JOINT DECLARATION ON UN/NATO SECRETARIAT COOPERATION

Click here to read the declaration courtesy of The Streit Council webpage

NATO’s relations with the United Nations

Click here to read this on NATO website

NATO and the United Nations (UN) share a commitment to maintaining international peace and security. The two organizations have been cooperating in this area since the early 1990s.

At the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, the Allies underlined their commitment to strong and productive cooperation with the UN and welcomed the strengthened practical cooperation following the Joint Declaration on UN/NATO Secretariat Cooperation of September 2008. NATO aims to deepen this practical cooperation and further develop political dialogue on issues of common interest, including through enhanced liaison, more regular political consultation, and enhanced practical cooperation in managing crises where both organizations are engaged.
NATO’s new Strategic Concept commits the Alliance to prevent crises, manage conflicts and stabilize post-conflict situations, including by working more closely with NATO’s international partners, most importantly the United Nations and the European Union. The UN is at the core of the framework of international organizations within which the Alliance operates, a principle that is enshrined in NATO’s founding treaty.
 UN Security Council resolutions have provided the mandate for NATO’s operations in the Balkans and in Afghanistan, and the framework for NATO’s training mission in Iraq. More recently, in March 2011, the Allies decided to take on the whole military operation in Libya under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973, in order to protect civilians and civilian-populated areas under threat of attack. This operation was highly successful. It terminated on 31 October 2011.
Over the years, NATO-UN cooperation has been extended beyond cooperation in peace-support and stabilization operations to include consultations between NATO and UN specialised bodies on issues such as crisis assessment and management, civil-military cooperation, logistics, combating human trafficking, mine action, civilian capabilities, women and peace and security, arms control and non-proliferation, and the fight against terrorism.
Close cooperation between NATO and the UN and its agencies is an important element in the development of an international “Comprehensive Approach” to crisis management and operations. At Lisbon, the Allies decided to enhance NATO’s contribution to a comprehensive approach to crisis management as part of the international community’s effort and to improve NATO’s ability to deliver stabilization and reconstruction effects.
NATO has also provided support to UN-sponsored operations, including logistical assistance to the African Union’s UN-endorsed peacekeeping operations in Darfur, Sudan, and in Somalia; support for UN disaster-relief operations in Pakistan, following the massive earthquake in 2005; and escorting merchant ships carrying World Food Programme humanitarian supplies off the coast of Somalia.

• Framework for cooperation

  NATO’s Secretary General reports regularly to the UN Secretary General on progress in NATO-led operations and on other key decisions of the North Atlantic Council in the area of crisis management and in the fight against terrorism. In recent years, staff-level meetings and high-level visits have become more frequent. The UN is frequently invited to attend NATO ministerial meetings.
  In September 2008, building on the experience of over a decade of working together, the Secretaries General of the two organizations agreed to establish a framework for expanded consultation and cooperation. This includes regular exchanges and dialogue at senior and working levels on political and operational issues. Increasing cooperation will significantly contribute to addressing the threats and challenges that the international community faces.
  Within this framework, cooperation will be further developed between NATO and the UN on issues of common interest, including in communication and information-sharing; capacity-building, training and exercises; lessons learned, planning and support for contingencies; and operational coordination and support. Cooperation will continue to develop in a practical fashion, taking into account each organization’s specific mandate, expertise, procedures and capabilities.
  Staff-level meetings also take place with other UN organizations, such as the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), and NATO experts participate in events organized by other UN bodies.
  NATO also contributes actively to the work of the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee (UN CTC) – established in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1373 in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States – and participates in special meetings of the Committee bringing together international, regional and sub-regional organizations involved in this process. NATO and the UN conduct reciprocal briefings on progress in the area of counter-terrorism, in their respective committees. NATO is also committed to supporting the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.
  Since 2004, NATO has been working with a number of UN agencies in the framework of the Environmental Security (ENVSEC) Initiative, through the NATO Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Programme. (See NATO A-to-Z page on Environmental Security)"
  

• Evolution of NATO-UN cooperation in the field

  Working relations between the United Nations and the Alliance were limited during the Cold War. This changed in 1992, against the background of growing conflict in the western Balkans, where their respective roles in crisis management led to an intensification of practical cooperation between the two organizations in the field.
  

  Bringing peace to the former Yugoslavia

  In July 1992, NATO ships belonging to the Alliance's Standing Naval Force Mediterranean, assisted by NATO Maritime Patrol Aircraft, began monitoring operations in the Adriatic in support of a UN arms embargo against all republics of the former Yugoslavia. A few months later, in November 1992, NATO and the Western European Union (WEU) began enforcement operations in support of UN Security Council resolutions aimed at preventing the escalation of the conflict.
  The readiness of the Alliance to support peacekeeping operations under the authority of the UN Security Council was formally stated by NATO foreign ministers in December 1992. A number of measures were subsequently taken, including joint maritime operations under the authority of the NATO and WEU Councils; NATO air operations; close air support for the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR); air strikes to protect UN "Safe Areas"; and contingency planning for other options which the United Nations might take.
  Following the signature of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Dayton Agreement) on 14 December 1995, NATO was given a mandate by the United Nations, on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 1031, to implement the military aspects of the peace agreement. NATO’s first peacekeeping operation, the Implementation Force (IFOR) began operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina to fulfill this mandate in December 1995. One year later, it was replaced by a NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR). Throughout their mandates both multinational forces worked closely with other international organizations and humanitarian agencies on the ground, including UN agencies such as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the UN International Police Task Force (IPTF).
  From the onset of the conflict in Kosovo in 1998 and throughout the crisis, close contacts were maintained between the UN Secretary General and NATO’s Secretary General. Actions were taken by the Alliance in support of UN Security Council resolutions both during and after the conflict. The Kosovo Force (KFOR) was deployed on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 1244 of 12 June 1999 to provide an international security presence as the prerequisite for peace and reconstruction of Kosovo. Throughout its deployment, KFOR has worked closely with the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).
  In 2000 and 2001, NATO and the United Nations also cooperated successfully in containing major ethnic discord in southern Serbia and preventing a full-blown civil war in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia¹.
  

  Afghanistan

  Cooperation between NATO and the UN is playing a key role in Afghanistan. The Alliance formally took over the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), a UN-mandated force, in August 2003. Originally tasked with helping provide security in and around Kabul, ISAF has subsequently been authorized by a series of UN Security Council resolutions to expand its presence into other regions of the country to extend the authority of the central government and to facilitate development and reconstruction.
  NATO and ISAF work closely with the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and other international actors that are supporting governance, reconstruction and development. The close cooperation takes place in various settings, in Afghanistan as well as in UN and NATO capitals. It includes co-membership of the Joint Co-ordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) overseeing the implementation of the internationally endorsed Afghanistan Compact, co-chairmanship together with the Afghan Government of the Executive Steering Committee for Provincial Reconstruction Teams, and other joint Afghan-International Community bodies.
  The practical close work also covers cooperation between UNAMA, ISAF and the NATO Senior Civilian Representative in Kabul on civil-military issues such as operational planning. Beyond Kabul city, close civil-military cooperation between UNAMA and ISAF is also being pursued in those provinces where both ISAF and UNAMA are present. This practical work is now being developed comprehensively in the context of UNAMA’s Integrated Approach to selected prioritized Afghan districts.
  

  Iraq

  Under the terms of UN Security Council Resolution 1546 and at the request of the Iraqi Interim Government, NATO is providing assistance in training and equipping Iraqi security forces.
  

  Supporting African Union missions

  In June 2005, following a request from the African Union and in close coordination with the United Nations and the European Union, NATO agreed to support the African Union’s Mission in Sudan (AMIS), which is trying to end the continuing violence in the Darfur region. NATO assisted by airlifting peacekeepers from African troop-contributing countries to the region and also helped train AU troops in how to run a multinational military headquarters and how to manage intelligence.
  Following a request from the African Union in 2007, NATO accepted to assist the African Union mission in Somalia (AMISOM) by providing airlift support to AU member states willing to deploy on this mission. NATO is also providing capacity building assistance for the African Union via a Senior Military Liaison Office in Addis Abbaba. The Alliance also protects UN shipping in support of AMISOM.
  

  Deterring piracy

  In October 2008, NATO agreed to a request from the UN Secretary General to deploy ships off the coast off Somalia to deter piracy and escort merchant ships carrying World Food Programme cargo.
  

  Libya

  On March 27, NATO Allies decided to take on the whole military operation in Libya under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973. The purpose of Operation Unified Protector was to protect civilians and civilian-populated areas under threat of attack. NATO implementied all military aspects of the UN Resolution.  Allies moved swiftly and decisively to enforce the arms embargo and no-fly zone called for in the resolution, and to take further measures to protect civilians and civilian populated areas from attack. Operation Unified Protector was successfully concluded on 31 October 2011.
  
  1.Turkey recognizes the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name

The North Atlantic Treaty and the UN Charter

The Charter of the United Nations, signed in San Francisco on 26 June 1945 by fifty nations, provides the legal basis for the creation of NATO and acknowledges the overall responsibility of the UN Security Council for international peace and security.
The preamble to NATO’s North Atlantic Treaty signed in Washington on 4 April 1949 makes it clear that the UN Charter is the framework within which the Alliance operates. In its opening phrases, the signatories of the Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter.
In Article 1 they also undertake to settle international disputes by peaceful means and to refrain from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the UN Charter.
Article 5 of the Treaty makes explicit reference to Article 51 of the UN Charter in asserting the right of the Allies to take, individually or collectively, such action as they deem necessary for their self-defence. Moreover, it commits the member countries to terminating any armed attack and all measures taken as a result, when the UN Security Council has itself taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.
Further reference to the UN Charter can be found in Article 7 of the North Atlantic Treaty. It states that the Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of Allies under the Charter, and reaffirms the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.
And finally, in Article 12, a clause was included in the Treaty providing for it to be reviewed after ten years, if any of the Parties to it so requested. It stipulated that the review would take place in the light of new developments affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area, including the development of universal and regional arrangements under the UN Charter.

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50321.htm

U.N. Agency Prepares to Resume Aid to Libya Even if Qaddafi Remains in Power

click here for story

By George Russell

Published May 15, 2011 | FoxNews.com

While the U.S. and NATO demand that Libyan despot Muammar al-Qaddafi relinquish control and stop slaughtering his own people, the United NationsDevelopment Program is secretively planning for a quick return to action in the country, even if Libya’s rebels fail to drive him from power.

UNDP, the U.N.’s flagship anti-poverty agency, abandoned its previously close embrace of the Qaddafi family as the anti-regime protests turned into widespread armed rebellion and NATO air forces began supporting the often-beleaguered rebels. The agency’s non-Libyan staffers left the country, along with other U.N. personnel, and now work out of Cairo.

But now, UNDP bureaucrats are planning to return with a “forward looking framework of likely recovery policies,” even if the rebels are not successful, according to a planning document obtained by Fox News. The proposed price tag: $25.3 million, though the document also says the numbers are “no more than estimates of what would be required to kick-start program initiatives.”

Evidence of the detailed contingency planning was hastily scrubbed from a UNDP website the day after Fox News raised questions about the activity, and sensitive wording was rephrased in the text that remained. A Fox News request for the specific six-page document that summed up UNDP’s thinking was denied, on the grounds that the document “is in draft form and is still under discussion.”

CLICK HERE FOR THE UNDP WEB PAGE AS IT FIRST APPEARED

CLICK HERE FOR THE UNDP WEB PAGE AS LATER MODIFIED

Now, “in anticipation of the possibility of a ceasefire/political agreement or a victory by the opposition, UNDP is already preparing to adjust and scale up its programming inside Libya,” according to the internal document on “recovery and transition in post-crisis Libya,” obtained by Fox News despite UNDP’’s refusal to provide it.

Even if rebel control is limited to the eastern half of the country, where the rebellion is strongest, the “recovery policies” can be used by the U.N. agency to “support early recovery activities, including capacity development support for local government and civil society.”

And if Qaddafi falls, as NATO leaders and European government leaders are demanding, UNDP intends to be quickly in place to provide “advisory support to the new government on transitional arrangements and processes” (including a new constitution and elections) as well as a strategy for “public administration reform,” and “support for national dialogue and reconciliation,” according to the contingency document.

“UNDP has a critical role to play,” the paper declares, “given its expertise in such areas as transitional governance, national dialogue and reconciliation; youth and civil society; strengthening national and local governance institutions and restoring public service delivery; and (re-)establishing the rule of law and community safety.”

CLICK HERE FOR THE ‘POST-CRISIS’ DOCUMENT

There is considerable irony to UNDP’s claims of expertise, as the agency has been responsible for many similarly-named policies in the previous decade, all carried out with the full support, and very often the full financing, of the Qaddafi regime itself.

UNDP, which has operated inside Libya in close cooperation with the government since 1974-- put its $19.7 million local program for 2011-2014 on hold when the fighting became heavy.

That program was developed entirely in cooperation with the Qaddafi government, using Libyan money, and called for programs under such headings as “Strengthening national institutions toward public service delivery; and strengthening national data management systems,” and “Strengthening Government efforts on economic diversification through increased focus on small and medium enterprises, youth capacity development, and economic empowerment of women.”

The programs were to be carried out in close cooperation with a variety of Qaddafi government ministries, as well as non-governmental organizations and civil society organizations—all of which, in pre-upheaval Libya, were closely controlled by the Qaddafi government or members of the despot’s family.

CLICK HERE FOR THE 2011-2014 PROGRAM

UNDP’s previous Libyan program, for 2006-2009 (later extended through 2010), was also developed in close cooperation with the regime, and had such headings as “Improved governance at local and central levels.”

Under the governance rubric, it included the promise to “continue to support national capacity building efforts in the area of good governance, including human rights,” and conduct “a comprehensive technical review of the legal system in Libya, in support of the country's efforts to promote the rule of law, and to modernize the judicial system at the national and local levels.”

The projected cost of that program was initially estimated at $16 million, with all of the money likewise coming from the Qaddafi regime.

CLICK HERE FOR THE 2006-2009 PROGRAM

The program, along with its successor, was carried out under an arrangement known as “national execution,” or NEX, which is, according to a UNDP handbook, “a cooperative operational arrangement entailing...overall responsibility and assumption of accountability for the formulation and management of the program country of UNDP-supported programs and projects.”

Translation: the programs were run by the Qaddafi government itself, with UNDP providing technical advice and its seal of approval. For its role, UNDP takes a management fee of about 3 percent of total program spending.

(The NEX “modality” is used by UNDP in many if not most of the 167 countries where it operates, including some of the world’s worst despotisms—Zimbabwe, for example.)

In its latest, confidential “post-crisis” planning paper, however, UNDP admits that ordinary Libyans do not think highly of some of the institutions the U.N. agency “supported” in its previous multi-year development plans in Libya.

“Rule of law institutions, including the justice sector and police, have suffered a severe erosion of trust among the Libyan people,” the document declares. “Reforming these institutions to regain that trust is indispensible to ensure security and stability during the recovery process.”

Among other things, as a medium-term priority, it suggests “Increase access to justice for vulnerable communities by establishing legal advice services, raising awareness of rule of law and human rights, and training for traditional justice providers.”

Those solutions seem pallid alongside the description of the failings of the Libyan justice system in the U.S. State Department’s latest human rights examination of the country. There, the system is described as essentially a sham. As the report puts it: “At his discretion Qaddafi and his close associates may interfere in the administration of justice by altering court judgments, replacing judges, or manipulating the appeal system. The judiciary failed to incorporate international standards for fair trials, detention, and imprisonment.”

Libyan local government institutions, the UNDP document says, were also not very commendable; they “were weak and had limited planning and implementation capacities.” The paper noted that “immediate and longer-term support to local authorities and development institutions would be critical.”

The paper also suggests “scaled-up support” for a campaign to rid Libya of land mines, noting that “the use of landmines and the proliferation of small arms during the conflict are creating new risks to community security.” (Over the past seven years, the paper notes, the regime had imported $1.7 billion worth of small arms “from European countries.”)

As it happens, a similar anti-land-mine campaign was previously carried out under UNDP auspices in Libya, in cooperation with a local non-government organization that was supervised by the Qaddafi Charity and Development Foundation.

The foundation was run by Muammar al-Qaddafi’s son Saif al-Islam, considered before the latest rebellion as Libya’s most likely benign reformer. (In those not-so-long-ago days, UNDP hailed its relationship with the Qaddafi Foundation as a “long and healthy partnership.”

Since the situation in Libya remains highly fluid, the latest post-crisis paper says, “needs and options will obviously vary depending on what happens.”

But whatever direction comes next, the document makes clear, UNDP intends to remain as close to the center of things as possible—just as it did in the Qaddafi-dominated past.

George Russell is executive editor of Fox News and can be found on Twitter@GeorgeRussell.

Scandinavian Makes Bid For Afghanistan Envoy Role

Diplomacy: Another Scandinavian As Super Envoy In Afghanistan?

Scoop News: Candidates are beginning to appear for the vacant role of United Nations Special Envoy for Afghanistan after the collapse of the candidature of prominent British politician Lord Paddy Ashdown.

Norway’s Ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Brussels, Belgium, appears to be one of the leading candidates.

According to a report by Oslo’s newspaper Aftenposten, Ambassador Kai Eide, a former UN Envoy in Kosovo and a veteran diplomat with the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, has made the shortlist currently reviewed by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon.

Ban Ki-moon is required to make his final decision once consultations with all relevant partners have concluded – that includes the European Union, NATO and major contributors in the country.

“If an offer comes, it would be natural to discuss it first with my family, the foreign minister [Jonas Gahr Store] and others directly affected,” Ambassador Eide told Aftenposten in an interview.

Norway has been very active in Afghanistan and has been pushing for a much more active role of the international community since 2006.

Oslo first suggested a “super envoy” figure two years ago, to represent the entire international community in Kabul. The idea, however, started to be seriously considered only this past summer, as reports mounted of problems in Afghanistan.

The “super envoy” would be expected to become the main point of contact between Afghan President Hamid Karzai and the international forces, the EU policing mission and the UN contingent, as well as co-ordinate reconstruction efforts and liaise with NATO. He [or she] would have to balance the need for implementing the so-called “Afghanization” process with that of combating the Taleban insurgency.

Other rumored candidates for the post are Jan Kubis, Foreign Minister of Slovakia; Hikmat Chetin, a senior Turkish diplomat with experience in Afghanistan; and Joschka Fischer, former German Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Norway, as well as other Nordic countries – Denmark, Finland, Iceland, and Sweden – have historically been very active peacekeepers and envoys, in the tradition of former UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld and Finland’s Martti Ahtisaari.

Of all UN Envoys and Representative around the world, fifteen are from Scandinavia, including the top officials in Iraq, Darfur, Kosovo, and Lebanon. Quite an extraordinary achievement considering the amount of pressure and lobbying the United Nations and its Secretary-General have to sustain for such highly-coveted vacant post.

According to recent statistics, Norway and Sweden account for the largest number of UN Envoys/Representatives, a total of five each. Denmark has three, while Finland has two. At present, Iceland is the only Nordic country not represented with a UN Envoy/Representative.

The five Scandinavian nations have long been strong supporters of the United Nations, advancing their foreign policy goals through the UN Secretariat and actively backing the agendas of the UN specialized agencies.

“For countries with such small populations – collectively totaling no more than 24.8 million – they have influence far out of proportion to their size,” according to 2007 report published by Bnet.

The main reason, of course, is their enormous financial commitment to the UN.

According to the report, Denmark, Norway and Sweden devote at least 0.8 percent of their gross domestic product (GDP) to official development assistance (ODA).

Both Norway and Sweden give close to 1 percent, the highest in the entire UN system (outside of Scandinavia, the only other countries which approach this level of funding are the Netherlands and Luxembourg).

Iceland and Finland are not far behind. In terms of total UN contributions (both assessed and voluntary), Norway ranks number 8, Sweden 9 and Denmark 11.

The United States, the world's largest economy, gives only 0.16 percent of GDP to foreign assistance.

Ambassador Johan Løvald, Norway's Permanent Representative to the UN, said in the report: “With this amount of investment in the United Nations system, it's not surprising that we have a lot of influence. We use the UN to advance our common agenda, which is grounded in a multilateral approach to solving problems, the rule of law, building peace and security, advancing human rights, including women’s rights, reducing poverty, and tackling global environmental challenges, such as climate change.”