Saturday, August 17, 2013
UN accredits NGO whose head is ‘glad to be labeled anti-Semitic’
A United Nations committee dedicated to Palestinians’ rights accredited a nongovernmental organization headed by the former prime minister of Malaysia, a controversial figure who has said he is “glad” to be called an anti-Semite, sparking protests by pro-Israel groups.
At a session in New York last week, the UN Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People officially granted accreditation to five civil society organizations, among them the Perdana Global Peace Foundation, which was founded by Mahathir Mohamad.
Mohamad, who served as Malaysia’s prime minister from 1981 until 2003, has repeatedly sparked controversy with his anti-Western and anti-Semitic comments. In a 2003 speech, he said that “the Jews rule the world by proxy” and get “others to fight and die for them.” During the same speech, he further stated, “They invented socialism, communism, human rights and democracy so that persecuting them would appear to be wrong so they may enjoy equal rights with others. With these, they have now gained control of the most powerful countries.”
Thursday, August 2, 2012
The missing millions of Kibera (Where did Bill Gates money went ? ) - Did UNDP told the truth about it ?
The mythical million comes from estimates built upon estimates that have spread over the years like Chinese whispers through the NGO community and, later, the internet. Paul Currion laid out how this works two years ago, in his essay "Lies, damned lies and you know the rest":
In the absence of actual data (such as an official census), NGO staff make a back-of-envelope estimate in order to plan their projects; a postgraduate visiting the NGO staff tweaks that estimate for his thesis research; a journalist interviews the researcher and includes the estimate in a newspaper article; a UN officer reads the article and copies the estimate into her report; a television station picks up the report and the estimate becomes the headline; NGO staff see the television report and update their original estimate accordingly. All statistical hell breaks loose, and the population of Kibera leaps ever higher.
Every actor at every stage has a motive for using the upper end of that initial estimate, rather than more conservative figures – planning, funding, visibility, and so on – but no single person is responsible for inflating the figure progressively further from reality.
Thursday, September 1, 2011
Hiding the Real Africa
Why NGOs prefer bad news
And now for some good news out of Africa. Poverty rates throughout the continent have been falling steadily and much faster than previously thought, according to the National Bureau of Economic Research. The death rate of children under five years of age is dropping, with “clear evidence of accelerating rates of decline,” according to The Lancet. Perhaps most encouragingly, Africa is “among the world’s most rapidly growing economic regions,” according to the McKinsey Quarterly.
Yet US journalism continues to portray a continent of unending horrors. Last June, for example, Time magazine published graphic pictures of a naked woman from Sierra Leone dying in childbirth. Not long after, CNN did a story about two young Kenyan boys whose family is so poor they are forced to work delivering goats to a slaughterhouse for less than a penny per goat. Reinforcing the sense of economic misery, between May and September 2010 the ten most-read US newspapers and magazines carried 245 articles mentioning poverty in Africa, but only five mentioning gross domestic product growth.
Reporters’ attraction to certain kinds of Africa stories has a lot to do with the frames of reference they arrive with. Nineteenth century New York Herald correspondent Henry M. Stanley wrote that he was prepared to find Zanzibar “populated by ignorant blacks, with great thick lips, whose general appearance might be compared to Du Chaillu’s gorillas.” Since the Biafran War, a cause célèbre in the West, helped give rise in the late 1960s to the new field of human rights, Western reporters have closely tracked issues like traditional female circumcision. In the 1980s, a famine in Ethiopia that, in fact, had as much to do with politics as with drought, set a pattern of stories about “starving Africans” that not only hasn’t been abandoned, but continues to grow: according to a 2004 study done by Steven S. Ross, then a Columbia journalism professor, between 1998 and 2002 the number of stories about famine in Africa tripled. In Kenya, where I was a Peace Corps volunteer in the late 1960s and where I returned to live four years ago, The New York Times description of post-election violence in 2007 as a manifestation of “atavistic” tribalism carried echoes of Stanley and other early Western visitors.
But the main reason for the continued dominance of such negative stereotypes, I have come to believe, may well be the influence of Western-based non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and international aid groups like United Nations agencies. These organizations understandably tend to focus not on what has been accomplished but on convincing people how much remains to be done. As a practical matter, they also need to attract funding. Together, these pressures create incentives to present as gloomy a picture of Africa as possible in order to keep attention and money flowing, and to enlist journalists in disseminating that picture.
Africans themselves readily concede that there continues to be terrible conflict and human suffering on the continent. But what’s lacking, say media observers like Sunny Bindra, a Kenyan management consultant, is context and breadth of coverage so that outsiders can see the continent whole—its potential and successes along with its very real challenges. “There are famines; they’re not made up,” Bindra says. “There are arrogant leaders. But most of the journalism that’s done doesn’t challenge anyone’s thinking.”
Over the past thirty years, NGOs have come to play an increasingly important role in aid to Africa. A major reason is that Western donors, worried about government corruption, have channelled more funds through them. In the mid-1970s, less than half a dozen NGOs (like the Red Cross or CARE) might operate in a typical African country, according to Nicolas van de Walle, a professor of government at Cornell, but now the same country will likely have 250.
This explosive NGO growth means increasing competition for funds. And according to the head of a large US-based NGO in Nairobi, “When you’re fundraising you have to prove there is a need. Children starving, mothers dying. If you’re not negative enough, you won’t get funding.” So fierce is the competition that many NGOs don’t want to hear good news. An official of an organization that provides data on Somalia’s food situation says that after reporting a bumper harvest last year, “I was told by several NGOs and UN agencies that the report was too positive.”
Rasna Warah, a Kenyan who worked for UN-Habitat before leaving to pursue a writing career, says that exaggerations of need were not uncommon among aid officials she encountered. “They wanted journalists to say ‘Wow.’ They want them to quote your report,” she says. “That means more money for the next report. It’s really as cynical as that.”
Western journalists, for their part, tend to be far too trusting of aid officials, according to veteran Dutch correspondent Linda Polman. In her book The Crisis Caravan, she cites as one example the willingness of journalists to be guided around NGO-run refugee camps without asking tough questions about possible corruption or the need for such facilities. She writes, “Aid organizations are businesses dressed up like Mother Teresa, but that’s not how reporters see them.”
Pushed and pulled by slashed budgets and increased demands, journalists are growing increasingly reliant on aid groups. Sometimes that involves not just information or a seat on a supply plane, but deep involvement in the entire journalistic process.
In an online essay written in 2009, Kimberly Abbott of the International Crisis Group discussed a 2005 Nightline program on Uganda that her NGO helped to produce and fund. It was hosted by actor Don Cheadle, the star of Hotel Rwanda. Nightline’s Ted Koppel explained in his introduction, as retold by Abbott: “Cheadle wanted his wife and daughters to get a sense of the kind of suffering that is so widespread in Africa. The International Crisis Group wanted publicity for what is happening in Uganda. And we, to put it bluntly, get to bring you a riveting story at a greatly reduced expense.” According to Abbott, “versions of such partnerships are happening now in print and broadcast newsrooms across the country, though many are reluctant to discuss them too openly.”
Daniel Dickinson, a former BBC reporter who is now a communications officer for the European Union in Nairobi, has seen the impact of technology and economics on reporting on Africa first-hand. “The big difference in the past five to ten years is the expansion of the Internet,” he says. “Journalists have got to feed these animals. Add to that the financial crash, and more and more internationals are taking the content we offer them.”
Ben Parker, co-founder and head of IRIN, a news agency that is part of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, admires Dickinson’s success. “He does stories and they’re picked up whole,” Parker says. IRIN itself can point to many similar successes in finding takers for its stories on aid projects. “The Western media won’t reprint us verbatim,” he says. “But some plagiarize.”
Lauren Gelfand, a correspondent for Jane’s Defence Weekly who is based in Nairobi, says most reporters she knows string for three or four news organizations to make ends meet, and can’t afford to do time-consuming stories. She saw the effect when she took a year off from journalism to work for Oxfam. “If reporters were going to cover a development story it had to be easy,” remembers Gelfand, noting that the simplest sell was a celebrity visit to an aid project.
Gelfand says that her Oxfam experience helped her to understand just how much attention ngos put on getting their story told. “All the talking points are carefully worked out…. It’s a huge bureaucracy and there are as many levels of control as in any government,” she says of Oxfam, adding that many NGOs are reluctant to cooperate with media unless they know they’ll be shown in a positive light.
To be fair to the NGOs, Gelfand says, “It’s easier to sell a famine than to effect real, common-sense policy change.” And, she says, she continues to believe that most aid workers do what they do because they want to make a difference. Nonetheless, “A lot of what Oxfam does is to sustain Oxfam.”
Stories featuring aid projects often rely on dubious numbers provided by the organizations. Take Kibera, a poor neighborhood in Nairobi. A Nexis search of major world publications found Kibera described as the “biggest” or “largest” slum in Africa at least thirty-four times in 2004; in the first ten months of 2010 the claim appeared eighty-three times. Many of those stories focused on the work of one of the estimated 6,000 or more local and international NGOs working there, and cited population figures that ranged as high as one million residents. Recently, however, the results of Kenya’s 2009 census were released: according to the official tally, Kibera has just 194,269 residents. In 2010, Rasna Warah wrote in the Daily Nation, a Kenyan paper, that while working for the Worldwatch Institute, an NGO, she had published inflated population estimates using UN-Habitat data, despite knowing there was no consensus on the numbers among her former colleagues at the organization. Sometime after 2004, she wrote, population estimates for Kibera started to rise, and “Before we knew it, the figure spread like a virus.” She added, “The inflated figures were not challenged, perhaps because they were useful to various actors…. They were particularly useful to NGOs, which used them to ‘shock’ charities and other do-gooders into donating more money to their projects in Kibera.”Questionable figures of another sort are to be found in reports on the United Nations Millennium Development Goals, a series of targets on poverty reduction and other measures of well-being. UN and NGO officials routinely describe Africa as failing to meet the goals, and the press routinely writes up this failure.
But some experts, among them Jan Vandemoortele, one of the architects of the MDGS, have expressed concern that the goals are being misused. He wrote in 2009 that the MDGS were intended as global targets, but have been improperly applied to individual countries and regions. “It is a real tragedy when respectable progress in Africa is reported as a failure by international organizations and external observers,” Vandemoortele wrote, voicing the suspicion that particular measurements have been selected “so as to present Africa as a failure, solely to gain support for a particular agenda, strategy, or argument.”
Nonetheless, when the UN met in September, The Associated Press quoted UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon as saying, “Many countries are falling short, especially in Africa,” while the Los Angeles Times quoted an Oxfam report as saying, “Unless an urgent rescue package is developed to accelerate fulfillment of all the MDGS, we are likely to witness the greatest collective failure in history.”
The consequences of skewed or incomplete reporting on Africa are not just a disservice to readers but also have the potential to influence policy. “The welfare model [of Africa] is still dominant on the Hill and in Hillary Clinton’s world,” according to van de Walle. Among corporate officials, says Catherine Duggan, an assistant professor at Harvard Business School, the perception is still that “Africa is where you put your money once you’ve made it somewhere else.” Moreover, such reporting is demoralizing to Africans working for change. Martin Dawes, a unicef regional chief of communication for West and Central Africa, says that when there is a disaster, journalists “come to us as aid workers but often don’t talk to the government, which is often what we’re working through. It means that the chances for Africans to show an engaged response is limited. They are written out of their own story.”
Even with shrinking resources, journalists can do better than this. For a start, they can stop depending so heavily, and uncritically, on aid organizations for statistics, subjects, stories, and sources. They can also educate themselves on how to find and interpret data available from independent sources. And they can actively seek out stories that deviate from existing story lines.
But in the end, it will probably take sustained economic progress to break the current mold. Sunny Bindra, the Kenyan management consultant, recalls that in the 1980s, “Japan got attention because it was whacking the US. It’s the same with India and China now.” Until that happens, a sick African woman in labor will continue to be treated as poverty porn, and most Africans will have to starve in order to make it onto the evening news.
This article was adapted from a paper (pdf) written for Harvard’s Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy.
Media perpetuates aid industry stereotypes about Africa
EASTAFRICAPRESS.NET
By Karen Rothmyer
Here are three stories culled from the February 17 editions of Kenya’s two largest newspapers, The Daily Nation and The Standard: “Neglect led to famine, say NGOs”; “NGO gives Sh20m for schools upgrade”; “North Rift leads in gender violence” (about an NGO report).What all these stories, and several more on the same day, have in common is that they were generated by one of Kenya’s (and Africa’s) biggest industries, the aid industry. Comprised of over 6,500 registered NGOs, as well as international organisations like UN agencies, Kenya’s aid groups are a major source of news in the form of press conferences, reports and project visits.
If you study such news carefully, as I’ve been doing since 2005, when I returned to Kenya after many years away, you begin to realize that it contains two recurring themes: One is that Kenya has terrible problems; the other is that the aid groups know what to do to solve them.
Local journalists play a key role in getting these messages out, both to the Kenyan public and to the world of donors beyond. Many have what strikes me as a healthier level of scepticism about the aid groups’ activities than their foreign journalistic counterparts. Nevertheless, the local press corps as a whole seems to me to be far too willing to accept aid officials’ statistics, story ideas and view of the world.
“Most journalists follow the frame created by the NGOs,” says a Kenyan journalism instructor who worked for several NGOs earlier in her career. “They are lazy when it comes to reporting. They want quick data and they report it very shallowly.”
The aid groups’ stated objectives are laudable: they want to eliminate the very real problems that exist on the continent. Understandably, in this context, they want to create a sense of urgency about dealing with them. As a practical matter, they also have to attract money. “When you’re fundraising you have to prove there is a need,” says the head of the Kenya office of one large NGO. “Children starving, mothers dying. If you’re not negative enough, you won’t get funding.”
Together, however, these two factors - a desire to call attention to the problems and a need for money to address them - can lead to exaggerated claims and, in turn, distorted news. “They wanted journalists to say ‘Wow,’ they want them to quote your report,” says Nation columnist Rasna Warah, speaking of former aid organisation colleagues. “That means more money for the next report. It’s really as cynical as that.”
Lauren Gelfand, a Nairobi-based correspondent for Jane’s Defence Weekly, got to see an NGO media operation first-hand during a year she took off from journalism to work for Oxfam. “All the talking points are carefully worked out,” she says. “It’s a huge bureaucracy and there are as many levels of control as in any government.”
Gelfand says she remains convinced that most aid workers do what they do because they want to make a difference. Nonetheless, she says, “A lot of what Oxfam does is to sustain Oxfam.”
One recent example of dubious data, and of the way in which it can contribute to distorted news, involves Nairobi’s Kibera neighbourhood, which for several years was increasingly referred to as the largest slum in Africa. One typical locally-written story in early 2010 about the work of a French NGO claimed a population of “between 700,000 and one million people.”
Visiting dignitaries from Barack Obama (when he was a Senator) to entertainers and UN officials have all trooped to Kibera, often accompanied by Kenya government officials who use the opportunity to plead for more assistance. A few months ago, however, the results of Kenya’s 2009 census were released. According to the Kenya National Bureau of Statisics, Kibera has 194,269 residents.
The Daily Nation, to its credit, given that it had done its share of “largest slum” stories, was the first to report the census data (with a slightly different tally), in a September article by Muchiri Karanja. Acidly referring to the “largest slum” characterization as “one big lie”, Karanja described it as a lie that “has been fed to all, from poor residents of the slum who have since grown accustomed to flashing camera lights from tourists taking shots of ‘the biggest slum in Africa’ to schoolchildren who cram the lie everyday in geography classes.”
Karanja’s article was followed by a column by Rasna Warah, who wrote that she was “among those people who have published inflated population estimates for Kibera without having any solid evidence to back up the figures.” This, she said, occurred while she was working for Worldwatch Institute, which got its data from UN-Habitat, where she had also worked.
She said that sometime after 2004, population estimates for Kibera started to rise, and “Before we knew it, the figure spread like a virus…However, even within UN Habitat, there was no consensus on what the actual figure might be.” She added, “The inflated figures were not challenged, perhaps because they were useful to various actors…They were particularly useful to NGOs, which used them to ‘shock’ charities and other do-gooders into donating more money to their projects in Kibera.”
Questionable figures of another sort are to be found in UN and NGO reports on the Millennium Development Goals, a series of UN targets on poverty reduction and other measures of well-being. UN officials have repeatedly described sub-Saharan Africa as failing miserably; for example, UN General Assembly President Srgjan Kerim said in 2007 that “in sub-Saharan Africa we may not achieve a single goal by 2015. This is indeed an emergency situation.”
Here in East Africa, a story in Business Daily in January 2010 quoted a World Bank analysis as saying that “additional aid required to attain the MDGs is somewhere between $40 billion and $60 billion a year.” It concluded that “developing countries are likely to register poor performance on several goals, especially the eradication of extreme poverty unless there is significant improvement in policies and funding in the remaining five-year window.”
Not everyone thinks the picture is quite so gloomy. Some experts, in fact, think that Africa is actually doing reasonably well. But they rarely get quoted in the press. William Easterly, an economist in the US, wrote in 2007 that school enrolments were growing faster in Africa than at a comparable period in Western development. Despite the educational progress, he noted, the continent won’t meet the relevant MDG goal: universal primary school enrolment by 2015.
Easterly has repeatedly raised the possibility that the MDGs were intentionally set in the way they were in order to satisfy the interests of aid groups, a suspicion shared by Jan Vandemoortele, one of the architects of the MDGs. Vandemoortele wrote in a 2009 paper in an academic journal that the MDGs were intended as global targets, but had been improperly applied to individual countries and regions.
“It is a real tragedy when respectable progress in Africa is reported as a failure by international organizations and external observers,” Vandemoortele wrote. He added, “It is unacceptable that targets are set and metrics are selected so as to present Africa as a failure, solely to gain support for a particular agenda, strategy or argument.”
Nonetheless, when the UN met last September to assess progress on the MDGs, most reporting and opinion - in East Africa as elsewhere--continued to reflect the framework of failure. The Associated Press quoted UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon as saying, “Many countries are falling short, especially in Africa.”
A Daily Nation editorial of September 16 glumly began: “The latest review of Kenya’s progress toward eliminating hunger and poverty in line with the global development goals makes depressing reading.” A widely-quoted Oxfam report stated that “Unless an urgent rescue package is developed to accelerate fulfillment of all the MDGs, we are likely to witness the greatest collective failure in history.”
If East African journalists are to be in a position to properly evaluate, and sometimes to challenge, the data and assertions of international NGOs and aid agencies, they need to adequately educate themselves about development issues. They also need to cultivate their own sources of data and statistics—think-tanks, academic experts and the like - rather than to rely so heavily on aid agencies. And they need to question descriptions of events that put aid groups at the centre of the action.
Some East African journalists are already doing just that. Salim Amin, the founder of Nairobi-based A24, a video agency inspired by Al Jazeera that packages and sells video news from around the continent, says that his company sometimes uses raw footage from NGOs. But, he says, the NGOs don’t have a say in how the footage will be used.
“If, for example, we want to do a general piece about water issues, maybe we will use material from an NGO that’s working on a water project,” he says. “But we will shape the story.” Amin adds, “A24 will still tell the negative stories, but it will tell them from an African perspective and with African context.”
And finally, East African journalists need to develop their own “lens” through which to view what is going on around them. Too many journalists fall into the easy habit of thinking that “development” equals “foreign-funded project”. But all over Africa, “development” is occurring that has nothing to do with NGOs or aid agencies.
One of the most interesting stories I’ve read in this regard was a piece in The Star (where I’m a consultant) two years ago, written by environment and health specialist John Muchangi. Following up on an invitation from an NGO (but paid for by his employer), Muchangi had gone to visit one of the “Millennium Villages”—a group of 14 sites that have received large amounts of financial and other assistance from western donors. After completing his interviews there, he decided to also check out a nearby village that had no Millennium Village funding but that he’d heard was making impressive progress. According to his report, he found that the second village was doing as well, and in some ways better, than the first, which he concluded was the result of enlightened local leadership.
East Africa needs more of that kind of reporting, and it has plenty of journalists capable of producing it.
Karen Rothmyer has worked for US publications ranging from The Wall St. Journal to a political weekly. This article is adapted from a paper she wrote while a fellow at the Shorenstein Centre on the Press, Politics and Public Policy at Harvard University.
Saturday, August 28, 2010
How Not to Win Hearts and Minds
In a U.N. survey, 52% of Afghans said foreign aid organizations 'are corrupt and are in the country just to get rich.'
By WILLIAM EASTERLY
In June, this newspaper broke the story of how Afghan officials were literally stuffing suitcases with aid money and flying out of the country. As a result, the House foreign aid appropriations subcommittee voted to cut $4.5 billion from the U.S. aid program to Afghanistan.
The situation in Afghanistan is not unique. Indeed, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has long been plagued by accusations of corruption and lack of transparency. But foreign aid bureaucracies traditionally have two contradictory mandates: 1) We must not give aid to corrupt recipients; and 2) We must spend the entire aid budget. No. 2 usually beats No. 1. Aid agencies put a glossy face on this outcome, which makes the victory of corruption even more likely.
An Afghan government report in 2008 (the "Kazimi report") detailed abundant corruption and suggested that aid inflows contributed to it. USAID's own report in 2009 said "corruption is now at an unprecedented scope in the country's history" and that the "tremendous size . . . [of] development assistance . . . increase[s] Afghanistan's vulnerability to corruption." According to Transparency International, Afghanistan went from the 42nd most corrupt country in the world in 2005 to the second most corrupt in 2009 (Somalia was first).
The 2009 USAID report noted that domestic Afghan anticorruption efforts fail because "often the officials and agencies that are supposed to be part of the solution to corruption are instead a critical part of the corruption syndrome." Yet it recommends providing more "resources" to these same corrupt anticorruption fighters.
The report correctly noted that part of the solution to corruption is "transparency and accountability." True, but USAID itself lacks transparency and accountability. The report fails to mention a single USAID program that has suffered from corruption.
I run a blog called Aid Watch together with Laura Freschi at New York University. When we contacted USAID after its 2009 report was released to ask how this could be so, we started informative discussions with the Afghan country desk. Unfortunately, the USAID Press Office quickly intervened, saying that any response had to come from them. Then they failed to provide any such response.
Others have had similar experiences. Till Bruckner, a field-based researcher on corruption in the Republic of Georgia, asked USAID for information on the budgets of the NGOs they funded there. When USAID refused, he filed a Freedom of Information Act request in May 2009. After months of stonewalling, USAID finally responded last month, with copies of NGO budgets—but much of the key information blacked out.Why such impunity? Discussion about corruption in aid has been abundant since then World Bank President James Wolfensohn broke a longstanding taboo on the subject in a speech condemning corruption in 1996. Yet the share of the most corrupt recipients in foreign aid is actually higher today than it was in 1996.
Aid recipients understand unconditional conditions all too well. Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai knows that USAID will have to spend its Afghanistan budget no matter what, so he makes some token commitment, does nothing, and indeed the aid keeps flowing.
I can certainly understand why USAID would prefer not to talk about this unsavory equilibrium. But the stakes are far higher in Afghanistan than in the usual aid recipient.
As the war there drags on, we have to ask the following question: Is U.S. aid winning hearts and minds? A U.N. survey taken in January found that 52% of Afghans believe aid organizations "are corrupt and are in the country just to get rich." I don't know much about waging a counterinsurgency, but it seems to me that we're getting very little for our money.
Mr. Easterly is a professor of economics at NYU and author of "The White Man's Burden: Why the West's Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good" (Penguin, 2007).
The accidental NGO and USAID transparency test
By Guest Blogger | Published August 18, 2010
The following post was written by Till Bruckner, PhD candidate at the University of Bristol and former Transparency International Georgia aid monitoring coordinator. An op-ed from Bill in Monday’s Wall Street Journal mentioned Till’s struggles with USAID; here Till provides the details.
The aid industry routinely pushes institutions in developing countries to become more transparent and accountable. But a slow and almost comically incomplete donor response to a request to see some specific project budgets sheds light on exactly how willing donors are to apply such “best practices” to themselves.
As I described in a previous Aid Watch blog post, I filed a Freedom of Information request with USAID after ten international NGOs working in the Republic of Georgia refused to publish their project budgets. After a painful, 14-month struggle, including failing to respond at all to my first three communications, USAID finally released a set of documents covering project budgets of 19 UN bodies, NGOs and private contractors.
The documents are disappointingly full of blacked-out non-information. The level of disclosure varies drastically from one document to the next. Some budgets are provided in full, while others appear as blacked-out row upon row. In three cases, USAID even withheld the identity of the contractor itself. USAID explained this inconsistency saying that it was legally required to contact each grantee to give it “the opportunity to address how the disclosure of their information could reasonably be expected to cause substantial competitive harm.”
I wondered why USAID is legally bound to follow its grantees’ wishes in deciding which information to withhold. Can the grantees of a US federal agency really compel that agency to keep the total amount disbursed, or even their very identities, secret? Why doesn’t USAID specify full disclosure as a grant condition? I have filed an appeal with USAID to address these questions, and will keep the readers of this blog updated.
Since according to USAID every piece of blacked-out information was withheld on request of the grantee, the budgets provide a fascinating glimpse into aid agencies’ willingness to open their books. If USAID blackouts do NOT correspond to NGO requests, I would be happy to correct the record.
Perhaps surprisingly, the United Nations showed the highest consistent commitment to transparency. The budgets of the two UN agencies funded by USAID are both reproduced in full.
UMCOR, Mercy Corps, and AIHA emerge as the most transparent NGOs. These charities apparently felt that they had nothing to hide, and did not request USAID to black out any of the information contained in their budgets.
In contrast, Save the Children apparently asked USAID to withhold all information related to salaries. As even the aggregate subtotals for international and national staff have been blacked out, concerns about the privacy of individual staff members cannot have been the sole concern driving the organization’s response. Still, the fact that all non-salary related budget lines remain visible put Save the Children in the middle ground in terms of NGO transparency.
CARE’s response is harder to interpret as USAID inexplicably sent only an aggregated “summary budget” that leaves little to conceal. What information exists shows that CARE did not object to the release of unit prices for supplementary food items, or of aggregated staff and operational support costs. In contrast, CARE appears to regard its “indirect cost rate” and “cost share” as confidential. To hide this information, USAID also had to black out the budget’s bottom line, thus leaving unclear how many taxpayer dollars were handed over in total.
The least transparent NGOs in this test are CNFA, World Vision, and Counterpart International. They apparently requested that USAID black out all information in their budgets except for the grand total. Apparently, these NGOs consider budget items such as “office furniture” (CNFA), “visibility items (t-shirts, caps, publications)” (World Vision) and “forklift expenses” (Counterpart) as confidential information whose release could cause them substantial competitive harm.
What does this transparency test tell us? First, USAID’s mechanism for responding to Freedom of Information requests desperately needs an overhaul. It took USAID 14 months to respond to a simple information request. Ironically, in terms of FOIA responsiveness, USAID is less transparent than public institutions in the Republic of Georgia, as recently assessed by a local watchdog organization. And we are still waiting to hear why USAID allows its own contractors to operate in secrecy whenever they wish. All of this places USAID in an awkward position as it recommends greater transparency and accountability to Georgia.
Second, NGOs have publicly committed themselves to transparency and accountability, but their actions show that their interpretations of what this entails in practice differ widely. For example, World Vision is a full member of theHumanitarian Accountability Partnership, but still asked USAID to hide all of its budget information apart from the bottom line. The Georgian country office of Mercy Corps had earlier refused to release its project budgets, but its headquarters apparently has no such reservations. Save the Children is willing to release indirect cost rates but refuses to divulge even aggregate salary information, while CARE appears more relaxed regarding human resource expenses even as it fiercely guards information on its indirect costs rates. Both USAID and the NGOs have too often violated the elementary principles of transparency.