to this man, in a professional sense, in Iraq. Spineless is a very appropriate term to use in describing this individual. There are more, but few are fit for publication. He is, indeed, a discredit to India, the Indian Army, and now the UN (where, incidentally, he has recently moved on significant promotion - despite already being totally over-promoted in the opinion of all that know, and have to work with, him). The recent recruitment of this man to the United Nations Office of Project Services in Copenhagen is yet another example of the ineptitude, nepotism and corruption which is so prevalent within the UN system, even at the highest levels (in this case, within UNOPS). But those in Baghdad are delighted that UNOPS has taken him away from Iraq all the same.

It is a shame. And it would appear people are still being fooled.

and Posted: Saturday, February 28, 2009, 06:34 am EST

SANDHAYA AGARWAL (India)

Siddharth Chatterjee is a spineless man .He could not even pass the staff exams in Indian Army ... IT IS A SHAME THAT United Nations... GET FOOLED

After the Indian Star article and its comments went offline, they still remained available in the cache of Google and other search engines. Ban's son in law's lawyers made more legal threats -- "this is round two of the Bans and Google," said one observer of plans by the UN to get Inner City Press removed from Google News, click here for the most recent -- to get it out of cache.

Now even that censorship of questions of nepotism within Ban's UN has been accomplished -- click here for the now empty cache page.

Siddarth Chatterjee a public figure, and thus his legal threats are spurious, even an abuse of process. He is the son in law of the UN Secretary General, he was awarded a job at the UN's D-2 level (see below. Now, after refusing to answer Inner City Press' repeated questions referred by Ban's Spokesperson's Office if Chatterjee is a D-2 or a D-1, UNOPS tells other journalists that he is a D-1, in order to forestall other media coverage. Will it work?

UN's top lawyer O'Brien and Ban Ki-moon, legal threats of son in law not shown

Most recently, UNOPS in Copenhagen has told a Nordic newspaper what Chatterjee is a D-1, without explaining that the post was described by UNOPS' deputy director, in writing, as a D-2 post:

From: Vitaly VANSHELBOIM
Sent: 03 March 2009 11:09
To: UNOPS - EMO
Subject: Welcome to the new mailgroup

As you know, yesterday EUO and MEO formally merged into a new regional office called EMO (Europe and the Middle East) based in Copenhagen...I will be acting Regional Director of EMO until we have recruited a “permanent” replacement. In response to our advertisement for the D-2 regional director job, we received some 130 applications. Five candidates were short-listed for interviews: four were interviewed last Friday and the last interview is scheduled for Thursday this week. We’d like to make a decision by mid-March.

So even assuming that, as in Iraq, the UN decided even if only belatedly to keep Mr. Chatterjee a level below the grade of the post they awarded him, that is only being done to discourage press coverage of nepotism.

Even this raises questions of whether Ban, who came into the UN system promising reform and to run things cleanly, is due to his relatives' promotions so paranoia and angry about questions of nepotism that he has a conflict of interest in dealing with charges of nepotism against others in the UN, for example his own envoy to the Congo Alan Doss -- click herefor that.

Inner City Press broke the story about Alan Doss asking the UN Development Program for "leeway," to bend hiring rules and give his daughter Rebecca Doss a job in UNDP's Regional Bureau for Asia and the Pacific leading to a "man bite man" incident which was the focus of other media's follow up coverage. After Inner City Press' story about Ban and nepotism early on August 14, Ban's Deputy Spokesperson wrote to Inner City Press that:

From: okabe@un.org
To: matthew.lee@innercitypress.com
Sent: 8/14/2009 7:57:02 A.M. Eastern Standard Time
Subj: your latest entry

What I said was that queries on the biting incident should be directed to the NY County DA Office.

On the allegations, we take the matter very seriously.

"The Secretary-General is aware of the situation. He has been assured that a thorough independent investigation is underway, He takes this matter very seriously, and expects to see a report upon his return to NY."

Ban Ki-Moon returned to New York from his South Korea vacation and delivered prepared remarks at a World Humanitarian Day event in the UN's visitors' lobby on August 19. He took no questions. On August 21, after waiting two days, Inner City Press asked Ms. Okabe if Ban had as he expected now received the report on nepotism, and what would he do about it?

Ms. Okabe answered that although Ban had returned to New York, he had gone on leave again. So finally, what will he do?

Footnotes: in the course of legally threatening the Indian newspaper -- but not U.S. based Inner City Press -- it was argued that the Indian Star report which triggered the two comments Chatterjee and Ban did not like was "based only on a blog." The response was that Inner City Press is better read, at least online, than the Indian newspaper they threatened.

On that, Reuters of August 21 reported that "U.N. officials also complain bitterly about the indefatigable bloggerMatthew Lee, whose website Inner City Press regularly accuses Ban and other U.N. officials of hypocrisy and failing to keep their promises to reform the United Nations and root out corruption." Later, a telling second phrase was added: "(Some U.N. officials accuse Lee of not always getting his facts right, but his blog has become unofficial required reading for U.N. staffers around the world.)"

Ironically, on August 20 a UN under secretary general approached Inner City Press about the anti-Ban memo by Norwegian deputy permanent representative Mona Juul, having "just read it on your blog." For all of Ms. Juul's criticism of Ban, from Myanmar to Sri Lanka to climate change, Juul missed the nepotism and family connection angle. Her husband Terje Roed Larsen works for Ban, as another of his Under Secretaries General who has refused to make any disclosure of his finance or to answer Inner City Press' questions about them.

This is run for the proposition that as well as being a nepotism cover up scandal, this is a story about new media. Ban and his son in law have lawyers threaten ill-read newspapers for daring to carry a report based on what they call the "blog" Inner City Press and two resulting comments. They urge what they view as "real" or mainstream media not to cover stories which are broken by Inner City Press -- which, for example, had the world exclusive, acknowledged on Associated Press and in Japan media amog others, of the final draft of the Security Council's North Korea sanctions.

Inner City Press, which writes more about Myanmar than other UN based correspondents, was never even told of the opportunity, given to others, to accompany and report on Ban's ultimately failed trip there. Some say that in all this, Ban is being ill-advised by those around him. The question remains: is this anachronistic media strategy of cover up, deployed by Team Ban, working? Watch this site.

UNDP's Funding of Saakashvili Causes Russian Uproar, For-Ex Stonewalling Continues

By Matthew Lee (http://www.InnercityPress.Com)
UNITED NATIONS, September 11 -- As the UN Executive Board lurched through the fourth of its five day meeting, with UNDP management having stoked its its ostensible overseers into demanding it re-open the flow of money to Kim Jong Il's North Korea, one of UNDP's equally dubious programs on the other side of the political spectrum fell under fire. It involves UNDP having paid salary to Georgian president Saakashvili, with its own funds and those of George Soros' Open Society Institute. Inner City Press first reported on the program in December 2006, then again on August 25, 2008, click here for that story. This was picked up by Russia's Ambassador to the UN Vitaly Churkin and by Russian media. See examples here, here and here.
The question to be answered is, are the members of UNDP's Executive Board really informed by UNDP management what type of programs are going on?

Meanwhile, despite the Executive Board president's gushing on September 10 that no member disagreed with the head-long rush to return to Pyongyang, even in the face of uncertainty if Kim Jong Il is on his death bed or dead, possibly toppled by even harder-line generals who have restarted that country's nuclear program, in front of the Security Council Inner City Press asked U.S. Ambassador Khalilzad for the U.S. Mission position, video here at Minute 6:43:

Inner City Press: UNDP has been meeting this week. The US position seems to be that the UNDP should go back to North Korea. Do you feel--

Ambassador Khalilzad: We have been under the view that there is a need for steps to make sure that some of the problems that have been listed will not take place again. Thank you.

But when Inner City Press asked UNDP's spokesman early on September 11 for a copy of Regional Director Ajay Chhibber's so-called "roadmap" to return to North Korea, which even the Executive Board president said should be distributed and made transparent, it was not provided.


UNDP's Dervis, thinking of funding to Saakashvili, roadmap and Russian response not shown

Also in front of the Security Council on September 11, Inner City Press asked Ban Ki-moon's envoy to Myanmar Ibrahim Gambari to explain the UN system's silence while it was losing 20% of aid funds to the Than Shwe regime. "Matthew, I hope you raise that with [OCHA's] John Holmes and with UNDP." Video here, from Minute 7:19.

Well, Inner City Press has had currency exchange loss questions pending with UNDP for weeks and weeks, and has repeated sent reminded, still with no response. This did not impinge on the self-congratulatory dream world of some Executive Board delegates cooking up rubber stamp resolutions in Conference Room C in the UN's basement on the night of September 11. Nor did it stop once and future UNDP-er Jan Mattsson for patting himself on the back for finally getting an audit of the UN Office for Project Services after seven years, and moving to pay off a blatant cost overrun for Afghan elections in 2005. It all cuminates, he told the Board on September 11, in a new UNOPS web site, in three languages: English, French and Spanish. Maybe that's why Russia didn't know about the funding to Saakashvili...

Meanwhile, UNDP has not provided answers as simple as the volume of fees it collects as a conduit for funding for prisons and military barracks all over the world, and to pay an ex-UN Kosovo Mission staffer to work for Kosovo's government. Not only could this dubious middle-man role raise more Russian questions about UNDP -- more generally, it is for reasons like these that many believe that UNDP is an opaque, unaccountable and even corrupt organization.

The White Africans who keep UNDP secure: 11 million US$ spent to have our brothers and sisters killed in Algeria

(names are withheld from fear of direct retaliation from Kemal Dervis and Ad Melkert)

from: ..........................,
date: Dec 31, 2007
subject: [UNDP WATCH] New comment on How democratic are the institutions upon which we ....
mailed-by:

I thought I would give your publication the first opportunity, as the target audience is the most appropriate.

HQ in Algeria was blown up, with 13 dead, Now for Damage Control ... or fixing the blame
The UN HQ in Algeria was blown up, with 13 dead, the irony of this is that there is a budget to implement security, create stand offs to harden the targets but it was all ignored there was even an extra budget called MOSS/TARR to implement additional security measures besides the normal yearly budget and all went to waste no one did anything money disappeared and now who pays for the loss of 13 lives due to the security at the Office in Algeria. Someone needs to be held to account for that and the sooner the better. How much is the value of one life saved and how much more can be done at the international level in fulfilling UN mandate when corruption is rooted out.

But in the aftermath, most of those dead were SSAs (contractors), so UNDP don't care much, and doesn't even cover them under any form of insurance and or protection schemes. In fact UNDP's Ad Melkert has signed a deal with an Insurance Company which do not cover the "terrorist acts", so who is going to pay for our brothers and sisters who lost their lives ? Now Ad Melkert is giving orders to Akiko Yuge and Darshak Shah to find a way to pay somehow from other funds. While the Insurance Company is preparing to hike the prices - given the Algeria events.

Al Qaida took responsibility for the bombing but this begs the question as who is really at fault, and who will be the fall guy or guys and gals. It is easy to give credit or take credit; it is more difficult to fix blame where it really belongs. It is almost impossible, based on the sorted track record of the UN to accept their mistakes and take appropriate action to keep their house in order. The UN is more into damage control than to solving problems. Part of the problem is connected to networks of patronage and good old boy connections. Now it is time to looking for a fall guy. This is not the first time and unless there is organizational chance, such things can happen again and again.

It is clear from well placed sources at HQ they are looking for a fall guy for all the dead in Algeria even with all the money gone they are lining their pockets and it is very sophisticated in how they are doing it but the budget was there and they took the money and people died because of it a bit on criminal side due to the body count.

The South African Mafia inside UNDP

We all know the UN system is replete with mafia from various nationalities. However within the small office that provides for the security of UNDP the South African Mafia has become so well entrenched that even if you lack the basic qualifications you can land yourself a nice L-4 post and make yourself a home if you know the right people and of course come from the right country (and know who to show your appreciate to, and how the payment system works). Below that comes a thriving level of intermediaries.

Let us talk specifics, at least what can be easily verified. Certainly this mess and total cock-up must have been allowed to exist with the full knowledge of senior management, if not ... then let the reader be the judge.

Mr. Leon Terblanche

The former, recently de-throned P-5 Chief of the UNDP Security Unit was a South African with dual nationality in Canada. Mr. T managed to institutionalize himself as the Security Chief for several years even though he lacked any real security background. Mr. T. was a former South African military officer working in the engineers with military explosives and de-mining. He worked on several de-mining projects prior to getting the security post with the support of his friend ms. Janie McClusker of UNFPA.

Mr. T. was replaced only this past year after failing to compete for his own post, failing also in his diligent effort to re-align the post to a D1 ranking. His one success as Chief was to successful dis-enfranchise the Security Unit from all of the other business units where he was seen by many as the ultimate dis-enabler for UNDP by how he managed the security office. Only when truly qualified candidates were allowed to apply, and following years of his poor management was he finally removed only to be exiled as the UN Security Officer for all of the UN in Belgrade, Yugoslavia.

Jan A.B. (JAB)Swart

A engineer of Mr. Terblanche, Mr. Swart managed to have his close friend;s create and hire him into the UNDP Security Unit. Again Mr. S. possessed no security background but was given a comfortable P-4 post. One hand washes the other, as Mr. S. had previously given Mr. T. a post when working as a project manager with UNOPS, and so Mr. Swart assumed his P4 post. In Mr. T’s effort to re-align his post as a D1, he moved his friend Mr. S into an unofficial post as Deputy Security Chief and proposed that while he was made a D1 that Mr. S be made a P-5 in the process.

Mr. T. went so far as to have Mr. S. drafted his own individual new and approved Terms of Reference, TOR, as Deputy Chief. But with the failure of Mr. T. to realize his dream of D1, Mr. S. re-thought and did not press for his post to be re-aligned. Once the realization of his dismal failures became evident Mr. T. formally wrote to his friend JAB as his Deputy Security Chief and in spite of the fact that the post is entirely fictitious but anyway, he was now, appointed him in his stead as he prepared for his demoted repositioning to Belgrade. There is a story within a story here to be told.

Ah, it is indeed good to be King.

As Deputy Security Chief

Mr. S. manages, if what he does can truly be called management, the important MOSS supports funds for UNDP. Where have all the millions of dollars gone (over $11,000,000 so far) when our friends in Algeria worked from a non-compliant office and paid the ultimate price. Did Mr. S. do anything to ensure that adequate measures were in place? Did he authorize the finances to make the necessary changes? What about the other offices around the world? It is a lot of money Mr. S. how did you spend it? Did your good friend in Moldovia get his piece whilst Algeria sat at risk?

Carla Naude.

Ms. Naude, is perhaps the best qualified of the South African Mafia although her portfolio is focused that of premises security. Ms. Mafiosa sits in a nice P4 post having no previous UN experience no field security experience and now finds herself responsible for covering Mr. S. as he tries to dodge the bullets for Algeria and the $11,000,000 of funds spent so far to ensure security compliance for our offices worldwide. The question becomes Will she do it? and what does she owe Mr. S. or his predecessor?

Mr. Scotty Saunders.

Another friend of Mr. T. and Mr. S. This South African is the arrogant and undermining Senior Field Security Advisor for Iraq and as usual for the South African Mafia does not possess the required education or background to achieve such an important and well positioned post. He also serves as a nice L4. Maybe his on-line effort to gain the education he lacks will qualify him for a comfortable P5 or D1 in the future.

Mr. Johannes Vandermervwe.

Mr. V not surprisingly comes from UNOPS where he worked on de-mining programmes. Having no security background apart from his years in the South African military as an engineer (certainly no pattern) it is understandable that he was the perfect selection for the coveted UNDP Regional Security Officer posted in Bangkok.
Mr. Vandermerve, With his wife having to depart her high-level job at UNOPS, where Mr.'s T., S. and V. worked on de-mining programmes together allowed Mr.'s S. and T. to repay Mr. and Ms. Vandermerve by not only selecting Mr. V for the Bangkok post but moreover lobbying for a raise from the normal basic pay for a new L4 and made sure that Mr. V was provided with a full 200 series contact with all of the benefits. This would not seem unusual until you realize that serving security staff in similar positions in the Arab States and African regions were not also provided the same level of contract and had to fight hard almost to the point of contract expiration to gain parity with Mr. V. It was certainly no problem for Mr.'s Terblanche and Swart to get their good friend and co-mafioso in with a nice raise and benefits above the non-South African's in the same positions.

Mr. Johann Poltgieter.

Mr. P., another friend of Mr. Swart has managed to get posted as the Field Security Officer, L3 to UNDP in Israel the West Bank and Gaza, hired through the P.A.P.P. office. Of course it was nice that for this particular recruitment that the UNDP Security Office was not managing the recruitment like before and only guided the selection process since Mr. P. apparently was unsuccessful in several attempts to secure similar posts in UNDP elsewhere due to his lack of experience and failure in the interviews process. Possibly with guidance on how to answer the questions and how to address the questioning of the interview panel from Mr. Swart, and perhaps with even a little added influence as Mr. Swart repositioned the former Advisor for P.A.P.P. to Somalia, from L-3 to L-4, the new post for Mr. Poltgieter was realized.

So it is clear. Of six South Africans in the UNDP Security Office none have had the required security background training or experience that is normally required for these posts. The one at the top of the pile has been removed only to another security post outside of UNDP. The second in the line of succession remains in a fictitious unofficial post placing many of us at risk on a daily basis hoping for his coveted P-5 to materialize. The rest of the South African mafia remains in their posts quietly hoping for Mr. Swart to get promoted and continue the patronage process.

Mr. Swart as the Deputy Chief is responsible for all 'Field Support’, which includes supporting the Regional Security Officers and security support to our country offices. Mr. S. even as a fictitious Deputy Chief has also apparently been granted rights to receive all of the risk reports from the department of safety and security.

It would not take too much research to prove that Mr. Swart must have received the reports that indicated there was a threat against our colleague's offices in Algeria. Did his Regional Security Officer give Mr.Swart any indicators of the risk? With millions of dollars at his fingertips why didn't Mr. Swart use any to help Algeria prepare? Maybe something could have been done. Maybe someone should look at this. But that would mean that UNDP would really be trying to address the failures of Mr. T. and Mr. S. Maybe fewer of our friends in Algeria would have died, or none at all.

Over $11,000,000 has been spent to protect us but still the Algeria tragedy occurs. Everyone seems to get a piece of this pie but where was poor Algeria? Who is next?

It is comforting for the rest of us to now that UN reform and management in UNDP recognizes the value of retaining these uniquely qualified and well-positioned staff who are fully aware of the value of properly addressing national balance after all South Africa is from the South in terms of North & South balance. And of course we can all feel comfortable knowing that the Human Resources effort to place the right people in the right places” includes selecting and assigning non-qualified un-trained and in-experienced managers and security officers to positions where they can provide for UN security and protection.