Showing posts with label algeria. Show all posts
Showing posts with label algeria. Show all posts
Saturday, February 19, 2011
Protesters Retake Square in Bahrain While Libya and Yemen Try to Suppress Protests
Sunday, August 10, 2008
HQ in Algeria was blown up, with 13 dead, Now for Damage Control ... or fixing the blame
I am a freelance investigative reporter based in the Middle East and former Soviet Union and here is a story that I want to publish. My sources are confidential and you can read between the lines of the real story and you know how lifting the lid on a can of worms is usually difficult. The UN system is no exception, so it is hard to say quite how worm-ridden the sector actually is. Nor, despite some investigative coups, does its true color get the attention that it actually deserves.
I hope you will immediately consider my pitch for publication.
Here is the first draft of the investigative article.
Best regards, Jeffrey Silverman
I thought I would give your publication the first opportunity, as the target audience is the most appropriate.
HQ in Algeria was blown up, with 13 dead, Now for Damage Control ... or fixing the blame
The UN HQ in Algeria was blown up, with 13 dead, the irony of this is that there is a budget to implement security, create stand offs to harden the targets but it was all ignored there was even an extra budget called MOSS/TARR to implement additional security measures besides the normal yearly budget and all went to waste no one did anything money disappeared and now who pays for the loss of 13 lives due to the security at the Office in Algeria.
Someone needs to be held to account for that – and the sooner the better. How much is the value of one life saved – and how much more can be done at the international level in fulfilling UN mandate when corruption is rooted out.
Al Qaida took responsibility for the bombing but this begs the question as who is really at fault, and who will be the fall guy or “guys and gals.” It is easy to give credit or take credit; it is more difficult to fix blame where it really belongs. It is almost impossible, based on the sorted track record of the UN to accept their mistakes and take appropriate action to keep their house in order. The UN is more into damage control than to solving problems. Part of the problem is connected to networks of patronage and good old boy connections. Now it is time to looking for a fall guy. This is not the first time and unless there is organizational chance, such things can happen again and again.
It is clear from well placed sources that HQ they are looking for a fall guy for all the dead in Algeria even with all the money gone they are lining their pockets and it is very sophisticated in how they are doing it but the budget was there and they took the money and people died because of it a bit on criminal side due to the body count. As an investigative reporter dogging these kind of things; I know there is a connection in Lebanon between Iraq and Hezbollah with arms smuggling, the weapons from the US Army that are being given to the Iraq's is being sold in Beirut through Hezbollah brand new M4's with the 203 grenade launchers going for about 7000 USD. It is because of this nexus that I have been able to get close to what happened with the latest UN body bag count. It was this chase that leads me to this story via Georgia and Armenia – chasing fake passports and arms dealers that operate with the full support of the US government.
However, I am more interested in plane crashes involving Georgians and Armenians, arms from Jordan with end user certificates for the Georigan Ministry of Defense. However, I have not been able to find connection to the Congo, as far as I know at this time. Anyway, there is always a story to be told, and better shared. Money cascades down through various levels in the UN. At each there is a problem of interests that detract from the intended mission – spending money is paramount, how it gets spent is more the reality.
“The South African Mafia” inside UNDP
We all know the UN system is replete with ‘mafia’ from various nationalities. However within the small office that provides for the security of UNDP the South African Mafia has become so well entrenched that even if you lack the basic qualifications you can land yourself a nice L-4 post and make yourself a home if you know the right people and of course come from the right country (and know who to show your appreciate to, and how the payment system works). Below that comes a thriving level of intermediaries.
Let us talk specifics, at least what can be easily verified. Certainly this mess and total cock-up must have been allowed to exist with the full knowledge of senior management, if not ... then let the reader be the judge.
Mr. Leon Terblanche The former, recently de-throned P-5 Chief of the UNDP Security Unit was a South African with dual nationality in Canada. Mr. T managed to institutionalize himself as the Security Chief for several years even though he lacked any real security background. Mr. T. was a former South African military officer working in the engineers with military explosives and de-mining. He worked on several de-mining projects prior to getting the security post with the support of his friend ms. Janie McClusker of UNFPA.
Mr. T. was replaced only this past year after failing to compete for his own post, failing also in his diligent effort to re-align the post to a D1 ranking. His one success as Chief was to successful dis-enfranchise the Security Unit from all of the other business units where he was seen by many as the ultimate dis-enabler for UNDP by how he managed the security office. Only when truly qualified candidates were allowed to apply, and following years of his poor management was he finally removed only to be exiled as the UN Security Officer for all of the UN in Belgrade, Yugoslavia.
Jan A.B. (JAB) Swart A engineer of Mr. Terblanche, Mr. Swart managed to have his close “friend;s create and hire him into the UNDP Security Unit. Again Mr. S. possessed no security background but was given a comfortable P-4 post. One hand washes the other, as Mr. S. had previously given Mr. T. a post when working as a project manager with UNOPS, and so Mr. Swart assumed his P4 post. In Mr. T’s effort to re-align his post as a D1, he moved his friend Mr. S into an unofficial post as Deputy Security Chief and proposed that while he was made a D1 that Mr. S be made a P-5 in the process.
Mr. T. went so far as to have Mr. S. drafted his own individual new and approved Terms of Reference, TOR, as Deputy Chief. But with the failure of Mr. T. to realize his dream of D1, Mr. S. re-thought and did not press for his post to be re-aligned. Once the realization of his dismal failures became evident Mr. T. formally wrote to his friend JAB as his Deputy Security Chief – and in spite of the fact that the post is entirely fictitious but anyway, he was now, appointed him in his stead as he prepared for his demoted repositioning to Belgrade. There is a story within a story here to be told.
Ah, it is indeed good to be King.
As Deputy Security Chief Mr. S. manages, if what he does can truly be called management, the important MOSS supports funds for UNDP. Where have all the millions of dollars gone (over $11,000,000 so far) when our friends in Algeria worked from a non-compliant office and paid the ultimate price. Did Mr. S. do anything to ensure that adequate measures were in place? Did he authorize the finances to make the necessary changes? What about the other offices around the world? It is a lot of money Mr. S. how did you spend it? Did your good friend in Moldovia get his piece whilst Algeria sat at risk?
Carla Naude. Ms. Naude, is perhaps the best qualified of the South African Mafia although her portfolio is focused that of premises security. Ms. Mafiosa sits in a nice P4 post having no previous UN experience no field security experience and now finds herself responsible for covering Mr. S. as he tries to dodge the bullets for Algeria and the $11,000,000 of funds spent so far to ensure security compliance for our offices worldwide. The question becomes “Will she do it?” and what does she “owe” Mr. S. or his predecessor?
Mr. Scotty Saunders. Another friend of Mr. T. and Mr. S. This South African is the arrogant and undermining “Senior” Field Security Advisor for Iraq and as usual for the South African Mafia does not possess the required education or background to achieve such an important and well positioned post. He also serves as a nice L4. Maybe his on-line effort to gain the education he lacks will qualify him for a comfortable P5 or D1 in the future.
Mr. Johannes Vandermervwe. Mr. V not surprisingly comes from UNOPS where he worked on de-mining programmes. Having no security background apart from his years in the South African military as an engineer (certainly no pattern) it is understandable that he was the perfect selection for the coveted UNDP Regional Security Officer posted in Bangkok.
Mr. Vandermerve, with his wife having to depart her high-level job at UNOPS, where Mr.'s T., S. and V. worked on de-mining programmes together allowed Mr.'s S. and T. to repay Mr. and Ms. Vandermerve by not only selecting Mr. V for the Bangkok post but moreover lobbying for a raise from the normal basic pay for a new L4 and made sure that Mr. V was provided with a full 200 series contact with all of the benefits. This would not seem unusual until you realize that serving security staff in similar positions in the Arab States and African regions were not also provided the same level of contract and had to fight hard almost to the point of contract expiration to gain parity with Mr. V. It was certainly no problem for Mr.'s Terblanche and Swart to get their good friend and co-mafioso in with a nice raise and benefits above the non-South African's in the same positions.
Mr. Johann Poltgieter. Mr. P., another friend of Mr. Swart has managed to get posted as the Field Security Officer, L3 to UNDP in Israel the West Bank and Gaza, hired through the P.A.P.P. office. Of course it was nice that for this particular recruitment that the UNDP Security Office was not managing the recruitment like before and only guided the selection process since Mr. P. apparently was unsuccessful in several attempts to secure similar posts in UNDP elsewhere due to his lack of experience and failure in the interviews process. Possibly with guidance on how to answer the questions and how to address the questioning of the interview panel from Mr. Swart, and perhaps with even a little added influence as Mr. Swart repositioned the former Advisor for P.A.P.P. to Somalia, from L-3 to L-4, the new post for Mr. Poltgieter was realized.
So it is clear. Of six South Africans in the UNDP Security Office none have had the required security background training or experience that is normally required for these posts. The one at the top of the pile has been removed only to another security post outside of UNDP. The second in the line of succession remains in a fictitious unofficial post placing many of us at risk on a daily basis hoping for his coveted P-5 to materialize. The rest of the South African mafia remains in their posts quietly hoping for Mr. Swart to get promoted and continue the patronage process.
Mr. Swart as the Deputy Chief is responsible for all 'Field Support’, which includes supporting the Regional Security Officers and security support to our country offices. Mr. S. even as a fictitious Deputy Chief has also apparently been granted rights to receive all of the risk reports from the department of safety and security. It would not take too much research to prove that Mr. Swart must have received the reports that indicated there was a threat against our colleague's offices in Algeria. Did his Regional Security Officer give Mr.Swart any indicators of the risk? With millions of dollars at his fingertips why didn't Mr. Swart use any to help Algeria prepare? Maybe something could have been done. Maybe someone should look at this. But that would mean that UNDP would really be trying to address the failures of Mr. T. and Mr. S. Maybe fewer of our friends in Algeria would have died, or none at all.
Over $11,000,000 has been spent to protect us but still the Algeria tragedy occurs. Everyone seems to get a piece of this pie but where was poor Algeria? Who is next?
It is comforting for the rest of us to now that UN reform and management in UNDP recognizes the value of retaining these uniquely qualified and well-positioned staff who are fully aware of the value of properly addressing national balance after all South Africa is from the ‘South’ in terms of North & South balance. And of course we can all feel comfortable knowing that the Human Resources effort to place “the right people in the right places” includes selecting and assigning non-qualified un-trained and in-experienced managers and security officers to positions where they can provide for UN security and protection. I am sure our real friends in Algeria would have appreciated the effort as much as we do.
I hope you will immediately consider my pitch for publication.
Here is the first draft of the investigative article.
Best regards, Jeffrey Silverman
I thought I would give your publication the first opportunity, as the target audience is the most appropriate.
HQ in Algeria was blown up, with 13 dead, Now for Damage Control ... or fixing the blame
The UN HQ in Algeria was blown up, with 13 dead, the irony of this is that there is a budget to implement security, create stand offs to harden the targets but it was all ignored there was even an extra budget called MOSS/TARR to implement additional security measures besides the normal yearly budget and all went to waste no one did anything money disappeared and now who pays for the loss of 13 lives due to the security at the Office in Algeria.
Someone needs to be held to account for that – and the sooner the better. How much is the value of one life saved – and how much more can be done at the international level in fulfilling UN mandate when corruption is rooted out.
Al Qaida took responsibility for the bombing but this begs the question as who is really at fault, and who will be the fall guy or “guys and gals.” It is easy to give credit or take credit; it is more difficult to fix blame where it really belongs. It is almost impossible, based on the sorted track record of the UN to accept their mistakes and take appropriate action to keep their house in order. The UN is more into damage control than to solving problems. Part of the problem is connected to networks of patronage and good old boy connections. Now it is time to looking for a fall guy. This is not the first time and unless there is organizational chance, such things can happen again and again.
It is clear from well placed sources that HQ they are looking for a fall guy for all the dead in Algeria even with all the money gone they are lining their pockets and it is very sophisticated in how they are doing it but the budget was there and they took the money and people died because of it a bit on criminal side due to the body count. As an investigative reporter dogging these kind of things; I know there is a connection in Lebanon between Iraq and Hezbollah with arms smuggling, the weapons from the US Army that are being given to the Iraq's is being sold in Beirut through Hezbollah brand new M4's with the 203 grenade launchers going for about 7000 USD. It is because of this nexus that I have been able to get close to what happened with the latest UN body bag count. It was this chase that leads me to this story via Georgia and Armenia – chasing fake passports and arms dealers that operate with the full support of the US government.
However, I am more interested in plane crashes involving Georgians and Armenians, arms from Jordan with end user certificates for the Georigan Ministry of Defense. However, I have not been able to find connection to the Congo, as far as I know at this time. Anyway, there is always a story to be told, and better shared. Money cascades down through various levels in the UN. At each there is a problem of interests that detract from the intended mission – spending money is paramount, how it gets spent is more the reality.
“The South African Mafia” inside UNDP
We all know the UN system is replete with ‘mafia’ from various nationalities. However within the small office that provides for the security of UNDP the South African Mafia has become so well entrenched that even if you lack the basic qualifications you can land yourself a nice L-4 post and make yourself a home if you know the right people and of course come from the right country (and know who to show your appreciate to, and how the payment system works). Below that comes a thriving level of intermediaries.
Let us talk specifics, at least what can be easily verified. Certainly this mess and total cock-up must have been allowed to exist with the full knowledge of senior management, if not ... then let the reader be the judge.
Mr. Leon Terblanche The former, recently de-throned P-5 Chief of the UNDP Security Unit was a South African with dual nationality in Canada. Mr. T managed to institutionalize himself as the Security Chief for several years even though he lacked any real security background. Mr. T. was a former South African military officer working in the engineers with military explosives and de-mining. He worked on several de-mining projects prior to getting the security post with the support of his friend ms. Janie McClusker of UNFPA.
Mr. T. was replaced only this past year after failing to compete for his own post, failing also in his diligent effort to re-align the post to a D1 ranking. His one success as Chief was to successful dis-enfranchise the Security Unit from all of the other business units where he was seen by many as the ultimate dis-enabler for UNDP by how he managed the security office. Only when truly qualified candidates were allowed to apply, and following years of his poor management was he finally removed only to be exiled as the UN Security Officer for all of the UN in Belgrade, Yugoslavia.
Jan A.B. (JAB) Swart A engineer of Mr. Terblanche, Mr. Swart managed to have his close “friend;s create and hire him into the UNDP Security Unit. Again Mr. S. possessed no security background but was given a comfortable P-4 post. One hand washes the other, as Mr. S. had previously given Mr. T. a post when working as a project manager with UNOPS, and so Mr. Swart assumed his P4 post. In Mr. T’s effort to re-align his post as a D1, he moved his friend Mr. S into an unofficial post as Deputy Security Chief and proposed that while he was made a D1 that Mr. S be made a P-5 in the process.
Mr. T. went so far as to have Mr. S. drafted his own individual new and approved Terms of Reference, TOR, as Deputy Chief. But with the failure of Mr. T. to realize his dream of D1, Mr. S. re-thought and did not press for his post to be re-aligned. Once the realization of his dismal failures became evident Mr. T. formally wrote to his friend JAB as his Deputy Security Chief – and in spite of the fact that the post is entirely fictitious but anyway, he was now, appointed him in his stead as he prepared for his demoted repositioning to Belgrade. There is a story within a story here to be told.
Ah, it is indeed good to be King.
As Deputy Security Chief Mr. S. manages, if what he does can truly be called management, the important MOSS supports funds for UNDP. Where have all the millions of dollars gone (over $11,000,000 so far) when our friends in Algeria worked from a non-compliant office and paid the ultimate price. Did Mr. S. do anything to ensure that adequate measures were in place? Did he authorize the finances to make the necessary changes? What about the other offices around the world? It is a lot of money Mr. S. how did you spend it? Did your good friend in Moldovia get his piece whilst Algeria sat at risk?
Carla Naude. Ms. Naude, is perhaps the best qualified of the South African Mafia although her portfolio is focused that of premises security. Ms. Mafiosa sits in a nice P4 post having no previous UN experience no field security experience and now finds herself responsible for covering Mr. S. as he tries to dodge the bullets for Algeria and the $11,000,000 of funds spent so far to ensure security compliance for our offices worldwide. The question becomes “Will she do it?” and what does she “owe” Mr. S. or his predecessor?
Mr. Scotty Saunders. Another friend of Mr. T. and Mr. S. This South African is the arrogant and undermining “Senior” Field Security Advisor for Iraq and as usual for the South African Mafia does not possess the required education or background to achieve such an important and well positioned post. He also serves as a nice L4. Maybe his on-line effort to gain the education he lacks will qualify him for a comfortable P5 or D1 in the future.
Mr. Johannes Vandermervwe. Mr. V not surprisingly comes from UNOPS where he worked on de-mining programmes. Having no security background apart from his years in the South African military as an engineer (certainly no pattern) it is understandable that he was the perfect selection for the coveted UNDP Regional Security Officer posted in Bangkok.
Mr. Vandermerve, with his wife having to depart her high-level job at UNOPS, where Mr.'s T., S. and V. worked on de-mining programmes together allowed Mr.'s S. and T. to repay Mr. and Ms. Vandermerve by not only selecting Mr. V for the Bangkok post but moreover lobbying for a raise from the normal basic pay for a new L4 and made sure that Mr. V was provided with a full 200 series contact with all of the benefits. This would not seem unusual until you realize that serving security staff in similar positions in the Arab States and African regions were not also provided the same level of contract and had to fight hard almost to the point of contract expiration to gain parity with Mr. V. It was certainly no problem for Mr.'s Terblanche and Swart to get their good friend and co-mafioso in with a nice raise and benefits above the non-South African's in the same positions.
Mr. Johann Poltgieter. Mr. P., another friend of Mr. Swart has managed to get posted as the Field Security Officer, L3 to UNDP in Israel the West Bank and Gaza, hired through the P.A.P.P. office. Of course it was nice that for this particular recruitment that the UNDP Security Office was not managing the recruitment like before and only guided the selection process since Mr. P. apparently was unsuccessful in several attempts to secure similar posts in UNDP elsewhere due to his lack of experience and failure in the interviews process. Possibly with guidance on how to answer the questions and how to address the questioning of the interview panel from Mr. Swart, and perhaps with even a little added influence as Mr. Swart repositioned the former Advisor for P.A.P.P. to Somalia, from L-3 to L-4, the new post for Mr. Poltgieter was realized.
So it is clear. Of six South Africans in the UNDP Security Office none have had the required security background training or experience that is normally required for these posts. The one at the top of the pile has been removed only to another security post outside of UNDP. The second in the line of succession remains in a fictitious unofficial post placing many of us at risk on a daily basis hoping for his coveted P-5 to materialize. The rest of the South African mafia remains in their posts quietly hoping for Mr. Swart to get promoted and continue the patronage process.
Mr. Swart as the Deputy Chief is responsible for all 'Field Support’, which includes supporting the Regional Security Officers and security support to our country offices. Mr. S. even as a fictitious Deputy Chief has also apparently been granted rights to receive all of the risk reports from the department of safety and security. It would not take too much research to prove that Mr. Swart must have received the reports that indicated there was a threat against our colleague's offices in Algeria. Did his Regional Security Officer give Mr.Swart any indicators of the risk? With millions of dollars at his fingertips why didn't Mr. Swart use any to help Algeria prepare? Maybe something could have been done. Maybe someone should look at this. But that would mean that UNDP would really be trying to address the failures of Mr. T. and Mr. S. Maybe fewer of our friends in Algeria would have died, or none at all.
Over $11,000,000 has been spent to protect us but still the Algeria tragedy occurs. Everyone seems to get a piece of this pie but where was poor Algeria? Who is next?
It is comforting for the rest of us to now that UN reform and management in UNDP recognizes the value of retaining these uniquely qualified and well-positioned staff who are fully aware of the value of properly addressing national balance after all South Africa is from the ‘South’ in terms of North & South balance. And of course we can all feel comfortable knowing that the Human Resources effort to place “the right people in the right places” includes selecting and assigning non-qualified un-trained and in-experienced managers and security officers to positions where they can provide for UN security and protection. I am sure our real friends in Algeria would have appreciated the effort as much as we do.
Tuesday, April 1, 2008
U.N. had warning of terror attack
By Betsy Pisik
Washington Times
NEW YORK — U.N. and Algerian officials were warned in advance of a December terrorist attack in Algiers that killed 17 U.N. staffers but they failed to boost security measures at the U.N. compound, a preliminary report says.
"The hostile intent against the U.N. in Algeria was present and well-known before the attack," David Veness, U.N. undersecretary general for safety and security, wrote in a 20-page preliminary report, a copy of which was obtained by The Washington Times.
Six months before the attack, "the media branch for [al Qaeda in the Maghreb] issued a direct threat against the U.N.," Mr. Veness wrote.
Beginning in April, the U.N. security coordinator for the Algerian compound sent a series of urgent messages to headquarters in New York, warning that the likelihood of an attack on the compound housing seven U.N. agencies was "high" and that damage would be "severe."
In subsequent warnings, Babacar Ndiaye of Senegal, the U.N. security coordinator, sought barriers to protect the compound and other measures.
Despite the warnings, the compound remained at "Phase 1" of a five-level security system used by the United Nations — a level considered safe enough for U.N. staffers to bring their families to live overseas.
Mr. Ndiaye died in the Dec. 11 attack that killed 17 and injured at least 40.
Shortly afterward, al Qaeda claimed credit for the bombing, boasting that it used nearly a ton of explosives against "the den of international apostasy."
Local press reports shortly after the attack quote Algerian Interior Minister Noureddine Yazid Zerhouni as saying that the government had reason to expect an attack because in April, authorities had arrested a man with surveillance video of the site on his cell phone.
That man, an al Qaeda associate, was wanted in connection with an April 11 attack on the presidential palace in Algeria and a nearby police station.
It was the deadliest attack on the United Nations since the August 2003 Baghdad bombing that killed 22, and forced the organization to leave Iraq for more than a year.
Islamist turmoil has plagued Algeria for years. Up to 200,000 people were killed in a civil war that began in 1992 after the army canceled elections that a now-banned Islamist party was poised to win.
The war ended a decade later, but an Islamist insurgency continued.
By 1996, however, the situation was calmer and the Algerian government began complaining to U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan that security precautions stigmatized Algeria with "an undeserved bad image abroad to the extent that it kept out foreign investment," according to the Veness report.
The U.N. subsequently lowered the threat level in stages, ultimately to its lowest level.
Mr. Veness also wrote that the Algerian government was slow to respond to repeated requests for additional security.
He said "care has been taken not to apportion blame or responsibility."
The warnings were received at the U.N. headquarters in New York, but it is not clear from the Veness report how the U.N. responded.
The U.N. Staff Union, a New York-based organization that represents many but not all U.N. employees, has called for a full investigation to find out why better protections were not in place.
The group has publicly questioned why the formal risk assessment for that duty station was so relaxed, given the threats and attacks on foreigners and government buildings.
Just two weeks ago, the United Nations announced the formation of a seven-member panel to review U.N. security arrangements around the world.
Though the review is in response to the Dec. 11 attack, it will not focus on how so many red flags were missed in Algiers, said senior U.N. official Lakhdar Brahimi, who is in charge of the project.
Mr. Brahimi told a press conference last month that the blue and white U.N. flag was no longer a symbol of neutrality and protection, but in fact a target.
Washington Times
NEW YORK — U.N. and Algerian officials were warned in advance of a December terrorist attack in Algiers that killed 17 U.N. staffers but they failed to boost security measures at the U.N. compound, a preliminary report says.
"The hostile intent against the U.N. in Algeria was present and well-known before the attack," David Veness, U.N. undersecretary general for safety and security, wrote in a 20-page preliminary report, a copy of which was obtained by The Washington Times.
Six months before the attack, "the media branch for [al Qaeda in the Maghreb] issued a direct threat against the U.N.," Mr. Veness wrote.
Beginning in April, the U.N. security coordinator for the Algerian compound sent a series of urgent messages to headquarters in New York, warning that the likelihood of an attack on the compound housing seven U.N. agencies was "high" and that damage would be "severe."
In subsequent warnings, Babacar Ndiaye of Senegal, the U.N. security coordinator, sought barriers to protect the compound and other measures.
Despite the warnings, the compound remained at "Phase 1" of a five-level security system used by the United Nations — a level considered safe enough for U.N. staffers to bring their families to live overseas.
Mr. Ndiaye died in the Dec. 11 attack that killed 17 and injured at least 40.
Shortly afterward, al Qaeda claimed credit for the bombing, boasting that it used nearly a ton of explosives against "the den of international apostasy."
Local press reports shortly after the attack quote Algerian Interior Minister Noureddine Yazid Zerhouni as saying that the government had reason to expect an attack because in April, authorities had arrested a man with surveillance video of the site on his cell phone.
That man, an al Qaeda associate, was wanted in connection with an April 11 attack on the presidential palace in Algeria and a nearby police station.
It was the deadliest attack on the United Nations since the August 2003 Baghdad bombing that killed 22, and forced the organization to leave Iraq for more than a year.
Islamist turmoil has plagued Algeria for years. Up to 200,000 people were killed in a civil war that began in 1992 after the army canceled elections that a now-banned Islamist party was poised to win.
The war ended a decade later, but an Islamist insurgency continued.
By 1996, however, the situation was calmer and the Algerian government began complaining to U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan that security precautions stigmatized Algeria with "an undeserved bad image abroad to the extent that it kept out foreign investment," according to the Veness report.
The U.N. subsequently lowered the threat level in stages, ultimately to its lowest level.
Mr. Veness also wrote that the Algerian government was slow to respond to repeated requests for additional security.
He said "care has been taken not to apportion blame or responsibility."
The warnings were received at the U.N. headquarters in New York, but it is not clear from the Veness report how the U.N. responded.
The U.N. Staff Union, a New York-based organization that represents many but not all U.N. employees, has called for a full investigation to find out why better protections were not in place.
The group has publicly questioned why the formal risk assessment for that duty station was so relaxed, given the threats and attacks on foreigners and government buildings.
Just two weeks ago, the United Nations announced the formation of a seven-member panel to review U.N. security arrangements around the world.
Though the review is in response to the Dec. 11 attack, it will not focus on how so many red flags were missed in Algiers, said senior U.N. official Lakhdar Brahimi, who is in charge of the project.
Mr. Brahimi told a press conference last month that the blue and white U.N. flag was no longer a symbol of neutrality and protection, but in fact a target.
Monday, March 31, 2008
Letter to UNDP Watch on Algeria bombing
It has been 3 months now since the last posting to UNDP Watch to air the blood soaked laundry of UNDP and its negligence in Algeria which cost the lives of 13 of our colleagues and the gross mismanagement of the Security Unit for UNDP. 3 months to take action to prevent another Algeria. 3 months to make the changes in the Security Unit to make sure that rules and regulations are followed in hiring and that the falsely titled deputy chief is removed. But what has happened?UNDP executive board has given over 30 million dollars to the Security Unit to provide for our safety after Algeria. Of course Mr. Jab Swart has been placed in charge of managing this fund again, even following his inability to give funds to Algeria when it was needed most. Each region was asked to prioritize the needs for using these funds. each responsible regional security unit focal point reviewed and approved these requests. The security unit budgeting manager reviewed and validated these requests.The Administrator and Associate Administrator have reminded everyone that security is the highest priority and that the funding is available to help protect us. But what has happened in this 3 months? NOTHING.
Mr.Jab Swart sits on his deputy chief's throne and 'manages' this fund. If you ask anyone they refer to this fund as "Jab's fund". Funds for some moving of UNDP offices have been proposed but not a penny has been issued. Almost every UNDP country office where you and I work every day far from Mr. Jab Swart in his private ofice in New York have asked for funds. What have we received NOTHING.
Mr. Jab Swart was keen to use "his" fund last year to give funds to projects he personally endorsed such as thousands for countries in Europe where his friends worked. Many thousands for other countries where there was a lesser threat than in Algeria, where again Mr. Jab Swart's friends worked or where he had worked himself. But Algeria was given funds for only some radios. How did Mr. Jab Swart think that a few radios would help against a bomb? In Mr. Jab Swart's management of security it is more important to but an armoured truck for his friends in Somalia where the staff worked from a safe hotel most of the time. For Algeria Mr. Jab Swart did virtually NOTHING.
With the blood of 13 UN colleages on his hands it could be expected that Mr. Jab Swart would be eager to make right and do for us what he refused to do for Algeria. But he has done NOTHING.
In Africa we have a saying: Rain beats a leopard's skin, but it does not wash out the spots. The rain of our colleagues' blood was not enough even to wash out Mr. Jab Swart's spots of incompetence. His background is not security and he is an incompetent manager and UNDP administration has not seen fit to remove him. Again my friends, what has been done NOTHING.
Perhaps Mr. Brahimi and his investigating team will see the truth behind Mr. Jab Swart's spots. But I and many others expect the usual NOTHING.
Saturday, December 15, 2007
Staff Council Appeal for assistance of Algiers Victims
MESSAGE FROM THE UNDP/UNFPA/UNOPS STAFF COUNCIL IN RESPONSE TO THE TRAGEDY IN ALGIERS
Dear Colleagues,
As you all know, quite a number of fellow staff members, friends and colleagues have died and several of them have been injured in the tragic bombing of the UN compound in Algeria. We are giving absolute priority to helping the families of the colleagues we have lost and those injured.
In close cooperation with the UNDP/UNFPA/UNOPS Staff Council an effort through an appeal for assistance is underway for collecting voluntary donations to complement the institutional contribution that is being made. To facilitate the donations the following procedures have been put in place:
For direct donations in cash at NY Headquarters, donation boxes will also be placed at the Regional Bureau for Arab States (DC1-22 floor), and at the entrance of the UNDP Cafeteria (DC1 the 3rd Floor) daily from 9:30-10:30 am and 12:30-2:30 pm starting Monday, 17 December. All donations collected through these boxes will be directed to the UNDP Treasury/Office of Finance.
For check contributions at NY Headquarters, donations may be delivered to UNDP Treasury, FF-478. Should someone prefer to transfer their contribution by wire, please contact Julie Anne Mejia, Treasurer, (212) 906-5690 for further instructions.
For Country Offices, funds should be deposited into the CO bank account (USD checks should be pouched to Treasury for deposit if there is no local USD account). If funds are deposited into the CO bank account the CO should create a pending item using:
As you all know, quite a number of fellow staff members, friends and colleagues have died and several of them have been injured in the tragic bombing of the UN compound in Algeria. We are giving absolute priority to helping the families of the colleagues we have lost and those injured.
In close cooperation with the UNDP/UNFPA/UNOPS Staff Council an effort through an appeal for assistance is underway for collecting voluntary donations to complement the institutional contribution that is being made. To facilitate the donations the following procedures have been put in place:
For direct donations in cash at NY Headquarters, donation boxes will also be placed at the Regional Bureau for Arab States (DC1-22 floor), and at the entrance of the UNDP Cafeteria (DC1 the 3rd Floor) daily from 9:30-10:30 am and 12:30-2:30 pm starting Monday, 17 December. All donations collected through these boxes will be directed to the UNDP Treasury/Office of Finance.
For check contributions at NY Headquarters, donations may be delivered to UNDP Treasury, FF-478. Should someone prefer to transfer their contribution by wire, please contact Julie Anne Mejia, Treasurer, (212) 906-5690 for further instructions.
For Country Offices, funds should be deposited into the CO bank account (USD checks should be pouched to Treasury for deposit if there is no local USD account). If funds are deposited into the CO bank account the CO should create a pending item using:
- Fund ID 68140 – Algeria Relief Fund
- Generic Donor ID 11098 – Algeria Relief donors
The CO should create a deposit through AR using the generic donor ID 11098 and fund code 00001.
We are UNITED in our profound sorrow and express our solidarity with the families and friends of our dear colleagues. We pay tribute to their courage, personal commitment and strength.
For further questions, please contact the UNDP/UNFPA/UNOPS Staff Council (registry.staff-council@undp.org) and/or Dima Al-Khatib (dima.al-khatib@undp.org)
Thank you for your contributions and support.
UNDP/UNFPA/UNOPS Staff Council
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