Showing posts with label unops. Show all posts
Showing posts with label unops. Show all posts

Friday, April 12, 2013

United Nations start trading certificates - big business, lot's of deals - great profits for those who know how to play the game !


Click here to read this in full at: http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/new-partnership-to-offset-un-carbon-emissions-and-support-sustainable-development

New Partnership to Offset UN Carbon Emissions and Support Sustainable Development


airobi/Copenhagen, 5 April 2013 - A wind farm in India and a waste management project in Colombia are set to benefit from a new to offset the carbon emissions of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS).
Ever since the UN Secretary-General first announced a directive for UN agencies to move toward climate neutrality in 2007, the organization has been measuring its greenhouse gas emissions and identifying opportunities to reduce them.

UNEP, which has been climate neutral since 2008, recently requested UNOPS, an operational and central procurement arm of the UN, to buy 50,000 certificates of emission reduction (CERs), to cover UNEP’s emissions for 2010-2013.

As part of its own emission-reduction plan, UNOPS decided to purchase additional offsets and added almost 14,000 certificates to the order, one for every tonne of greenhouse gases emitted by its global activities in 2011.

Combining the procurement volumes allowed the two organizations to buy the certificates from Swiss company First Climate at a reduced price. As a result, the emissions from both organizations were offset in a landfill gas management project in Colombia, while UNEP also contributed to the installation of a 15 megawatt wind farm in Tamil Nadu, India.

Friday, December 10, 2010

UNOPS PROBLEMS WITH BOARD OF AUDITORS

Current challenges and measures to address them


2. For the 2006-2007 biennium the Board of Auditors had issued a modified audit opinion, in which, among other concerns, there were three matters of emphasis, namely, the unreconciled inter-fund account mainly with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), deferred revenue and non-expendable assets. The financial situation of the organization has improved significantly over the course of the last three biennia. This has occurred despite the fact that in the last five years, in addition to a number of significant write-offs, UNOPS made exceptionally high bad-debt provisions, covering sizeable losses from prior periods, and made full accrual for all end-of-service liabilities, including after-service health insurance. As at December 2009, UNOPS reserves were fully replenished at $42.7 million, representing an addition of some $38.4 million since December 2005.


Issues to watch and risks to mitigate


In paragraph 45, UNOPS agreed with the Board’s reiterated prior recommendation to review its accounting policies regarding revenue recognition, as part of its preparation for IPSAS implementation.


1. UNOPS has established an IPSAS project board to drive the organization-wide

transition from UNSAS to IPSAS by January 2012. UNOPS is presently reviewing

and drafting its revenue recognition policy for project revenue. The policy will be

based on the percentage completion method.

Department responsible: Finance

Status: In progress

Priority: High

Target date: December 2010


In paragraph 48, UNOPS agreed with the Board’s recommendation to establish procedures to review the reasonableness of the interest income received from the UNDP Treasury.


2. UNOPS has conceptualized a methodology to review the interest received

from the UNDP Treasury for reasonableness on a quarterly basis.

Department responsible: Finance

Status: In progress

Priority: High

Target date: December 2010


In paragraph 51, UNOPS agreed with the Board’s recommendation to regularly monitor administrative budgets on a line-by-line basis to ensure that budgets are not exceeded.


3. UNOPS follows a rigorous half-yearly budget review process of administrative

expenditures throughout its country offices, regional offices and headquarters.

Department responsible: Finance

Status: In progress

Priority: Medium

Target date: December 2010


In paragraph 57, UNOPS agreed with the Board’s recommendation to address instances of obligations raised that are not supported with valid and appropriate obligating documents.


4. UNOPS retired the imprest modality in April 2010, and further occurrences of

the instances noted by the Board have been prevented. UNOPS monitors purchase

orders on its financial dashboard, and random purchase orders are selected for

review at headquarters. In addition, quarterly certification of obligating documents

is requested from regional directors.

Department responsible: Finance

Status: Completed

Priority: High

Target date: Fully implemented


In paragraph 64, UNOPS agreed with the Board’s recommendation to implement controls and reports to accurately differentiate between project receivable and payable balances and project balances that represent over-expenditure.


5. UNOPS has implemented a quarterly project quality assurance review process

for all projects. Any project over-expenditure is highlighted for action through the

quality assurance process. Furthermore, reports will be prepared for the next audit to

clearly differentiate project receivable and project payable balances.

Department responsible: Finance

Status: In progress

Priority: High

Target date: December 2010 & April 2011


In paragraph 65, UNOPS agreed with the Board’s further recommendation to improve its system controls to prevent and detect any classification errors in financial reporting in a timely manner.


6. UNOPS will implement monitoring and review controls to detect

misclassifications in a timely manner and prior to financial reporting.

Department responsible: Finance

Status: In Progress

Priority: High

Target date: December 2010


In paragraph 69, UNOPS agreed with the Board’s recommendation to account for the funds received in advance from donors as a liability upon receipt of the funds and not as a credit entry within the accounts receivable accounts.


7. UNOPS will implement an annual review process to identify credit balances in

accounts receivable and to reclassify these as accounts payable.

Department responsible: Finance

Status: In Progress

Priority: Medium


In paragraph 72, UNOPS agreed with the Board’s recommendation to (a) follow-up and clear the credit balances in the accounts receivable, and (b) reclassify credit balances in accounts receivable and account for them as payable.


8. UNOPS will implement an annual review process to identify credit balances in

accounts receivable and to reclassify these as accounts payable.

Department responsible: Finance

Status: In Progress

Priority: Medium

Target date: December 2010


In paragraph 83, UNOPS agreed with the Board’s recommendation to resolve the disputed inter-fund differences in its accounts with UNDP.


9. Resolution of the historic UNOPS-UNDP inter-fund differences is sought and

is currently under discussion at the Executive Director level. These negotiations are

expected to be finalized by the end of 2010.

Department responsible: Finance

Status: In progress

Priority: High

Target date: December 2010


In paragraph 86, UNOPS agreed with the Board’s recommendation to (a) follow-up the rejected project expenditures and make appropriate accounting entries, (b) improve the validation of information captured on its system to ensure that the incidents of rejections are minimized, and (c) consider alternate arrangements with UNDP to further improve the acceptance rate.


10. UNOPS continues to submit project expenditures to UNDP on a quarterly

basis. In late 2009, UNOPS developed a project expenditure validation system to

detect possible rejections and correction of data prior to submission to UNDP.

Overall, the validation process has reduced the rate of rejections to below 1 per cent

for the 2009 year. In addition, UNOPS is also in the process of implementing new

controls to prevent incorrect posting of project expenditures to the chart of accounts.

Department responsible : Finance

Status : In Progress

Priority : High

Target date : December 2010


In paragraph 91, UNOPS agreed with the Board’s recommendation to (a) continue to follow-up on the unreconciled inter-fund differences in its accounts, and (b) engage with the relevant United Nations agencies in order to resolve the old inter-fund differences.


11. As part of the UNOPS project closure phase 2 initiative, meetings will be set

up with the relevant UN agencies to negotiate a resolution of the old inter-fund

differences.

Department responsible: Finance

Status: In Progress

Priority: High

Target date: March 2011


In paragraph 111, UNOPS agreed with the Board’s recommendation to consider a revision of its policy for the valuation of the annual leave liability in its implementation of International Public Sector Accounting Standards.


12. UNOPS selection of policies for the valuation of the annual leave liability is

based on decisions made for the entire United Nations system. At the United

Nations IPSAS task force meeting, which was held in late August through early

September 2010, further guidance on the accounting and disclosure of all end-ofservice-

liabilities in compliance with IPSAS was requested.

Department responsible: Finance

Status: In progress

Priority: High

Target date: December 2010


In paragraph 116, UNOPS agreed with the Board’s recommendation to take appropriate measures to ensure the validity, accuracy and completeness of the data used in the computation of all post-retirement and end-of-service liabilities in future financial periods by ensuring that the information pertains to the correct reporting period.


13. UNOPS selection of policies for the valuation of all end-of-service liabilities is

based on decisions made for the entire United Nations system. An expected outcome

of the aforementioned UN IPSAS task force meeting has been further guidance on

the accounting and disclosure of all end-of-service-liabilities in compliance with

IPSAS.

Department responsible: Finance

Status: In progress

Priority: Medium

Target date: December 2010

Sunday, June 13, 2010

The risks for fraud and violations of the United Nations Staff Regulations and Rules in the United Nations tsunami disaster relief programmes

THANKS TO WIKILEAKS.ORG


This report is protected under the provisions of paragraph 18 of ST/SGB/273 of 7 September 1994


STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE OF INTERNAL OVERSIGHT SERVICES INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION

REDACTED ASSESSMENT REPORT

ID CASE NO. 0558/04


OIOS ASSESSMENT MISSION REPORT


The risks for fraud and violations of the United Nations Staff Regulations and Rules in the United Nations tsunami disaster relief programmes in Indonesia and Sri Lanka


I. INTRODUCTION


1. This document reports on the assessment mission carried out in Jakarta and Aceh province in the Island of Sumatra, Republic of Indonesia between 17 February and 2 March 2005 by the Investigations Division of the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) following discussions, both actual and virtual, with colleagues responsible for investigative activities in United Nations agencies as to how we might jointly address the potential for fraud and corruption in what promises to be a long-term project for the United Nations. The purpose of this mission was to assess the potential for fraud, misconduct, mismanagement, abuse of authority, waste of resources and other violations of the United Nations Regulations and Rules with respect to the resources and staff of the United Nations and others and who are currently deployed and involved on behalf of the United Nations in the Tsunami Disaster relief, rehabilitation and development programmes [TDR]. It was not intended to be an investigation but was designed to provide a means for estimating the potential opportunities for fraud and other abuses to occur; for determining how complaints of wrongdoing can be made in the environment; for ascertaining the critical persons and entities involved in TDR who are those who may be able to identify possible problems and to assist in solving them; and finally, for seeking local advice for preventive and response actions.


2. This document reports on information that was collected and provides analysis of the information as well as descriptions of potential risk scenarios. It also proposes recommendations as to how such risks can be mitigated or even avoided.3. OIOS had initiated early consultations in January 2005 with agency investigative oversight offices, notably UNDP, UNICEF, UNHCR and WFP as well as the World Bank and OLAF/EC to establish a working group which would be able to consider how we might ensure appropriate investigative responses as required. It was agreed that an assessment mission was needed and should be conducted as soon as possible so that necessary measures could be undertaken to prevent fraud and to detect it early where it does occur. Due to other commitments, none of the other agencies’ oversight personnel who were invited were able to join the OIOS team (of two investigators) who undertook the mission. Nevertheless, upon return, the head of the team from OIOS provided briefings to interested agencies in both New York and Geneva. The feedback from those sessions is incorporated into this report.


READ FULL REPORT HERE...

Friday, March 26, 2010

IRENA calls in UNOPS to help achieve its mission

The International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) and the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) have signed an agreement which paves the way for UNOPS to provide comprehensive administrative and procurement support to the recently established renewables agency.

Mandated by governments worldwide, IRENA's mission is to promote the widespread and increased adoption and sustainable use of all forms of renewable energy. With the global population projected to reach 10 billion in 2050, abundant renewable energy sources worldwide can make a significant contribution to the world’s growing demand for energy.

IRENA was officially established in Bonn (Germany) in January 2009 and 142 states and the European Union have now signed its statute. It is headquartered in Abu Dhabi (United Arab Emirates).

The Memorandum of Understanding signed by Hélène Pelosse, Interim Director-General of IRENA, and Jan Mattsson, Executive Director of UNOPS, is aimed at ensuring that the agency can quickly and efficiently begin implementing its mandate. Speaking at the signing ceremony at UNOPS headquarters in Copenhagen, Ms. Pelosse said: "The unique expertise of UNOPS in the area of service provision will enhance the capabilities of IRENA and boost the take-off of its activities dedicated to renewable energy.”

UNOPS will provide services such as the recruitment and administration of personnel, financial management, procurement and legal functions. On request it will also provide other consultancy and management services.

"This is an excellent example of where UNOPS is able to support an agency, with each partner focusing on its comparative strengths. We are delighted to be able to assist IRENA so it is in a position to quickly deliver on its important mission," declared Mr. Mattsson.

For additional information:

IRENA

UNOPS

Wednesday, March 24, 2010

IRENA and UNOPS to work together

WAM Copenhagen, March 24th, 2010 (WAM) -- The International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) and United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) today signed an agreement which paves the way for UNOPS to provide comprehensive administrative and procurement support to the recently established agency.

Mandated by governments worldwide, IRENA's mission is to promote the widespread and increased adoption and sustainable use of all forms of renewable energy. With the global population projected to reach 10 billion in 2050, abundant renewable energy sources worldwide can make a significant contribution to the world's growing demand for energy.

IRENA was officially established in Bonn, Germany on January 26, 2009 and 142 states and the European Union have now signed its statute. It is headquartered in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates.

The Memorandum of Understanding signed by H l ne Pelosse, Interim Director-General of IRENA and Jan Mattsson, Executive Director of UNOPS, is aimed at ensuring that the agency can quickly and efficiently begin implementing its mandate.

UNOPS will provide services such as the recruitment and administration of personnel, financial management, procurement and legal functions. On request it will also provide other consultancy and management services.

Speaking at the signing ceremony at UNOPS headquarters in Copenhagen, Ms. Pelosse said: "The unique expertise of UNOPS in the area of service provision will enhance the capabilities of IRENA and boost the take-off of its activities dedicated to renewable energy." Mattsson said: "This is an excellent example of where UNOPS is able to support an agency, with each partner focusing on its comparative strengths. We are delighted to be able to assist IRENA so it is in a position to quickly deliver on its important mission." WAM/SS WAM/SS/AM

Tuesday, March 9, 2010

Budget Committee Takes Up Secretary-General's Report on Proposed Accountability System for United Nations Secretariat

Responding to the Secretary-General's report on a proposed "accountability system", speakers in the Fifth Committee (Administrative and Budgetary) today urged that more attention be given to what the United Nations leadership could do to foster a sense of personal responsibility among staff, in order to better address what some saw as weak links between resource allocation and desired results.

(Media-Newswire.com) - Responding to the Secretary-General’s report on a proposed “accountability system”, speakers in the Fifth Committee ( Administrative and Budgetary ) today urged that more attention be given to what the United Nations leadership could do to foster a sense of personal responsibility among staff, in order to better address what some saw as weak links between resource allocation and desired results.



Presented by Angela Kane, Under-Secretary-General for Management, the report included a definition of accountability for the Secretariat that drew on existing definitions used by funds and programmes, such as the United Nations Development Programme ( UNDP ) and the United Nations Population Fund ( UNFPA ), as well as by international institutions such as the World Bank, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development ( OECD ) and the European Union.



The report defines accountability as “the obligation of the Organization and its staff members to be answerable for delivering specific results that have been determined through a clear and transparent assignment of responsibility”, and included, among other things, “accurate reporting on performance results, stewardship of funds, and all aspects of performance in accordance with regulations”.



As described by the report, she said the proposed a system of accountability would be based on six interrelated components. It would be underpinned by the principles of the United Nations Charter and the Secretariat’s covenant with Member States, as presented through the strategic framework, programme budget and peacekeeping budget. The system would focus on delivery of results and have a well-functioning process of internal controls, while laying emphasis on ethical standards and good oversight.



To implement the system, the report recommends the establishment of a Results Management Unit in the Office of Programme Planning, Budgets and Accounts of the Department of Management. It also recommends that an Enterprise Risk Management and Control Section be established in the Office of the Under-Secretary-General for Management. Listing its other recommendations, Ms. Kane said the report suggests better integration of the Senior Managers’ Compact with the Organization’s overall objectives, and that a mechanism be proposed for relating the findings of the system of Administration of Justice to staff assessments. It also drew attention to the need to streamline the various mechanisms for delegating authority.



The definition of accountability proposed in the report was not perfect, Ms. Kane admitted. But, she stressed that the United Nations’ accountability systems, instruments and tools must continually evolve. “‘Accountability’ is a dynamic concept,” she said. “What is acceptable now might not be acceptable tomorrow”.



Responding, several speakers said that the Secretary-General’s report on accountability fell short of expectations, because its definition of accountability was limited, and did not place enough importance on the personal responsibility of staff members in their decision-making.



The representative of Yemen, speaking on behalf of the “Group of 77” developing countries and China, noted that the section of the report that dealt with the oil-for-food scandal had charged the scandal to a lack of resources for audits and oversight review, while ignoring a more fundamental issue ‑‑ that of the personal responsibility of United Nations staff.



Echoing the opinion of several others, the Republic of Korea stressed that, if the staff mindset did not change, an accountability framework alone would not create a sense of accountability, rendering the Secretary-General’s proposed measures useless. As a way of strengthening accountability, he suggested that the current performance appraisal system be reformed, and that staff who did not meet its criteria should be forced to leave the Organization, regardless of their contractual type. “The Organization should no longer be a safety net for those who could not show competency,” he said.



The representative of New Zealand observed that, while the legal and regulatory framework could be well developed, its rigorous application through sustained senior leadership would always be a critical factor in efforts to improve the performance of the Secretariat. He believed that the Secretary-General and his senior team had a critical role in strengthening the Organization’s accountability framework, to ensure that the Organization’s limited resources were used efficiently and for the purposes that they were provided.



Susan McLurg, Chair of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions ( ACABQ ), presented that Committee’s view on the report, saying it was “a good basis for moving forward”, but the Committee stopped short of recommending the establishment of either an Enterprise Risk Management and Control Section or a Results Management Unit. Also, the ACABQ was not in a position to recommend the endorsement of the six elements of accountability, believing they were not fully developed.



Also speaking today were the representatives of Spain ( on behalf of the European Union ), Côte d’Ivoire ( on behalf of the African Group ), United States, Singapore, Japan, Switzerland and Mexico.



Inga-Britt Ahlenius, Under-Secretary-General for Internal Oversight Services ( OIOS ), introduced the OIOS report on the review of the practice of the Secretariat regarding the sharing of information included in reports of consultants on management-related issues.



The Committee will meet again on 10 March to take up the conditions of service of ad litem judges on the International Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and revised estimates in the 2010-2011 biennium budget.



Background



The Secretary-General’s report, towards an accountability system in the United Nations Secretariat ( document A/64/640 ), responds to issues raised in General Assembly resolution 63/276, regarding accountability, enterprise risk management and internal control and results-based management. The report proposes a new definition of “accountability”:



“Accountability is the obligation of the Organization and its staff members to be answerable for delivering specific results that have been determined through a clear and transparent assignment of responsibility, subject to the availability of resources and the constraints posed by external factors. Accountability includes achieving objectives and results in response to mandates, fair and accurate reporting on performance results, stewardship of funds, and all aspects of performance in accordance with regulations.”



The report recommends establishing a Results Management Unit in the Office of Programme Planning, Budgets and Accounts of the Department of Management. It also recommends that an Enterprise Risk Management and Control Section be established in the Office of the Under-Secretary-General for Management to conduct strategic and operational planning, operational and financial management, and performance measurement and management.



Member States are asked to endorse the components of an Accountability System for the Secretariat, which is based on a concept of accountability devolved from the Charter of the United Nations; the covenant with Member States to commit to achieving certain results that have been mandated by those States; the delivery of results and performance ( including a system of rewards and sanctions ); the use of internal systems and controls; the implementation of ethical standards and integrity; and the fulfillment of oversight roles and functions.



The report says an interim performance report was produced covering the first year of the biennium 2008-2009 as a trial, and the Secretary-General now proposes to supplement the biennial programme performance report with an interim report at the end of the first year of each biennium. For their part, Member States are requested to continue supporting the implementation of Umoja, the enterprise resource planning project that seeks to link resources to objectives. Also, they are asked to continue supporting the work of the oversight bodies of the United Nations; similar support is urged for the Management Committee, which feeds the findings and recommendations of the oversight bodies into executive management processes.



Also before the Committee was the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions ( ACABQ ) related report ( document A/64/683 ), in which it stresses that an accountability framework cannot create a culture of accountability. Such a culture requires a change in the mindset of the staff, driven by sustained commitment at the most senior levels of the Secretariat.



Among its conclusions and observations, the ACABQ notes that the Secretary-General’s report lists legal instruments, mechanisms and tools that form part of the accountability system. However, the report fails to explain why the current components are not fully functional and stops short of addressing existing gaps or specifying proposals for improvement. Further, the Secretary-General identifies the six components of the Organization’s accountability structure in his report. The ACABQ believes that within these elements there should be a clear acknowledgment of the role of the intergovernmental bodies and therefore that relevant resolutions and decisions of those bodies should have been included.



The ACABQ recalls its earlier comment that a lack of clarity in the definition of accountability is one of the fundamental weaknesses in the Secretary-General’s accountability architecture, and believes that the definitions employed by the International Civil Service Commission ( ICSC ) and the United Nations Population Fund ( UNFPA ) provide a good basis for a definition of accountability for the Organization. Further, the Advisory Committee believes that it would be desirable to seek a common definition to be used by all entities under the authority of the Secretary-General.



The ACABQ recognizes that there are weaknesses in the annual programme performance report, including the inability to demonstrate how resources were used to achieve results. Given this and other long-standing concerns expressed by the General Assembly and the ACABQ about the timeliness and usefulness of that survey, it is disappointed that the Secretary-General did not propose specific improvements, or submit an alternative proposal. Rather than produce an annual report that has limited practical impact, the ACABQ recommends that the Assembly request the Secretary-General to develop an improved performance report that is more focused on the analysis of the effective use of resources.



The ACABQ states that, in light of the insufficient accountability awareness at all levels in the Secretariat, there is a need to clearly identify the links between the senior managers’ compacts and performance objectives at all departmental levels of the Secretariat. The ACABQ views the compact system as an improved method to record the achievements expected of senior managers with a view to evaluating their performance. Thus far, the impact of the compacts on enhancing accountability at the United Nations has yet to be felt.



While the ACABQ recognizes the elements of accountability as set out in annex I to the Secretary-General’s report, it is nevertheless not in a position to recommend their endorsement to the Assembly, believing they are not fully developed.



The Office of Internal Oversight Services ( OIOS ), in its review of the practice of the Secretariat regarding the sharing of information contained in reports of consultants on management-related issues ( document A/64/587 ) says that reports by management consultants are better used as inputs for management decisions, and that sharing them with Member States may “diminish their objectivity” and “dilute” the Secretary-General’s management accountability when he submits proposals to the General Assembly. While declining to grant the Fifth Committee access to some consultants’ reports, the Secretariat does share such reports with relevant departments and offices as required.



However, a survey of 12 departments and offices of the Secretariat revealed that consultants’ reports were not widely shared within departments. Some 52 per cent of respondents indicated that they did not store the reports in a central location where they could be accessed by staff members outside the division or service that commissioned the consultancy. While most respondents ( 78 per cent ) indicated that they did share consultants’ reports with other departments and offices to which they felt the reports would be relevant, the OIOS found that this determination was made without applying any established criteria. There were also no criteria to determine when requests for access to consultants’ reports should be granted.



Although respondents from some departments and offices were willing to share consultants’ reports with legislative bodies or Member States, others preferred that the legislative bodies or Member States rely on the related report of the Secretary-General. Some departments and offices were concerned that if consultants were aware that their reports would be widely available it would impair the candidness of the consultants’ advice. One office indicated that it would be necessary to redraft certain parts of a consultant’s report or provide some context for the report before sharing it to prevent misunderstanding.



To enhance the practice of sharing consultants’ reports within the Secretariat, a mechanism is needed to inform departments and offices of the consultancies carried out. A taxonomy needs to be developed to categorize consultants’ reports, and they need to be stored in a central repository. Where consultancies relate to matters that are of a highly confidential nature, the related reports should be designated “confidential” or “strictly confidential” and should be shared only in exceptional cases, using the precautions outlined in existing guidelines. Departments and offices should pay more attention to the proper categorization of documents and develop criteria to guide staff in categorizing documents and sharing reports or information contained in reports in accordance with the existing guidelines.



The Department of Management accepted all of the recommendations contained in the present report.



Introduction of Reports



ANGELA KANE, Under-Secretary-General, Department of Management, introduced the report of the Secretary-General on accountability ( document A/64/640 ), in which he proposed a definition of accountability for the Secretariat that was elaborated drawing from different sources, such as the United Nations Development Programme ( UNDP ), United Nations Population Fund, the United Nations Children’s Fund ( UNICEF ), the World Bank, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development ( OECD ) and the European Union. The proposed definition was discussed in more than 15 consultations the Secretariat held to discuss the report on accountability, and although “not perfect”, summarized the results of the review and those discussions.



She said the report recommended several immediate actions: issuing an annual programme performance report to address the problem associated with the availability and timing of information provided to Member States on performance; enhancing the role of the Management Committee; improving the integration of Senior Managers’ Compact objectives with the Organization’s overall objectives; proposing a mechanism for relating the findings and decisions of the new system of Administration of Justice to the performance assessments of managers and staff at all levels; streamlining the mechanisms for delegating authority; and leading a review to update other types of delegation of authority that exist in the Secretariat, whether substantive, institutional or by designation.



She said issues to be addressed in forthcoming comprehensive reviews include reform of the performance appraisal system ( PAS ), and self-evaluation and lessons learned. Issues that would require the establishment of dedicated capacities are those for effective implementation of results-based management, and for an enterprise risk management and internal control framework.



She added that the report underlined the importance of all stakeholders playing the role they had been assigned in the process: Member States providing clear and concise mandates and the appropriate resources commensurate with those mandates; and the Secretariat being responsive to those mandates.



“’Accountability’ is a dynamic concept. What is acceptable now might not be acceptable tomorrow,” she said, adding that the systems, instruments and tools that must ensure that the Organization operated in an accountable manner must continue to mature and evolve, and must be continuously revised.



She pointed to Annex I of the report, which explained the fundamental elements of the system, as comprised by six components: the United Nations Charter; the covenant with Member States, in the form of the strategic framework, programme budget and peacekeeping budgets; delivery of results; internal systems and controls; ethical standards and integrity; and oversight. It was followed by Annex II, where the Secretary-General presents a proposal on enterprise risk management and internal control. The main components outlined in that regard were: to determine the internal environment; mapping risks and objectives; identifying risks and evaluating them; prioritizing risk and determining the effectiveness of control measures; information to be communicated throughout the Organization; and monitoring.



She said two important considerations in relation to the methodology for risk management and internal control had to do with how risk would be conceptualized. In addition to the concept of inherent risk, the Secretariat would be working with the concept of residual risk, which took into consideration the inherent risk exposure and levels of effectiveness of controls that were in place. Second, while the day-to-day management of risks and controls were envisioned to be the responsibility of managers and staff members, the overall responsibility would rest ultimately with the “highest level within the Organization”.



Elaborating on Annex III, strengthening the Secretariat’s accountability mechanisms in response to the flaws of the oil-for-food programme, she noted that the Independent Inquiry Committee had identified several weaknesses. Those were: its inadequate internal audit coverage; poor implementation of audit recommendations; absence of an independent audit committee; conflicts of interest; weakened internal control; inadequate monitoring of programme implementation; and non-conformity with procurement rules and a narrowly defined external audit scope.



SUSAN MCLURG introduced the ACABQ’s response to the report, which recognized it as “a good basis for moving forward”, but did not recommend the establishment of either an Enterprise Risk Management and Control Section or a Results Management Unit. She stressed that a strong underlying framework was indispensable in ensuring that the components of an accountability framework would lead to the embedding of personal and institutional accountability in the Organization’s culture. Also, the ACABQ was not in a position to recommend the endorsement of the elements of accountability in Annex I, believing they were not fully developed. She understood that Annex I was incomplete and would be reissued for technical reasons, since it was missing the definitions of accountability used by the Joint Inspection Unit and Board of Auditors.



INGA-BRITT AHLENIUS, Under-Secretary-General for Internal Oversight Services ( OIOS ), introduced the OIOS report on the review of the practice of the Secretariat regarding the sharing of information included in reports of consultants on management-related issues ( document A/64/587 ). In addition to summarizing the findings of the OIOS survey on the topic, she explained that departments and offices expressed reservations on sharing consultants’ reports with legislative bodies or Member States, especially where they had not accepted the consultants’ recommendations; thought the consultants’ methodologies were not rigorous; did not think the matter under consultation was relevant to them; or thought it would be used as input for policy decisions for other considerations. The OIOS concluded there needed to be more transparency in cases where the Secretariat used consultants’ reports as input, and has recommended guidelines to that end.



In relation to this topic, she brought up a broader issue, access to information. The Assembly, in resolution 60/283, noted the Secretary-General’s proposals to provide more detailed information on the policy for access to United Nations documentation. A policy on access to information was in line with many national and international “right to know” practices. The United Nations, being a publicly financed organization, must be accountable to its stakeholders. As such, she looked forward to General Assembly deliberations and decision on that issue as a key component in any discussion on accountability.



WALEED AL-SHAHARI ( Yemen ) speaking on behalf of the “Group of 77” developing countries and China, underlined his delegation’s firm belief in the need to strengthen accountability at the United Nations. Accountability was an issue that affected all Member States and, as such, he continued to be concerned over the late issuance of reports on that matter. In the current case, delegations had received the ACABQ’s report two days ago, hardly an ideal situation and quite surprising given the Secretary-General was well aware of when the item would be taken up.



At any rate, after reviewing the report, the Group found that it fell short of expectations and did not respond to the specific issues spelled out in General Assembly resolution A/63/276. In addition, the report “did not present an adequate, comprehensive accountability system for the United Nations”. He was concerned by various aspects of the report, including the way it had been prepared, and the Secretariat’s perspective on the definition of accountability, among others.



For instance, the report did not consider the fundamental link between the guiding role of intergovernmental bodies and their relevant resolutions and decisions, and the commitment of the Organization and its staff to deliver on those mandates, he continued. Emblematic of that problem was the section of the report that dealt with the oil-for-food scandal. That section of the report charged the scandal to a lack of resources for audits and oversight review, while it altogether ignored the more fundamental issue of personal responsibility of United Nations staff. Still, he said the Group remained strongly committed to the implementation of a comprehensive accountability system and would engage actively in the coming informal consultations on the matter.



D. JORGE PERALTA MOMPARLER ( Spain ), speaking on behalf of the European Union, reiterated his delegation’s strong support for an effective, efficient, accountable and transparent United Nations and stressed the importance of advancing the overall management reform process. The United Nations must be a fully results-oriented body that took into account and mitigated risks, and which held management and staff, at all levels, accountable for achieving results. The European Union noted that the Secretary-General’s report provided an overview, and analysis of, the Organization’s current risk structures and practices related to accountability, risk-based management, enterprise risk management and internal controls. That report also contained some recommendations, in that regard.



He also noted the conclusions and recommendations contained in the corresponding ACABQ report on those issues, including on the definition of accountability, the performance appraisal system, delegation of authority, results-based management, enterprise risk management and internal controls, and the proposed new structures in the Secretariat. The European Union stood ready to engage constructively in discussion on those issues with other delegations, on the basis of the ACABQ’s recommendations, to consider how the accountability system, results-based management, enterprise risk management and internal controls could be further developed and implemented in the United Nations.



PAUL BALLANTYNE ( New Zealand ), speaking on behalf of Canada, Australia and New Zealand ( CANZ ), highlighted the importance the three countries attached to the principles of accountability -– a focus on results, transparency and efficiency throughout the United Nations system. He believed that the Secretary-General and his senior team had a critical role in the strengthening of the accountability framework of the Organization, to ensure that all stakeholders could be assured that the Organization’s limited resources were used in an effective and efficient way and for the purposes that they were provided.



Urging the Committee not to lose sight of where the process had started, he said he was cognizant of the efforts made to date, including the report submitted to the General Assembly at its last session and the subsequent report of the Secretary-General that the Committee was debating today. He was hopeful that at the current session, five years down the track, Members could build on the conceptual work done to date, in an effort to make tangible improvements to the accountability framework of the Organization. He observed that, while the legal and regulatory framework could be well developed, its rigorous application through sustained senior leadership would always be a critical factor in efforts to improve the performance of the Secretariat.



Continuing, he said the report had been candid in identifying weaknesses and gaps in key areas, such as performance reporting and in the administration of authority. Like the ACABQ, he believed that possible solutions could have been more fully developed. With regard to the definition of accountability outlined in the report, he regretted that it did not contain any reference to efficiency, effectiveness or the role of the oversight bodies, and to that end, he saw merit in the ACABQ’s observations that the definition used by the International Civil Service Commission ( ICSC ) and United Nations Population Fund ( UNFPA ) provided a good basis for a definition of accountability for the United Nations secretariat.



Concluding, he said, while recognizing that the report was not perfect, he believed the Secretary-General’s proposals, as well as those of the ACABQ, provided a good basis to make progress on that issue, and looked forward to engaging constructively with all delegations to ensure that the consideration of the item was as productive as possible.



BROUZ RALPH COFFI ( C ôte d’Ivoire ), speaking on behalf of the African Group, said his delegation was also among those concerned that the reports under consideration today had been issued barely two days before this meeting. On the matters at hand, the African Group considered strengthening accountability at the United Nations a top priority, due to its impact on the work of the Secretariat and on relations between the Secretariat and Member States. In addition, there would be clear benefits to all if a comprehensive accountability framework, capable of promoting results-based management and budgeting, was implemented.



He said that over the past four years the Secretariat had submitted three reports on accountability in the United Nations Secretariat. Unfortunately, those surveys had met neither the requests of the General Assembly, nor the expectations of its Member States. The Assembly had again requested an accountability report last year, specifying exactly what should be included in it. Regrettably, after consideration of the current report, the African Group found that it did not adequately respond to the Assembly’s requests. Moreover, the report did not present an accountable and comprehensive accountability system that could be approved and implemented in the Secretariat and throughout the Organization.



He went on to express the African Group’s concerns about other aspects of the report, including, its preparation and the fact that it did not follow the road map requested by Member States. He also had concerns about the definition of accountability, the perspectives of the Secretariat regarding implementation of the recommendations of oversight bodies, the selection and appointment of senior managers, the implementation of a results-based management framework, and the enterprise risk management and internal control framework. Yet, despite those concerns, the African Group would participate actively and constructively in the informal consultations on accountability and management-related issues.



SHIN BOONAM ( Republic of Korea ) said accountability was the most critical factor in enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of the Secretariat in order to meet the needs and requests of stakeholders. In that regard, he welcomed and supported the Secretary-General’s continuing efforts to develop an accountability system, including the present report, “Towards an accountability system in the United Nations Secretariat”. He also noted the significant and tangible progress made on that matter in recent years by establishing the Ethics Office, implementing a rigorous financial disclosure programme, and introducing a new internal justice system, among other measures.



He expressed concern that the overall culture in the secretariat had not shown much improvement in terms of accountability. He further emphasized the importance of a fundamental change in the way of working and thinking among the secretariat staff, reiterating the ACABQ’s point in its report, that without a change in the mindset of the staff, an accountability framework itself could not create a culture of accountability, and the measures in the Secretary-General’s report would have little effect. Quoting a Korean proverb, he said: “Every great thing starts from a small thing.” Thus, small measures such as keeping a preset schedule may not seem that important, but along with other small changes, they could have a large impact.



Regarding the Accountability Framework, he stressed the importance of human resources management and financial resources management, which he believed to be fundamental to strengthening an accountability system in the United Nations. As a way of strengthening accountability, he suggested that the current performance appraisal system be fundamentally reformed by introducing measures such as the compulsory distribution of performance appraisal ratings, in which the portion of each performance rating was preset. In the new system he was proposing, staff at all levels who did not meet the criteria should be forced to leave the Organization, regardless of their contractual type. “The Organization should no longer be a safety net for those who could not show competency,” he said. Additionally, salary should reflect differences in performance by redistributing a significant portion of salary according to performance.



As for financial resource management, he was of the view that the current biennium programme budget could not fully reflect the objectives of the Organization as set out in the strategic framework. In addition, the current system lacked a mechanism to allocate available resources from a mid-term and long-term perspective. He encouraged introduction of a new fiscal management mechanism, in which the allocation of financial resources would be closely related to and reflect the Organization’s objectives.



JOSEPH MELROSE ( United States ) said his country fully endorsed the principles of accountability, transparency and efficiency throughout the United Nations. It was imperative for the Organization to have strong control mechanisms and oversight capabilities. In that regard, the United States had been pleased that the Assembly endorsed the principles of results based management and enterprise risk management. It was time to move past the endorsement of principles towards supporting their development and implementation, especially when the Organization was facing extraordinary opportunities and challenges.



He said the United States appreciated the Secretary-General’s efforts to address the current weaknesses within the accountability system, but remained concerned that key components had not been fully developed, as noted by the ACABQ. It was critical to provide States with unbiased information on the effectiveness of United Nations activities. The Secretary-General himself had noted that among the missing elements were poorly defined long-term objectives; the lack of a strong link between broad strategic objectives and the objectives of operational staff; weak links between desired results and resource allocation; and a lack of strong programme evaluation. He looked forward to working with the Secretariat and other stakeholders in developing those elements and resolving other issues that might have been raised.



CRAIG LIM ( Singapore ) observed that, while the Secretary-General’s report had tried to address some of the issues of concern to Member States, unfortunately, “it does not go far enough.” The very definition of accountability set out in the report was far too limited. While recognizing that the obligation to deliver specific results was one component of accountability, it was “a little surprising” that the report did not see the merit of including the fundamental element of personal responsibility of staff members for decisions made, and actions taken, into that definition.



Greater emphasis needed to be made on creating the conditions for a culture of accountability and integrity in the United Nations, he said. That was something that could be further developed, since integrity defines “who we are as a people” and “what we are as an Organization”. Singapore was also concerned that the Secretary-General’s report did not adequately address the eleven specific topics spelled out in a General Assembly resolution that had called for “consultation with the respective oversight bodies”. While some consultation did take place, those could have been done in a far more comprehensive and inclusive manner.



Additionally, he felt that the secretariat’s explanation of the steps taken to address the failure of the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme fell short of expectations. Even though the General Assembly resolution had included in its agenda the item “Follow up to the recommendations on administrative management and internal oversight of the Independent Inquiry Committee into the Oil-for-Food Programme” since its sixtieth session, he said, four years had passed without a full accounting of the significant flaws in terms of internal monitoring, inspection and accountability that were identified in the Volcker report. In that respect, he reiterated his country’s call for its discussion by the General Assembly in an open setting.



AKIRA SUGIYAMA ( Japan ) said his delegation attached great importance to strengthening accountability in the Secretariat. The key to ensuring such accountability was a sincere effort on the part of the Secretariat to achieve results by administering itself appropriately under the exiting framework provided by the Charter, relevant resolutions of this and other legislative bodies, and the Organization’s rules and regulations. As such, Japan shared the view that it would be important for the United Nations to promote a cultural change, whereby staff understood that they would be held accountable for the quality and timely delivery of their work. In addition, supervisors should understand that they would be held accountable for effectively managing their staff to that end.



Highlighting his concerns about the Secretary-General’s report, he noted that the survey had been submitted late and that it lacked clarity on its resource requirements, especially towards the establishment of “additional structures”. It was very difficult for the Assembly to consider the Secretary-General’s proposals without knowing their financial implications. Japan would reiterate its request to the Secretariat to avoid a piecemeal approach, in that regard. He went on to regret that there had been insufficient consultation with the oversight bodies in the preparation of the report, and that issue had been highlighted by the ACABQ in its corresponding report.



Finally, he acknowledged the decision taken by the Secretariat on the resolution of the National Competitive Recruitment Examination, and requested its expeditious implementation. As a next step, Japan looked forward to the Secretary-General’s report on implementing the recommendations of the Joint Inspection Unit ( JIU ), aimed at improving both the process and the roster management of the exam. He added that Japan would participate actively in the coming round of negotiations on all those important issues.



RITA GRUNENFELDER ( Switzerland ) noted the difficulty of defining the concept of accountability, which was a nuanced one, and said the Secretary-General’s effort to clarify the concept and to explain its significance to the Organization was “laudable”. While Switzerland shared the Secretary-General’s opinion on many aspects discussed in his report, it believed that the report fell short of expectations. In its view, accountability began with the willingness to assume responsibility for the outcome of professional actions and to abide by regulations, rules and the highest ethical standards. The Organization’s senior leadership should demonstrate such a willingness, and should constantly strive to promote and strengthen it among staff. Regretfully, that was not mentioned in the report.



Further, she was not convinced by the Secretary-General’s attempt to define and show a relationship between the six components of accountability. Instead of trying to design a complex accountability structure, there might be merit in trying to reduce complexity, and to identify more clearly delineated frameworks for discussing and further developing individual issues, perhaps at different speed. She shared the ACABQ’s analysis that progress in implementing results based management and enterprise risk management should not depend on the establishment of new dedicated capacities, and was curious to know what steps the Secretary-General had taken to build on existing legislative mandates and to make them more mainstream. Also, implementing an enterprise resource planning system was importance, but not sufficient, to resolve accountability issues. Finally, the important of oversight bodies should have been reflected in a more comprehensive involvement of those bodies in the preparation of the report. The OIOS had provided a sound analysis on the Secretariat’s practice of sharing information, and Switzerland was confident that its review would greatly facilitate the Committee’s efforts to define the modalities of future practice.



INGRID BERLANGA ( Mexico ) said the interaction between all monitoring, inspection and inquiry services was essential in improving transparency within the Organization. Accordingly, the recommendations from all those bodies must be followed up and monitored. Mexico’s views on the report coincided with that summarized in the ACABQ report. Some questions were “not examined” in the report, including the Assembly’s request to define the concept itself. It was one of the main shortcomings of the Secretary-General’s accountability architecture. While it might be hard to set limits on such a broad notion, doing so was essential. Mexico would be open to discussing that question.



She said Mexico had expressed, on other occasions, the importance in linking use of resources with results. It was important to scrutinize the way the Secretary-General delegated authority for spending; she had been hoping for further clarity on that issue. Rule 6.1 in the United Nations Regulations and Rules Governing Programme Planning should be carefully examined, since it covered the issue of institutional accountability. Performance appraisal of senior officials through the Compact had not proven effective in evaluating their actual performance. Accountability was important in the context of the new administration of justice system. It was unclear what was being done regarding resources lost through fraud and mismanagement and whether those funds were being recovered. She regretted that the report was not as useful as hoped, but Mexico nevertheless continued to support the Secretariat’s efforts.



Wrapping up the discussion, Ms. KANE said the discussions had been very helpful. She had gotten a good sense that, while most delegations felt the report and the issues contained therein could have been further developed, most speakers seemed to believe the report had nevertheless contributed to overall consideration of the issue. “It was obvious that accountability was important to you, as it is to all of us,” she added.



Noting that several speakers had expressed concerns about the consultation process ahead of the report’s compilation and issuance, she explained that while that process might not have been clearly set out in the report, the Secretariat had indeed held “thorough consultations”. Indeed, the process had begun with the creation of a task force that had included the OIOS. While that oversight body had participated in two meetings, its representatives subsequently pulled out, saying the discussions could impinge on the independence of OIOS and its work. Representatives of the OIOS had participated thereafter on a consultant basis.



She went on to say that the Secretariat had also consulted with the funds and programmes of the United Nations family. In addition, the JIU had been specifically invited to an accountability workshop in November and had been sent a copy of the draft report. Other oversight bodies had also been invited to participate in that workshop and, while not all had attended, several had sent in their comments on the draft report.



Finally, she noted that most of the speakers today had raised concerns about the lack of an agreed definition of accountability in the Secretariat. Discussing that issue further would certainly be useful. Some agencies such as the United Nations Development Programme ( UNDP ) and the United Nations Population Fund had already adopted their own definitions, in cooperation and coordination with their respective Executive Boards. The Secretariat was looking at those definitions and was also looking at the definitions used by the World Bank and several European Union entities. While more work needed to be done to come up with a definition for the Secretariat, she believed that, with some “tweaking”, a decision could be reached.

Monday, January 11, 2010

U.S. Ignored U.N. Aid Agency's Fraud and Mismanagement


FOXNews.com

Monday , January 11, 2010

By George Russell

FC1

Between 2004 and 2008, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) showered more than $330 million on an obscure United Nations agency known as UNOPS — United Nations Office for Project Services — to carry out development aid projects in Afghanistan. What happened next wasn’t pretty.

Among other things, USAID apparently overlooked a growing stack of U.N. audits and investigations that pointed to fraud, mismanagement and lack of internal financial controls by UNOPS in Afghanistan, even as the U.S. agency continued to shovel money in UNOPS’s direction. So did other branches of the U.S. government, to the tune of an additional $100 million.

In a stunning number of cases, however, USAID also ignored its own oversight procedures and did not even insist that contracts with UNOPS enshrine the agency’s uncontested right to access financial records that would tell how the U.S. government money was spent. Consequently those records were never examined.

In other cases, it looked like legal loopholes were created to make sure UNOPS got to keep its financial records out of USAID’s reach.

Worse, the oversight disaster may still not be fixed—even as UNOPS, claiming that it has changed its ways, may get a bigger role in Afghanistan, financed with dollops of U.S. money, in the months and years ahead. .

U.S. government inspectors who did a 17-month study of the fiasco, however, have reported that they can’t fully assess whether the problems with UNOPS have been solved — partially due to a continuing lack of full cooperation on the part of UNOPS officials, who refused to let the inspectors question UNOPS managers thoroughly about the operations of the U.N. agency’s financial management system.

Along with refusing to allow the inspectors access to significant information about its financial management system, the study reveals that UNOPS had not even begun investigating some aspects of alleged fraud by its employees that has already been uncovered in Afghanistan, and, more importantly for future operations, still does not systematically review the accuracy of the data on its electronic books.

All of those distressing conclusions, and more, are contained in a dense, 68-page report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), an investigative arm of Congress that examines how U.S. federal public funds are spent, and suggests a few remedies for the administrative lapses it uncovers.

Click here to read the entire report

In the case of UNOPS, GAO has been remarkably discreet. Its report was presented on Nov. 19 to the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Investigations that originally commissioned it, then kept out of the public eye for another month.

The GAO findings only became public on Dec. 17, just in time to languish without much notice over the Christmas break. They were, however, hailed by UNOPS four days later, as the organization pledged “to continue to implement reforms that strengthen the organization’s management and financial controls.”

Both U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and the Obama administration have their own reasons to applaud UNOPS’s attitude, however much it may or may not be grounded in fact. Both have big plans for upping U.S. spending in Afghanistan via the U.N., as part of an expanded military and civilian effort that President Obama inaugurated on Dec. 1, with the announcement that 30,000 additional U.S. troops would go to Afghanistan.

Alongside the military buildup, Secretary-General Ban on Dec. 4 began to tout a “civilian surge” in Afghanistan that would include mammoth infusions of additional development aid, under U.N. supervision, which would likely point to an increased role for UNOPS.

As part of that increase the U.N.’s requested spending this year for its peacekeeping mission in Afghanistan, known as UNAMA, is nearly $242 million, making it one of the fastest-growing — and contentious — big-ticket items in the U.N.’s 2010 budget. The U.S. share of that total would be about $63 million. (The U.S. pays about 22 percent of regular U.N budgets, and about 26 percent of peacekeeping tallies.)

But far more money than that will likely be involved. On Jan. 28, for example, Ban and British Prime Minister Gordon Brown will host a major international conference on Afghanistan that will include a significant pitch for more development aid — much of which will likely also be filtered through U.N. agencies, including UNOPS.

All of which could result in hundreds of millions of dollars worth of contracts churning through UNOPS, a little-known U.N. agency based in Copenhagen, which is the world organization’s chief on-the-ground manager for development projects, as well as a provider of procurement, human resources management, and financial management, services both for the U.N. and for other governments and private organizations.

It is also another U.N. organization swathed in diplomatic immunity and secrecy that has been stained in a series of scandals and administrative lapses in past years. The fallout from those lapses is continuing.

Last April, for example, the Inspector General of USAID issued a separate report on $25 million worth of projects sub-contracted to UNOPS between 2003 and 2006 to build small-scale infrastructure projects throughout Afghanistan. It revealed, among other things, that $10 million of the money was spent on UNOPS work in Haiti, Sudan, Sri Lanka and Dubai; that some of the projects actually completed in Afghanistan were built shoddily or to the wrong specifications and were on the verge of falling apart; that UNOPS officials saw at least one of the projects as a “cash cow,” and that UNOPS officials stonewalled when U.S. inspectors tried to find out what happened.

According to the report, UNOPS also drew down $6.7 million worth of U.S. funds from a line of credit months after the project ended, with no apparent justification. One whistleblowing U.N. employee cited in the Inspector General’s report reported that the local director of UNOPS spent about $200,000 of U.S. money on renovating his guesthouse.

At the same time, the agency’s oversight was further hampered by the fact that its 36-nation supervisory Executive Board did not have direct access to the internal audit reports documenting UNOPS’s failings — just as the same Executive Board, which also supervises the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), did not have access to internal audit reports from the same period that pointed to UNDP violations of its own rules in North Korea.

(In September 2008, the GAO report notes, UNOPS rules were altered to give Executive Board members “limited access” to the audits, if formally requested. The same change went into effect for UNDP.)

U.S. prosecutors subsequently were unable to bring civil or criminal charges against anyone involved with misappropriation of funds at UNOPS, because those officials operate under U.N. diplomatic immunity. The USAID Inspector General, however, vowed to set collection agencies on UNOPS to retrieve some of the money. UNOPS has since reported on its own website that it “has reimbursed money owed to its clients as a result of errors or misuse, and will address any new issues if they come to light.”

Click here for the Inspector General's report

The U.S. funds involved in the $25 million scandal are not even part of the bigger ocean of cash examined in the just-released GAO report.

Instead, the document observes in a footnote that UNOPS pulled down $97.8 million in U.S. subcontracting work between 2004 and 2008, over and above the money it received to undertake projects directly.

The litany of management sins uncovered in the U.N.’s own internal audits of UNOPS are the major focus of GAO concern—along with the fact that most of the documentation of those lapses was unavailable to the U.S., even as it funneled huge sums to the U.N. agency.

Since the inception of U.N. peacekeeping in Afghanistan in 2002, the GAO report says, regularly scheduled U.N. internal audits and investigations discovered that UNOPS was spending money it did not have (2002); lacked “valid information” on some of its costs and did not have an “independently validated internal control network” (2004); had “recurring expenditures” beyond its budget, along with inadequate or non-existent supervision by managers (2006), and along with continuing cost overruns, had “deficiencies in managing project budgets and expenditures in the field” (2007)

Some of the undocumented information on costs and spending increased the cost of projects dramatically. The GAO report says that the price-tag on the biggest USAID project in Afghanistan, building secondary roads, increased by a factor of ten through a series of modifications and add-ons—without supporting documentation.

In addition, an external U.N. Board of Auditors report on UNOPS, published in June, 2008, noted “significant weaknesses in the accounting and internal control system,” “inadequate cost control of projects” and other failings. At the same time the auditors declared that UNOPS “has made good progress” in “addressing various weaknesses in its internal control accounting and imprest functions.”

Click here to see a timeline of audit reports against USAID projects carried out by UNOPS

Indeed, during much of that period, UNOPS was in such bad shape that the U.N. comptroller declared in 2005 that the agency was “in a precarious situation,” and it subsequently underwent a substantial management overhaul. On its website, UNOPS claims that the new management (headed by current executive director Jan Mattson) was in the forefront of identifying the organization’s failings.

Significantly, however, the GAO study says that as far as it can determine, UNOPS financial documentation systems are still not up to the task of discovering bad management or wrongdoing. “Without a system in place that can document timely, accurate, and complete information, management’s capacity to ensure effective internal audits is limited.”

The GAO inspectors say that UNOPS’s own director of internal oversight has said that “the accuracy and completeness of data entry remain a concern.” The inspectors added their own important observation that UNOPS management “does not know the extent to which data reliability is a problem because UNOPS has not sought any systematic check on data reliability.”

Nor did UNOPS management apparently want the GAO inspectors to find out certain things on their own. As part of their investigation, the inspectors prepared a questionnaire for UNOPS managers world wide, asking them to assess how well the UNOPS financial management system, known as Atlas, captured data and strengthened internal financial controls.

The report says that UNOPS top management demanded that the inspectors cut out “almost half” of the proposed survey questions, including ones the U.S. officials felt “were important” to discovering the capabilities of Atlas.

The failings found by the inspectors on the part of USAID itself in the UNOPS case are equally grave, starting with the inexplicable lack of concern by the agency in following its own rules regarding oversight.

In dealing with organizations like UNAPS, the report says, USAID can demand a right to audit financial documentation in any contract where it is the sole donor to a project, as it was in five of 11 of the major grants made to UNOPS during the 2004-2008 period. UNAID did not demand the inclusion of that right in the contracts, the report says.

Even when the aid agency is not the sole contributor, it can negotiate for the same rights, and in four cases chose not to. In three of the four cases, the only other contributor turned out to be UNOPS itself, often in token ways, like adding in-kind landscaping services. Top UNOPS officials told the GAO inspectors that the U.N. agency’s actions were “strange,” because UNOPS is not normally a donor to anything it works on.

Says the report: “They told us these in-kind contributions might have been made to avoid USAID’s regulations.”

When it came to recommendations arising from their work, the GAO inspectors confined themselves to generalities, including the tightening up of USAID procedures to demand audits when the agency’s contributions gave it the right to do so, better training of USAID officials in those rights, and creation of some kind of system to check that the audit rights were actually asked for. All of these were apparently embraced by the State Department, of which USAID is a part.

When it came to UNOPS, the inspectors didn’t say much — presumably because the U.N. agency is immune to strong medicine administered from outside its diplomatic immunity envelope.

Instead, the GAO officials vaguely urged that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton work with other member states to “support” UNOPS’s “continued management reforms,” and to “encourage UNOPS management to assess the effectiveness of the reform effort.”

On the first GAO suggestion, UNOPS on its website has said it “takes note of these comments, and is committed to further strengthening data quality, to completing investigative processes and to implementing necessary reforms.”

But then it added, on the point of assessing the effectiveness of its reforms, that “UNOPS believes reforms have already produced tangible results.” Among other things, the agency said, its external auditors had approved its accounts without qualifications, and UNOPS has been able to sign new operating agreements with various U.N. agencies, the European Commission and the World Bank.

As a result, the agencies revenues and new business have “almost doubled,” the agency reported.

With fresh gushers of cash about to pour into Afghanistan in the near future, those revenues could be on a path to skyrocket much further — regardless how much improvement is actually registered with the way that UNOPS handles the money under its care.

George Russell is executive editor of Fox News